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Foreword
While there is considerable interest and concern about the
use of robots in the workplace, most public awareness has
been shaped by the popular press in the last year or two. In a
context of serious concern about high levels of unemploy
ment, there has been a growing need for thorough investiga
tion and sound estimates and projections of the labor market
effects of robotics. Nowhere is that need greater than in
Michigan, where the auto industry is one of the nation's
heaviest users of industrial robots.
This study was initiated at the request of the Michigan
Occupational Information Coordinating Committee as an
examination of the human resource implications of robotics
for the State of Michigan. It was later expanded to focus on
the impact of robots on the entire U.S. In the course of the
study, many fears have appeared to be unfounded. There are
also many areas of legitimate concern to human resource
planners and policymakers who need to understand the im
plications of robotics for economic development, job crea
tion, job displacement, training and retraining.
Facts and observations presented in this study are the sole
responsibility of the authors. Their viewpoints do not
necessarily represent the position of the W. E. Upjohn
Institute for Employment Research.
Jack R. Woods
Acting Director
March 1983
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Executive Summary
The human resource implications of the so-called robotics
"revolution" are explored in this monograph. Specifically,
we estimate the job creation and job displacement potential
of industrial robots in the U.S. and Michigan by 1990. The
study is targeted for policy makers and social researchers,
particularly those involved in employment and training ques
tions associated with robotics.
Given the intense media hyperbole and the lack of hard in
formation about robots, it is necessary to develop a broader,
more objective perspective of the coming changes before
proceeding. First, we submit that robots are simply one more
piece of automated industrial equipment, part of the long
history of the automation of production. We also argue that
the introduction of any new manufacturing process
technology is evolutionary rather than revolutionary. There
are physical, financial and human constraints on the rate of
change in process technology as it is actually applied.
Second, there appears to be a significant lack of
understanding that one of the consequences of a growing,
dynamic economy, one that makes more goods and services
available to all of us through the productivity gains of its
workers, is job displacement or the elimination of some jobs
through technological change. Concomitantly, we know that
other jobs are being created, sometimes in the very same
firms that adopt new technologies and sometimes in
altogether new sectors of the economy.
In view of the level of interest in robots, it is surprising
that so few industries are actually using robots today and
IX

that the proven industrial applications are so limited. Vir
tually all robots can be found in manufacturing firms, with
the primary user being the auto industry. The proven in
dustrial applications of robots are welding, painting, and
various pick-and-place operations, while assembly tasks hold
promise for the future.
We estimate that sales of robots by U.S. producers in 1982
approximated or slightly exceeded the 1981 sales level of
$150 million or 2,100 units. By the end of 1982 that implies a
total of 6,800 to 7,000 robots were operating in U.S. fac
tories. We also estimate that employment in U.S. robot
manufacturing today is roughly 2,000 workers nationwide.
This should make it clear that most of the employment im
pacts of robotics are in the future.
We expect strong growth in the utilization of industrial
robots in the decade of the 1980s. By 1990 the total robot
population in the U.S. will range from a minimum of 50,000
to a maximum of 100,000 units. Given our estimate of the
year-end 1982 population of about 7,000 units, that implies
an average annual growth rate of between 30 and 40 percent
for the eight years of the forecast period, or roughly a sevento fourteenfold increase in the total population of robots.
In terms of gross displacement (the elimination of job
tasks rather than actual layoffs of workers) we estimate that
robots in the U.S. will eliminate between 100,000 and
200,000 jobs by 1990, with roughly one-fourth of that total
in the auto industry. In relative terms, job displacement rates
due to robots will not be a general problem before 1990 in
the U.S., although there will be particular areas that will be
significantly affected. Chief among these is the auto industry
where from 6 to 11 percent of all operatives and laborers will
be displaced by 1990. The results are particularly striking in
occupations such as painting and welding for which today's
robots are so well adapted. We project that 15 to 20 percent

of auto welders and 27 to 37 percent of
will be displaced. Geographically, states
especially the southeastern quadrant
dependence on autos, will suffer greater
other states or regions.

auto painters jobs
such as Michigan,
with its heavy
displacement than

We do not believe that this job displacement will lead to
significant job loss among the currently employed, however.
Even in the auto industry, voluntary turnover rates
historically have been sufficient to handle the reduction in
force that might be required, and the new GM-UAW agree
ment appears to provide adequate job security measures.
However, new labor market entrants may find more and
more factory gates closed. Therefore, if there is an increase
in unemployment as a result of the spread of robotics
technology, we fear the burden will fall on the less experienc
ed, less well educated part of our labor force.
In terms of job creation, we foresee the direct creation of
about 32,000 to 64,000 jobs in the U.S. by 1990 in four
broad areas: robot manufacturing, direct suppliers to robot
manufacturers, robot systems engineering, and corporate
users. The largest single occupational group of jobs created
by robotics will be robotics technicians those persons with
the training or experience to test, program, install,
troubleshoot, or maintain industrial robots. The next most
important occupational group is graduate engineers. These
will be mostly electrical and mechanical engineers. Together,
engineers and technicians account for over one-half of the
jobs created.
We anticipate that most robotics technicians will be train
ed in community college programs of two years duration.
The exception is in the auto industry where this requirement
will continue to be met through retraining existing members
of the UAW Skilled Trades Council without substantial out
side hiring. The extent to which other industries will follow a
XI

retraining strategy is unknown today. There does not appear
to be a supply problem for robotics technicians, as the com
munity college system gives every indication that they will be
ready and willing to train whatever numbers are needed. In
fact, our current concern is that they may, in some instances,
be increasing the supply too rapidly.
The supply of engineers may be more of a problem
because there is already a clear shortage of engineers nation
wide, so we start from a deficit position. In addition, we face
the challenge of other likely engineering demand increases as
well as the historical instability of engineering enrollments.
Thus it is quite likely that a shortage of engineers could com
promise the expansion of robotics technology.
The most remarkable thing about the job displacement
and job creation impacts of industrial robots is the skill-twist
that emerges so clearly when the jobs eliminated are com
pared to the jobs created. The jobs eliminated are semi
skilled or unskilled, while the jobs created require significant
technical background. We submit that this is the true mean
ing of the so-called robotics revolution.
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"The Robots are Coming"
Introduction
In the past year or so there have been cover stories or
special reports about robots in Time, Newsweek, Fortune,
Business Week, and The Wall Street Journal, among others.
Indeed, the existence of a robot "revolution" in our fac
tories appears to be treated as a fact in the popular media.
Yet there is surprisingly little information available about the
possible social and economic implications of robots. How
many robots are toiling in our factories today? Which jobs
and how many will be done by robots that were once done by
human workers? What new jobs and how many will be
created by robots? In such an information vacuum it is easy
to exaggerate or to misunderstand the few facts that are
available; possible even to inadvertently mislead
policymakers and the general public as to the impact of
robots.
A recent study by Pat Choate warns of the imminent
robotization of American factories. He says "the speed and
force of this change will be awesome." (Choate, p. 13) He
concludes, "As the economy robotizes and domestic jobs are
lost to foreign production, 10 million to 15 million manufac
turing workers and a similar number of service workers like
ly will be displaced from their existing jobs. Much of this
l
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displacement will occur in the mid- to late 1980s." (Choate,
p. 2) Yet nowhere in the study does Choate really say how
many jobs will be specifically lost to robots.
On the other hand, Cetron and O'Toole, in their publica
tions on the jobs of tomorrow, predict that millions of new
jobs will be created by these same robots. According to
them, "there will be as many as 1.5 million robotics techni
cians on the job in the U.S. alone by 1990. ..." (Cetron and
O'Toole, 1982a, p. 12 and 1982b, p. 259) These technicians
will be needed for maintenance of robots for the most part.
In a recent issue of Newsweek, which highlighted the growth
industries and jobs of the future, the work of Cetron and
O'Toole and others was referenced. That article included an
estimate of total employment in industrial robot production
in 1990 of 800,000. ("Growth Industries of the Future," p.
83) If these numbers are believable, then over 2 million U.S.
workers will be building or maintaining robots by 1990. At
the same time, millions of other workers could be displaced
by those robots.
Policymakers, lacking adequate information, must make
do with whatever is available. Under these circumstances,
even the Secretary of Labor can be misled. In a speech to the
Productivity Advisory Committee, Secretary Donovan said,
". . .there will be a major shift from production-line
workers to versatile workers able to program, repair, and
service the array of robots on the factory floor. In fact, by
1990, half of the workers in any factory may well be
engineers and technicians and other white collar specialists,
rather than the current blue collar workers." (emphasis add
ed)
This small sampling of currently available hyperbole
about industrial robots contrasts sharply with the facts, in
our judgment. The Robot Institute of America, the industry
trade association of robot manufacturers and users of
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robots, predicts that there will be 75,000 to 100,000 robots in
U.S. factories by 1990. (Robot Institute of America, p. 30)
Indeed, even the most optimistic robot industry experts
foresee no more than 150,000 robots by 1990. In interviews
that we conducted, robot manufacturers were certainly en
thusiastic about the growth prospects for their industry, but
they deplored the "off-the-wall" predictions appearing in
the popular media.
In any case, the application of as many as 150,000 in
dustrial robots will not support cataclysmic employment im
pacts, either in terms of job creation or job displacement. It
is not reasonable to think that 1.5 million technicians are
needed to maintain 150,000 robots, nor is it reasonable to
suppose that 150,000 robots will displace millions of
workers. Perhaps it makes interesting reading to claim that
by 1990 employment in robot manufacturing will approx
imate 800,000 people. But such a figure would surpass cur
rent U.S. employment in the motor vehicle industry. Even
more startling, a figure of 1.5 million robotics technicians by
1990 would surpass current U.S. employment of all engineer
ing and science technicians. While these and other wild
claims about the impacts of robots may attract considerable
media attention, they do not square with the facts, as we
shall demonstrate in this monograph.
We agree that the robots are coming, but the near term
employment impacts will not be overwhelming by any
means. The impact of robots will be felt gradually and
cumulatively through the years, an evolutionary rather than
a revolutionary process. While these statements may not
make headlines, we believe they can be shown to be accurate.
In our opinion, the recent intense media attention on
robotics may have seriously confused the issues and the
policymakers.
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Scope and Purpose of the Study
This monograph will explore one aspect of the evolution
of technology, the application of industrial robots to the
manufacturing process. We focus on the human resource im
plications of the industrial utilization of robotics technology
rather than on the technology itself. More specifically, we
estimate the job creation and job displacement potential of
industrial robots in the U.S. by 1990. We also derive
estimates of the impacts of robotics on one state in the na
tion, the State of Michigan.
Robotics technology is important to Michigan for at least
two major reasons. First, Michigan has traditionally relied
on the "metalbending" business for a large share of its
manufacturing exports. In particular, the dependence of the
Michigan economy on auto and auto-related manufacturing
is well-documented. This focus has led to a major concentra
tion on manufacturing process technology as well. Thus
Michigan already has a very substantial commitment to
manufacturing and to manufacturing process technology.
Second, in 1981, Governor Milliken designated robotics
technology as the highest priority in the drive to rebuild the
Michigan economy with a high technology base. (Milliken,
1981a, pp. 14-15; Milliken, 1981b, p. 13) Of course, the
established stake in manufacturing process technology had a
role in the selection. So did the circumstance that the auto in
dustry, upon which Michigan has depended for so long, is
the leader in the application of industrial robots to the
manufacturing process. It was fairly obvious that industrial
robots constituted a threat to the Michigan employment
base. It was also obvious that the domestic auto industry had
been facing intense competitive pressure from the Japanese,
and that part of the Japanese cost advantage was emanating
from their superior productivity. This in turn could be at
tributed to the Japanese use of industrial robots, among
other factors.
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In the face of this situation, the Governor's High
Technology Task Force elected to try to make Michigan a
world class center of excellence in manufacturing process
technology, including but not limited to robotics technology.
The centerpiece of this effort has become the development of
the Industrial Technology Institute as an independent non
profit corporation designed (1) to foster basic and applied
research in manufacturing process technology, including the
social and economic implications thereof, and (2) to provide
practical assistance to Michigan manufacturers in both
adopting and producing new manufacturing process
technology. (Industrial Technology Institute, p. ii)
Because of the various initiatives of the State of Michigan
and the belief that robotics technology might significantly
affect the state's economy, the Michigan Occupational In
formation Coordinating Committee (MOICC) asked the W.
E. Upjohn Institute to look at the labor market implications
of robotics in order to provide a base upon which human
resource planning could proceed. The present monograph
contains much of the information reported to MOICC in the
Michigan study, but the major focus is on the national
estimates. Thus, we regard the present volume as an exten
sion of the earlier work.
This study is specifically targeted for policymakers and
social researchers, particularly those involved in employment
and training questions associated with robotics. No prior
knowledge of industrial robots is assumed or needed.
Technical questions about industrial robots are discussed on
ly to the extent necessary.
There are precious little hard data about industrial robots
today. Our data were gathered through published sources
and through interviews with robot manufacturers, corporate
users of robots, and other experts. While some judgment was
undeniably necessary, we attempted to maintain objectivity
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throughout our efforts. Our methodology and judgments are
explicitly stated in the study. This reflects our hope that this
study will lead to other efforts to improve the understanding
of the social and economic impacts of industrial robots.
A consistent framework is utilized in the study to evaluate
the social and economic implications of industrial robots,
particularly the job creation and job displacement caused by
industrial robots. That means, for instance, that our projec
tions of the population of robots in 1990 are consistent with
our estimates of job displacement and job creation in that
same year. Actually, we provide a range for the estimates
because of the uncertainties involved, but the point is that
the projections are consistent and comparable. This is very
helpful in avoiding unrealistic or exaggerated conclusions.
The outline of the study is as follows. In chapter 2 we pre
sent a selective review of other forecasts and then our
forecast of the U.S. robot population in 1990. The chapter
concludes with the derivation of the 1990 projected Michigan
robot population. In chapter 3 we discuss the jobs to be
eliminated by the robot population projected in chapter 2.
That includes not only the number of jobs involved but also
the specific occupations. In addition to this examination of
job displacement, there is also a discussion of the possible
unemployment impacts of robots. Chapter 4 is organized
similarly but discusses the jobs that will be created as a result
of industrial robots. In both chapters, the focus is on the
United States and the State of Michigan. The conclusions of
the study are presented in chapter 5.
Given the current lack of information about industrial
robots, an annotated bibliography is also provided as part of
the study. It is not necessarily complete, nor does it include
the popular news magazines or many of the technical jour
nals. However, it is, to the best of our knowledge, the first
compilation of an annotated research bibliography on the
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social and economic impacts of industrial robots. We hope
the interested reader can use the annotations to identify
items of interest; they cover a broad range, from the highly
technical and mathematical economic literature of
technological change to simple descriptions of robot
characteristics.
In this introduction, the basic facts of robots are discussed
first: What is a robot? What work can a robot do? Where are
they currently being used? Then the place of robots in pro
duction technology is assessed. Since robots are new
technology, we discuss the development of two other related
technologies, digital computers and numerically controlled
machine tools. Next some historical antecedents, including
the automation scare of the early 1960s, are considered.
These suggested analogies will hopefully lead to some com
mon ground upon which to develop a more dispassionate
view of today's new technology industrial robots. Finally,
we conclude chapter 1 with a discussion of a major study
which has examined the job displacement effects of robots in
great detail: the Carnegie-Mellon study. We believe misinter
pretation of that study is responsible for some of the
misunderstanding about industrial robots in the popular
media.

What is a Robot?
Complete data on current installations of robots in the
U.S. are not available. In part, that can be accounted for by
confusion in defining exactly what constitutes a robot. A
very broad definition originated with the Japan Industrial
Robot Association, while the narrower definition used
throughout this study originated with the Robot Institute of
America (RIA) in 1979. The RIA definition was adopted by
the llth International Symposium of Industrial Robots held
in Tokyo, Japan in October 1981. However, it should be
understood that international comparisons are still
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treacherous, and RIA and others have had to reevaluate the
U.S. robot population. There is still not total agreement
about U.S. installations of industrial robots and no one can
be certain exactly how many robots there are in the U.S. to
day.
The official RIA definition, now accepted internationally,
is as follows:
A robot is a reprogrammable multifunctional
manipulator designed to move material, parts,
tools, or other specialized devices through variable
programmed motions for the performance of a
variety of tasks. (Robot Institute of America, p. 1)
The key to this definition is that a robot is a reprogram
mable, multifunctional manipulator. A robot can perform
the same task on identical workpieces repetitively; it can per
form different tasks on the same workpiece; or it can be
reprogrammed to perform entirely new tasks.
Unlike R2D2 and C3PO of the movie Star Wars, however,
robots of today are essentially "dumb machines." They are
generally immobile, they usually lack any visual or tactile
sensory perception, and they cannot adapt to their environ
ment in any way whatsoever. Generally they are no faster
than human workers, but they are tireless. In layman's
terms, that means a robot can reproduce a specific range of
motions for which it has been programmed, but it does not
know if it is really holding the part it is supposed to be or if
the work was done correctly. Because of the robot's limita
tions, it must be carefully interfaced with other equipment
using mechanical and/or electrical switches to prevent
disasters, and procedures must be established to verify the
performance of the robot.
Essentially, then, robots are stationary machines with a
manipulator arm that can perform motions repetitively and
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tirelessly. Unless the workpiece arrives at the exact location
for which the arm is programmed, however, the robot will
fail. If the workpiece is not of the size expected, or is
oriented in the wrong position, the robot will fail. The bot
tom line is that today's robot can only operate in a carefully
structured and oriented world. Furthermore, although the
literature makes much of the reprogrammability of robots,
relatively few robots today are truly reprogrammed. Minor
alterations may be made in the path of the manipulator of a
welding robot, but most of today's robots perform the same
program over and over and over again.
RIA's 1981 survey reports 4,700 robots in the U.S. by
functional application area. (Robot Institute of America, p.
3) By the end of 1982 we estimate that 6,800 to 7,000 robots
were operating in U.S. factories. This should make it clear
that most of the employment impacts to be discussed are in
the future. The growth in application of industrial robots
and the implications of that growth both have to be pro
jected because of the very limited empirical base to date.
Robots perform a great variety of tasks today, but most
are simple pick-and-place maneuvers such as loading or
unloading machines, palletizing, etc. A common sequence
might be as follows: the robot picks up the workpiece at a
predetermined location, reorients it, places it in a machine
tool for processing, removes it after processing, reorients it
once again, places the item at a second predetermined loca
tion and returns to the beginning. There are also
sophisticated welding robots in which the manipulator (arm)
can be programmed to follow a continuous path through
space instead of simply going to various predetermined
points. Control of the entire path of the arm also facilitates
spray painting or application of other finishes.
In the auto industry, welding applications of robotics
dominate today because auto production is particularly

10

"The Robots are Coming"

amenable to spot welding robots. There are only a limited
variety of auto bodies, the assembly line can pre-position the
parts precisely, and the environment can be perfectly
organized because the nature of the work does not change.
In short, it is a dull, repetitive, hazardous task that is ideally
suited to today's robots. For these reasons, automakers are
robotizing assembly line welding operations as normal
retooling is done.
There are also pilot applications of robots for assembly
tasks. However, assembly is generally a very complex task
for today's "dumb" robots that cannot tell when the task is
done correctly and must operate in a perfectly oriented and
organized environment. Suffice it to say here that assembly
robots are viewed as the number one growth application of
the future. There are considerable ongoing research and
development efforts in this area, but presently robots cannot
perform most assembly tasks with consistency in an in
dustrial environment at a reasonable cost. The trade
literature implies that all of the problems will be solved very
soon, and assembly robots will shortly thereafter proliferate
in factories all over the world. Others are not so certain.
In sum, the proven applications of robots today are
welding, painting, and various pick-and-place operations,
while assembly tasks hold promise for the future. Given all
of the media attention to robots, it is surprising that there are
so few actually in operation. Part of the reason is to be
found in the limited industrial applications perfected so far.
For a more thorough technical (yet accessible) discussion of
robot applications and capabilities, the interested reader
should consult the book listed in the bibliography by Joseph
L. Engelberger, generally acknowledged as the father of
robotics.
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Robots in the Productive Process
The auto industry is the primary user of robots today. In
fact, the auto industry pioneered many of the current robot
applications and continues considerable research and
development efforts in the industrial application of robots.
Virtually all robots today are utilized in manufacturing
firms, and the bulk are located in what might loosely be call
ed metalcutting or metalbending industries (sometimes refer
red to as the metalworking sector fabricated metal pro
ducts, machinery, transportation equipment) and, to a lesser
extent, in instruments and related products. Again, the sur
prise is that so few industries are actually using robots, but it
is also true that these industries are particularly concentrated
in the five Great Lakes States.
Robots should be viewed as another form of automated
equipment. Generally, we can think of two extremes: custom
production or dedicated automation. In custom production,
general purpose machines are usually hand operated by skill
ed workers to produce a single item or small lots of that item.
Capital equipment costs may be low but total unit costs are
high because set-up time can be considerable, individual
machining can be a demanding and time-consuming task,
and all of the costs must be spread over a very small number
of units produced. At the other extreme stands dedicated (or
hard) automation, where the initial fixed capital investment
can be quite high but total unit costs are typically very low
because the automation of production increases speed and
insures constant quality. The highly specialized equipment
(dedicated automation) is set up once and thereafter produc
tion of a single product can flow continuously.
Robots are not identified with either of these extremes.
Set-up time for a robot exceeds that of a human operator in
custom production, and the speed of a robot is no match for
dedicated automated equipment. Instead, robots are a com-
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promise between these two extremes in terms of cost, flex
ibility and capability. The fixed capital costs of a robot in
stallation exceed that for custom production but are less than
dedicated automation; total unit costs are likewise between
the two extremes. In terms of capability, robots are no match
for the subtle skills of a precision machinist, nor can a robot
repeat a single task as perfectly as highly specialized
automated equipment.
In terms of flexibility, the robot once again is no match for
a skilled human operator that can adjust a workpiece, cor
rect a minor flaw, and carefully check each and every piece
as it is produced. On the other hand, the robot can do dif
ferent tasks (if it is preprogrammed for those tasks), unlike
dedicated automation which is capable of producing a single
product only. Specialized hard automation sometimes must
be scrapped when the product is changed, whereas in theory
the robot can be reprogrammed to perform a new task at any
time.
Despite the fact that robots represent a compromise be
tween the extremes of custom production and dedicated
automation in terms of cost, capability and flexibility,
robots today are being applied primarily in mass production
facilities where the human worker or the type of work itself
already limits the speed of the overall facility. Thus they are
serving primarily as a less expensive alternative to dedicated
automation rather than being applied to automate batch pro
duction facilities. The robot, once installed, appears to be
just an extension of the dedicated automation.
Frequently, one robot that operates alone in the sense that
it is not interfaced with other robots but only with the plant
equipment which it services is termed a stand-alone unit or
robot. In this lexicon, a robot system, then, is simply two or
more robots that are integrated with each other and the plant
equipment as necessary. Neither stand-alone robots nor
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robot systems require central computer control over the en
tire operation, although sufficient limit switches are needed.
Stand-alone robot installations dominate today and will con
tinue to do so, at least through the mid-1980s; but robot
systems will likely become more important later in the
decade.
Some experts think that the greatest potential for robots in
the future is the automation of small batch production
facilities. (Ayres and Miller, 1981-82, p. 42) This encom
passes the ability to reduce batch sizes in production that
now require mass production or very large batch facilities
(i.e., dedicated automation). The concept appears to pro
mise a capability of production of a family of parts or pro
ducts as the need arises. 1 Such systems are usually called flex
ible manufacturing systems, but there is no universally ac
cepted definition. It is unclear how the dedicated machinery
for fabrication of manufactured articles would be designed
for these new systems, but computer control appears para
mount because the automation would require off-line pro
gramming of robots and possibly other plant equipment to
switch from batch to batch. Ultimately, the individual flexi
ble manufacturing systems would be linked together and lead
to the completely automated factory, what some people ap
parently mean by the term "factory of the future." 2
However, flexible manufacturing systems will not
dominate immediately and the completely automated factory
is even farther in the future. Bela Gold, an economist at Case
Western Reserve who has studied technological change for
over 25 years, stresses the many human and economic prob1. The forerunners of these systems are machining centers in which one or more robots ser
vice various numerically controlled machine tools to produce precision-cut metal parts.
Such machining centers are available today.
2. The terms factory of the future, flexible manufacturing systems and others are en
countered frequently in the popular media and trade literature, but they have no consensus
definitions at this point.
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lems in moving toward the factory of the future. (Gold,
1981a, pp. 30-32, pp. 37-38; and Gold, 1979, pp. 298-302,
310-314) But there are also numerous technical problems.
Computer memory systems today are quickly exhausted in
controlling even a small manufacturing cell, let alone an en
tire factory. (Albus, pp. 65-67; Alexander, p. 145; and
Wisnosky, p. 22) The integration of individual automated
systems in factories involves very complex problems of coor
dination and transfer. Finally, among the technical problems
in robots we note that there are no universal grippers, and
off-line programming has not yet been perfected. (Gevarter,
p. 37) Today's continuous path robots, for the most part, are
"taught" their work task by physically moving the
manipulator through the desired sequence of motions.
Our study is focused on the development and introduction
of industrial robots and robot systems in manufacturing in
dustries by 1990. Flexible manufacturing systems, the fac
tory of the future, etc., are beyond the scope of the study
because their impacts lie beyond 1990, except on an ex
perimental basis. We simply do not find that this technology
is sufficiently close to routine implementation to make ac
curate predictions of its extent or its impact at this time.

Technological Analogies
Since the robot industry is very young today but does have
a bright future, it is useful to compare it to other analagous
technologies. Such analogies do not prove anything, but they
can provide a perspective with which to assess the likely
development and diffusion of industrial robots. We briefly
review the development of digital computers, certainly one
of the most significant technologies of several decades, and
numerically controlled machine tools, the most closely
related capital equipment to industrial robots.
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Before beginning, an important distinction is needed be
tween product technology and process technology. As the
names imply, product technology is the specific technology
that is embedded in a final product, such as calculators or
TV's, whereas process technology is the technology that is
embedded in the capital equipment that makes the final pro
ducts. Robots are definitely process technology and will like
ly remain so in the foreseeable future. We do not see an early
development of an extensive home market for robots. This
distinction is important because there is ample evidence that
new product technology tends to diffuse more rapidly than
new process technology. (Gold, 1979, pp. 183-184;
Mansfield, 1971b, pp. 77 and 84; and Sahal, p. 312)
The growth of digital computers from 1961 to 1979 is
presented in table 1-1. The year 1961 was selected because
that was the first year in which shipments of computers ex
ceeded 2,000 units, roughly the position in which the robot
industry finds itself today. The annual percentage increase in
the total population of digital computers averaged 26 percent
throughout the 19-year period. There were only three years
in which annual shipments declined from the prior year level:
1965, 1967, and 1975. Not surprisingly, relative growth was
slightly higher in the earlier years when the total population
of computers was smaller, but even in the most recent
10-year period, 1969-1979, the annual growth in the popula
tion of computers approximated 24 percent.
What does the growth of computers suggest for the growth
of industrial robots, if anything? Digital computers can be
classified as process technology in that the computer is not a
direct part of the final product (microcomputers for the
home market are excluded from the data). Rather, the com
puter provides information processing cost accounting,
recordkeeping, etc. that in turn supports the production of
a final product. The revelation is that computers, widely
heralded as the most significant technological innovation of
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the 1960s and 1970s, expanded at a growth rate of about 25
percent. Yet some are implying vastly higher growth rates for
industrial robots.

Table 1-1
Growth in Digital Computers in the U.S., 1961-1979

Year

Annual
shipments
(thousands)

Total
digital
computers
(thousands)

Percentage
increase in
total
population

1961
1962
1963
1964
1965

2.2
2.3
3.0
5.3
5.0

7.6
9.9
12.9
18.2
23.2

30.3
30.3
41.1
27.5

1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

7.9
5.9
9.5
10.3
11.5

31.1
37.0
46.5
56.8
68.3

34.1
19.0
25.7
22.2
20.2

1971
1972
1973
1974
1975

14.9
20.8
29.3
37.9
37.4

83.2
104.0
133.3
171.2
208.6

21.8
25.0
28.2
28.4
21.8

1976
1977
1978
1979

45.0
68.7
82.1
87.0

253.6
322.3
404.4
491.4

21.6
27.1
25.5
21.5

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Productivity and the
Economy: A Chartbook, Bulletin 2084, October 1981, p. 100.

There are important differences between computers and
robots that must be mentioned. It was realized almost from
the beginning that computers were widely applicable in both
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business and government, but robots have only limited ap
plications in the manufacturing sector today. An individual
firm can potentially use many more robots than computers;
however, robots are directly applied to the firm's production
technique. This necessitates careful design, application and
integration with the existing production process, while com
puters are really an adjunct to the production process. There
are obviously many differences between computers and
robots that make comparisons hazardous, but the fact re
mains that the growth of the most significant recent innova
tion in process technology spread or diffused at a rate of
about 25 percent annually.
The growth of numerically controlled machine tools is ex
amined because they are more closely related to industrial
robots. In fact, robots themselves can be regarded as
machine tools. There is also an interesting parallel to
robotics technology in the batch production mode. As with
robots, numerically controlled machine tools were billed as
capable of bringing mass production cost levels to batch pro
duction processes because of their great flexibility through
reprogramming.
Originally, numerical control meant that the machine tool
(lathe, drill press, milling machine, etc.) was controlled by
instructions contained on paper tape or cards, while today
microprocessor control is becoming more common. The air
craft industry, with research support of the U.S. govern
ment, developed numerically controlled machine tools to im
prove the precision of aircraft parts. This new process
technology became available commercially in the mid-1950s;
it was widely heralded as applicable in industry anywhere
metalcutting was done. By the early 1960s, growth in
employment of machine tool operators was thought to be
seriously threatened. (Macut, pp. 1-6)
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The actual growth of numerically controlled machine tools
from 1965 to 1981 is presented in table 1-2. Except for the
years 1966-68, the growth of numerically controlled machine
tools remained under 20 percent annually. In fact, in 7 of the
16 years in the table, annual shipments declined from prior
year levels. The annual growth rate was about 15 percent for
the entire period, but averaged only 12 percent for the most
recent 10-year period. After 25 years, only 3 to 4 percent of
all metalcutting machine tools are numerically controlled. In
short, the growth of numerically controlled machine tools
has been much less than predicted.
There are many reasons why the growth of numerically
controlled machine tools fell far short of expectations, but
only three will be mentioned here. First, the applicability of
numerical control technology to other industries was
significantly overestimated. It appears to have no advantage
over conventional machine tooling unless great precision or
moderate sized batch production (but less than that needed
for justification of dedicated machine tools) is required.
(Nabseth and Ray, p. 45; and Mansfield, 1971a, p. 201)
Clearly, there must be an opportunity to recover the increas
ed capital investment costs of such technology if it is to be ef
ficient.
Second, there was a significant lack of knowledge about
numerical control, and the new technology not only altered
the basic production structure but also required the new skill
of programming. (Nabseth and Ray, p. 52; and Mansfield,
197la, p. 201) Thus the human resource limitations were im
portant as well. Third, the price of numerical control
($150,000-$200,000 today for just the hardware) was perceiv
ed by many small firms as too high. Many small shops sim
ply do not have the capitalization to afford such in
vestments. Even as recently as 1978, in a survey done of
small machine tool firms of 50-100 employees who were
nonusers of numerical control but likely candidates for
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utilization of the technology, it was found that over 72 per
cent of the surveyed firms had not even evaluated numerical
control. (Putnam, p. 100)

Table 1-2
Growth of Numerically Controlled Machine Tools
in the U.S., 1965-1981

Year

Annual
shipments
(thousands)

Total NC
machine tools
(thousands)

Percentage
increase in
total
population

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

2.1
2.9
3.0
2.9
2.4

8.1
11.0
14.0
16.9
19.3

35.8
27.3
20.7
14.2

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974

1.9
1.2
1.6
2.7
4.2

21.2
22.4
24.0
26.7
30.9

9.8
5.7
7.1
11.3
15.7

1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

4.0
3.9
4.5
5.7
7.2

34.9
38.8
43.3
49.0
56.2

12.9
11.2
11.6
13.2
14.7

1980
1981

8.9
7.9

65.1
73.0

15.8
12.1

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, "Current Industrial Reports, Series MQ-35W,
Metalworking Machinery," Annual Summaries, 1965-1980, and Quarterly Summaries,
1981.
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Once again, too much can be made of the comparison be
tween numerically controlled machine tools and robots, and
there are substantial differences as well as similarities.
However, the growth and diffusion of numerical control il
lustrates the general obstacles to the rapid diffusion of pro
cess technology in general. 3

Historical Analogies
The purpose of the foregoing discussion was to develop a
more rational perspective of technological change by briefly
looking at two earlier new technologies related to robots,
whereas the purpose of this section is to briefly discuss
economic change in general. The fear of unemployment and
massive displacement caused by labor-saving technology is
not new. Such fears began with the dawn of the industrial era
in the late 18th century; they continue today with the growth
of industrial robots.
For example, the U.S. economy recovered very slowly
from the deep 1958-59 recession and then experienced
another recession in 1961. The "automation problem" was
of urgent national concern, and in 1962 the U.S. Congress
passed the Manpower Development and Training Act to ad
dress the retraining needs of technologically displaced
workers. Then, in 1964, the President appointed a National
Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic
Progress to determine the impact of automation and
technological change on the U.S. economy.
But the economy was already beginning to recover
significantly in 1964, and by the time the Commission
rendered its final report in 1966, the economy was near full
employment. Historical events ultimately obviated the need
for and impact of the Commission; the problem seemed to
3. The interested reader should consult the recent works of Sahal and Gold listed in the
bibliography for a review of this literature.
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have gone away. To no one's surprise, the Commission's
conclusion was that a sluggish economy was the major cause
of unemployment rather than automation. (Bowen and
Mangum, pp. 3-4)
The recessionary phase of any business cycle is difficult
and traumatic for workers, particularly in a state like
Michigan with its durable goods-oriented economy. The
clear danger is that we may wrongly attribute the short run
cyclical problem to other factors, such as automation.
Walter Buckingham issued a grim forecast at the time of the
1961 recession: "There are 160,000 unemployed in Detroit
who will probably never go back to making automobiles,
partly because the industry is past its peak of growth and
partly because automation has taken their jobs." (Buck
ingham, pp. 117-118) Subsequently, however, the auto in
dustry set new employment peaks in the middle of the 1960s,
and the auto-dominated Michigan economy boomed once
again. (Verway, p. 1) We suffered through another such cy
cle, although attenuated, with the 1974-75 recession. Yet the
auto industry went on to its all-time peak employment in
1978.
The general comparison between the early 1960s and the
early 1980s appears compelling in our judgment. History
does not and will not repeat itself, but history can provide a
more objective perspective within which to judge the current
(new) situation. Employment in the auto industry may not
recover to its 1978 peak, but employment gains will be
significant during the recovery phase of the business cycle.
Automation is not the cause of the U.S. or Michigan's
unemployment today any more than it was in the early
1960s. That is not to imply that we should take a "rah rah
robots" approach to the coming technological change;
however, neither should we adopt a doomsday attitude that
attributes most or all unemployment during major recessions
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to automation. In fact, one might plausibly argue that some
of our basic industries suffer more today from a lack of
automation and the rational organization of that automation
vis-a-vis our European and Japanese competitors than from
too much automation.
It is possible to develop a more dispassionate view of
technological change, or more specifically, of the introduc
tion of industrial robots. First, let us admit that most
technological change throughout American history has been
labor-saving, and that means job displacement. By job
displacement we mean the elimination of job tasks, not
necessarily implying worker unemployment. As will be
discussed later, they are not the same thing by any means.
The powerful job displacing effect of technological change
is illustrated in table 1-3; it lists hypothetical job displace
ment in manufacturing in the U.S. and Michigan from 1979
to 1990, assuming a fixed output and a continuation of the
slow annual growth in output per worker experienced in the
late 1970s of 2.1 percent. (U.S. Department of Labor, 1981c,
p. 24) The base year employment for the calculations is 1978.
Under the unrealistic assumption of constant output, if the
annual growth in output per worker of 2.1 percent continues
throughout the decade of the 1980s, then cumulative job
displacement by 1990 will approximate 4.6 million in the
U.S. and 265,000 jobs in manufacturing in Michigan.
Stated in relative terms, 22 percent of all existing jobs in
manufacturing could disappear by 1990 as a result of in
creases in productivity. Of course, worker productivity gains
are not solely the result of new labor-saving technologies,
but the total effect is the same; gains in productivity,
whatever the source, can cause considerable and sometimes
dramatic displacement effects on the existing job base if they
are examined in isolation.
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Table 1-3
Illustrative Displacement Impact of General
Productivity Gains, Michigan and U.S. Manufacturing
Year

Cumulative displacement
Michigan
U.S.

1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986

24,772
49,023
72,765
96,009
118,764
141,042
162,852
184,204

430,605
852,167
1,264,876
1,668,919
2,064,477
2,451,728
2,830,847
3,202,004

1987
1988
1989
1990

205,107
225,571
245,606
265,220

3,565,367
3,921,099
4,269,361
4,610,309

NOTE: The 1978 base year employment figures are 1,179,600 for Michigan and 20,505,000
for the U.S., as found in U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employ
ment and Earnings, May 1981, pp. 39 and 125.

Second, the dramatic job displacing effects of
technological change have not caused massive unemploy
ment in the American economic system because in normal
times they have been accompanied by significant economic
growth, i.e., output has not been constant. Displaced
workers are reemployed in other sectors of the economy, or
they may gain new jobs in the same firm if demand increases
sufficiently after the introduction of new technology. The
heart of the problem appears to be the perception that there
is only a constant amount of work to be done, so a machine
or robot eliminates not only the job task but also the need
for that worker. Historically, this has not generally been
true.
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Third, the association of technological change and
economic growth is not just a coincidence; the two are inter
twined and inseparable. That is not to imply that adoption of
new technologies necessarily insures economic growth, or
that displaced workers will always find new jobs. However,
it does mean that we all have a vital stake in productivity
gains (i.e., in displacing jobs) because that is what allows the
possibility of economic growth. The price of a growing,
dynamic economy that raises incomes and makes more
goods and services available to all of us is job displacement,
or the elimination of jobs through technological change.
Fourth, although the long-run impact of technological
change has been favorable on the American economy, job
displacement in the short run can be traumatic for the
workers involved, who usually are concentrated
geographically and occupationally. Displaced workers may
find it difficult to learn new tasks. Severely impacted regions
may not have the resources to cope with those displaced. Job
displacement in the short run may require significant public
and/or private retraining efforts. Furthermore, the public
education system must insure that entry-level workers
possess the requisite new skills and not old, obsolete skills.
Finally, we must guard against the temptation to view
technological change as revolutionary; the fear that tomor
row we will awaken to the unmanned factory and a world of
robots without workers. Technological change tends to be
evolutionary, especially in process technology. There are
physical, financial, and human constraints on the rate of
change of process technology. While no one would dispute
that computers have changed our world, this has taken a
quarter of a century.
In summary, industrial robots are simply one more piece
of automated industrial equipment, part of the long history
of automation of production. Robots will displace workers
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in the same way that technological change has always
displaced workers. There is a possibility that this job
displacement will be a significant problem, particularly in
given occupations, industries, or geographical areas. These
questions are examined later in the study. There is also the
certainty that robots will create jobs, and that also is examin
ed later in the study. Robots will not guarantee economic
growth and we cannot be assured that displaced workers will
be reemployed, although there is reason for some optimism
historically. In the short run, there will likely be some worker
dislocation, and that dislocation may be concentrated
geographically. Policy issues raised by these changes will be
addressed after their magnitude is determined.

The Carnegie-Mellon Study
We conclude this chapter with a discussion of the only
study which has examined the job displacement impacts of
robots in great detail, the Carnegie-Mellon study. Actually
the Carnegie-Mellon study is not one published document,
but several that originated from a project in which Robert
Ayres and Steven Miller were the principal investigators.
(Ayres and Miller, 198la)
The fundamental basis of the job displacement estimates
of Ayres and Miller is a survey of corporate users of robots
(with 16 respondents) that asked them to provide estimates
of potential job displacement in 32 occupations by today's
commercially available robots (Level 1) and tomorrow's
robots that would be sensor-based with rudimentary tactile
and/or visual perception (Level 2). The occupations were
chosen by Ayres and Miller as those most likely to be
robotized. The responses were weighted by size of firm (six
classes) to obtain a weighted average response. These sam
pled occupations were then combined with other nonsampled occupations (based on similarity) and job displacement
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estimates were derived for the metalworking sector and for
all manufacturing.
Perhaps Ayres and Miller best summarize their conclu
sions in a Technology Review article:
Based on these results, we estimate that Level 1
robots could theoretically replace about 1 million
operators, and Level 2 robots could theoretically
replace 3 million of a current total of 8 million
operators. However, this displacement will take at
least 20 years. By 2025, it is conceivable that more
sophisticated robots will replace almost all
operators in manufacturing (about 8 percent of to
day's workforce), as well as a number of routine
nonmanufacturing jobs. (Ayres and Miller, 1982b,
p. 42)
According to Ayres and Miller, 4 million manufacturing
operative jobs are subject to robotization over the next 20
years or more, and all operatives in manufacturing may be
replaced by 2025. The emphasis is clearly on theoretical
displacement in the indefinite future rather than actual or
probable displacement by some specific date.
We doubt that production techniques, even theoretically,
are as homogeneous across manufacturing as Ayres and
Miller imply; by industry, by size of firm, or by type of pro
duct. But those doubts are minor in the context of theoretical
estimation of the unbounded future. As Ayres and Miller
themselves point out, their estimates are really only rough
guesses to obtain "a feeling of how many people will be in
volved in 'first order' adjustment processes." (Ayres and
Miller, 1981a, p. 100)
Ayres and Miller go on to conclude that their study has
highly significant policy implications. They talk of an "in
stitutional failure" in that our public education and training
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programs reflect obsolete rather than emerging needs. (Ayres
and Miller, 198la, pp. 22-23) They are particularly critical of
CETA, vocational schools and government occupational
forecasters, none of which in their opinion recognize the
future employment needs of society. (Ayres and Miller,
1982a, p. 21) Ayres and Miller conclude, "the transition to
the factory of the future is occurring now. ... If ap
propriate measures are not taken, the nation will experience
unnecessary economic distress and lost opportunities."
(Ayres and Miller, 1982b, p. 46)
We do not concur with Ayres and Miller that their
estimates of theoretical displacement by occupation at some
undefined point in the future are proof that our public in
stitutions today are training their clientele in obsolete skills.
Furthermore, Ayres and Miller offer no evidence whatsoever
about the emerging occupations, so their criticism in that
regard is especially puzzling. In our judgment, if policy
responses to the challenges of the future are to be for
mulated, including the possible effects of robotics
technology, then the assessment must proceed based upon
the most likely or probable events that are expected to occur
within a definite time horizon. That is what we will endeavor
to do in the remainder of the study.

2
Forecasts of the
Robot Population
Unlike the Carnegie-Mellon study, the projections of oc
cupational displacement in this study are the result of first
forecasting the U.S. robot population by industry and ap
plication areas within those industries. This approach con
strains the displacement estimates to reflect the actual ex
pected sales of robots. In this way, a consistent economic
framework is established within which it is possible to
estimate not only the population of robots and job displace
ment but also the job creation resulting therefrom. The job
displacement and job creation aspects of the development of
robotics are discussed in chapters 3 and 4 respectively.
In this chapter, various other forecasts of the robot
population which are inputs to our forecasts are discussed
first. Then, the specific methodology of this study to
forecast the population of robots is developed. That includes
selection of the projection date, robot application areas, user
industries, and alternative growth scenarios. Next, our
forecast of the U.S. robot population is discussed. Finally,
the link of our forecast of the U.S. robot population and the
Michigan robot population is established and the resultant
estimates presented.
There are quite a few forecasts of the growth in the robot
population available today. Some of the more prominent
29
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overall forecasts are discussed first. Then, three forecasts
that provide more detailed information about application
areas and/or user industries are examined: the General
Motors corporate forecast, the University of
Michigan/Society of Manufacturing Engineering Delphi
forecast, hereafter shortened to the UM/SME Delphi
forecast, and a forecast of the impact of robots on the U.S.
auto industry by William R. Tanner and William F.
Adolfson.

General Forecasts of the Robot Population
There are no official U.S. government statistics on the
robotics industry. The Robot Institute of America (RIA), the
trade association of robot manufacturers and corporate user
firms, estimated the U.S. robot population at the end of
1981 to be 4,700 units, approximately 20 percent of the
worldwide total. (Robot Institute of America, p. 2) Laura
Conigliaro, one of the leading investment analysts of the
robotics industry and author of a continuing newsletter
about robotics, estimated 1981 unit sales at 2,100 with a
dollar value of $150 million. (Conigliaro, June 19, 1981, p.
8) Conigliaro points out that the sales revenue of robot
manufacturers includes robots and related items such as con
trols, software, applications engineering, and sometimes
other peripheral hardware systems. The data problems are
even more complicated because robot manufacturing may be
only a small division of a much larger firm, leading to a lack
of accounting uniformity in any robot sales estimates. In
fact, Conigliaro stresses that past sales of robots are
themselves only estimates, such as her figure for 1980 of
1,450 units with a dollar value of $100 million. (Conigliaro,
June 19, 1981, p. 2)
Sales expectations for robots in 1982 were originally quite
high for a number of reasons. First, the sales growth rate in
terms of revenue was approximately 50 percent in 1981. Sec-
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ond, attendance at the industry trade show, Robotics VI,
held in Detroit in March 1982, surpassed even the most op
timistic projections. (Jablonowski, pp. 163-178) Third, there
had been a flurry of announcements by major firms planning
robot production General Motors, General Electric, IBM,
United Technologies, Westinghouse, and Bendix Corpora
tion, to name only a few of the potential entrants. Not sur
prisingly, the industry also has captured considerable media
attention in the last year, which may have fueled public ex
pectations even further.
The media attention notwithstanding, most
knowledgeable industry people were not misled. In our inter
views, robot manufacturers, robot users, and other robotics
experts indicated considerable dismay at the media focus and
concern that the industry had caught the public's fancy at the
very moment that sales were lagging. As early as March 19,
1982, shortly after the Robotics VI conference, Iron Age, a
respected trade journal of the metalworking sector,
presented an analysis of the robotics industry as one that had
indeed been popularized, but one which was short on orders.
(Obrzut, pp. 59-83) It is also true that the lack of a signifi
cant economic recovery anytime in 1982 and continued
weakness in the domestic auto industry surprised most of
American industry, including robotics, and may have caused
unexpected cancellation of some robot orders, delay in
others, and failure to close many prospective sales.
We believe 1982 robot sales were approximately the same
as those in 1981, or perhaps slightly higher. If this is correct,
then the U.S. robot population at 1982 year-end was about
6,800-7,000 units, utilizing RIA's 1981 base of 4,700 units. 1
Actual 1982 robot sales may appear disappointing to some,
but in our judgment, flat sales or modestly rising sales in the
face of a longer than expected recession reflects economic
1. The RIA estimate is not universally accepted, but it is representative.
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strength. The lesson of 1982 is that robotics, as part of the
capital goods sector, cannot expect to be immune from reces
sions. The vulnerability of the robotics industry to recessions
will likely increase as robotics expenditures become a more
important (and postponable) part of the capital investment
plans of user firms.
Overall forecasts of the growth of the robotics industry
usually terminate in 1990. For the convenience of the reader
and due to the importance of 1990 in our projections,
selected estimates of 1990 sales, average annual growth rates,
and the cumulative population of robots in 1990 are
presented in table 2-1. They are representative of public
sources frequently quoted and respected in the industry. 2
Since there is not universal agreement on the current popula
tion of robots, comparison of average annual growth rates
may be less meaningful than looking at the expected popula
tion of robots.
The available estimates of robot sales and population are
roughly similar. Conigliaro forecasts a 1990 market of over
$2 billion, 31,350 unit robot sales, and a population of U.S.
robots of approximately 122,000. Paul Aron of Daiwa
Securities, a leading American expert on the Japanese
robotics industry, forecasts a 1990 market in the U.S. of
21,575 units worth about $1.9 billion. (Aron, 1981, p. 60)
Aron's 1980-1985-1990 sales figures can be extrapolated to
obtain 1990 U.S. robot population of 94,000-95,000. The
UM/SME Delphi forecast, details of which are discussed
later, foresees a 1990 or 1991 market of approximately
33,333 units which implies a U.S. population of robots of
2. There are other forecasts available, primarily private market studies by such firms as
Frost and Sullivan, International Resources Development, Predicasts, and others. We did
not have primary access to these documents and did not wish to possibly unfairly
characterize them by quoting secondary sources. Suffice it to say that these private market
studies tend to be optimistic and project 100,000 or more units installed by 1990.
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well over 100,000 in 1990 or 1991. 3 Joseph Engelberger, the
father of robotics and president of Unimation, Inc., the na
tion's leading robot manufacturer, predicts an average an
nual industry growth rate of 35 percent, with possibly 40,000
unit market sales in 1990. (Engelberger, p. 115) Finally, the
RIA, in its own survey, foresees a U.S. robot population of
75,000-100,000 units in 1990. (Robot Institute of America,
P. 30)
The overall forecasts of the development of the robotics
industry are informative and valuable. However, more
specific information is needed to provide occupational and
industrial specificity for our study. For that reason the GM
corporate forecast, the UM/SME Delphi forecast and the
forecast by Tanner and Adolfson are presented.

General Motors Forecast
The GM corporate forecast is presented in table 2-2.
General Motors plans to increase the number of robots in use
from its 1980 total of 302 to 14,000 in 1990 for an average
annual growth rate of 47 percent. As of April 1982, General
Motors reported a total of 1,758 robots available (in house
or in use). Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine ex
actly how many are actually in operation, but the goal of
1983 would appear to be well within reach.
Beyond 1983, the GM goals may be more challenging. In a
government report about the status of the U.S. auto industry
released in late 1981 in which three agencies participated, it is
suggested that the length and severity of the slump in the
3. The Delphi estimates are derived from information in the study. Robot sales in 1990-91
are nearly $2 billion, the average price is $30,000 in terms of 1980 dollars, 40 percent of all
robot sales are a part of systems, and the robot is 30 percent of the cost of the systems.
Thus, the nearly $2 billion in robot sales consists of $.6 billion in stand-alone units, $.4
billion packaged for systems, and $933 million of other systems hardware. The $1 billion in
sales of robots only (excluding the other systems hardware) can then be divided by the
average price of $30,000 to obtain 33,333 units sales in 1990-91.
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auto industry has resulted in a serious erosion of the finan
cial strength of the auto firms. (U.S. Department of Com
merce, pp. 1 and 7) Postponement of some modernizing in
vestments for purposes of increasing productivity (such as
robots) may be necessary in order to preserve the industry's
liquidity. (U.S. Department of Commerce, p. 8)

Table 2-1
Selected Estimates of 1990 Sales, Population
and Growth Rates of Robots in the U.S.

Source
Conigliaro3
Aronb
UM/SME
Delphi0
Engelbergerd
RIAe

Unit
sales
1990

Value
(billions)
(1980 $)

1980-90
annual
growth rate
(percent)

Cumulative
population

31,350
21,575

2.0 +
1.9

38
36

122,000
94-95,000

33,333
40,000
-

2.0 +

45
35
35-39

150,000
150,000
75-100,000

-

NOTE: The 1980-90 annual growth rate and the cumulative population in 1990 are not
necessarily stated directly in all of these studies but can be calculated from data that are
provided.
a. Laura Conigliaro, Robotics Newsletter, Prudential-Bache Securities Inc., January 15,
1982, p. 7 and June 19, 1981, p. 8.
b. Paul Aron, "Robots Revisited: One Year Later," in Exploratory Workshop on the
Social Impacts of Robotics: Summary and Issues, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, July 1981, p. 34.
c. Donald N. Smith and Richard C. Wilson, Industrial Robots: A Delphi Forecast of
Markets and Technology, Society of Manufacturing Engineers, Dearborn, Michigan, 1982,
pp. 47-51, and Donald N. Smith, Peter G. Heytler, and Murry D. Wikol, "Sociological Ef
fects of the Introduction of Robots in U.S. Manufacturing Industry," Industrial Develop
ment Division, Institute of Science and Technology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,
Michigan. Unpublished paper presented at the CAMPRO '82 Conference on Computer
Aided Manufacturing and Productivity, October 1982, p. 7.
d. Joseph L. Engelberger, Robotics in Practice, American Management Association,
AMACOM Press, New York, 1980, p. 115.
e. Robot Institute of America, RIA Worldwide Survey and Directory on Industrial Robots,
Dearborn, Michigan, 1981, p. 30.
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Table 2-2
Projected Robot Applications in General Motors
Application

1980

Number of robots in use
1985
1983
1988

Welding (Arc and Spot)
Painting
Assembly
Machine Loading
Parts Transfer

138
47
17
68
32

1,000
300
675
200
125

1,700
650
1,200
1,200
250

2,500
1,200
3,200
2,600
500

2,700
1,500
5,000
4,000
800

302

2,300

5,000

10,000

14,000

Total

1990

SOURCE: GM Technical Center, Robotics Display, April 1982.

In 1982 there have been media reports of a slowdown in
robot acquisitions at GM and other auto firms due to the
lack of financial capital, ("A Robotics Mecca in Michigan?
Car Sales Must Rebound First") yet GM must more than
double yearly acquisitions from 600-700 to almost 1,500 to
meet its 1985 goal. If GM is to meet its robot installation
goals, the need for some recovery in the auto industry is ap
parent. From a slightly different vantage point, near term
goals are aided by a major retooling effort that GM commit
ted itself to several years ago, while long term efforts require
an increasing share of available financial capital and
therefore both a larger management and manpower commit
ment to robot applications.
Insofar as the details of GM's forecast of their robot
population are concerned, GM anticipates a significant and
dramatic shift in specific application areas. Welding robots
represent almost two-thirds of GM's installations today,
while they will be slightly less than one-fifth of the installa
tions in 1990. In contrast, assembly robots, an almost in
significant portion of the total now will grow to over onethird of the total by 1990. The growth in painting and
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machine loading is more steady. However, new installations
of both painting and welding robots will level off well before
1990, while almost one-half of the new installations in that
same year will be assembly robots.
There are a number of important implications of the GM
plans. First, notice that of the 14,000 robots GM expects to
have by 1990, approximately 64 percent will be installed after
1985. This fact alone should emphasize the uncertainties and
conditional nature of these plans. Second, early arguments
for robots have concentrated on elimination of dirty and
dangerous tasks. That argument will carry less weight as
robots diffuse to assembly operations and become even more
important in machine loading. Third, given that GM expects
to install 76 percent of its assembly robots after 1985, it ap
pears that successful application of assembly robots in large
numbers awaits technological developments and/or
reorganization of the factory floor.

UM/SME Delphi Forecast
The UM/SME Delphi forecast of industrial robots,
authored by Donald N. Smith and Richard C. Wilson
represents another important contribution to our under
standing of robotics. The current UM/SME Delphi forecast
reports results of three rounds of questioning on many
technical, marketing, and sociological aspects of the
development of industrial robots. Over 200 questions were
asked in round one, while rounds two and three repeated
some questions of round one as well as adding supplemental
questions suggested by the experts. The total number of par
ticipants ranged from 36 to 60, with as many as 90 percent
from corporate user firms.
The Delphi technique itself is an iterative forecasting pro
cess in which experts independently input their own forecasts
of the future by responding to a consistent series of ques-
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tions. The objective of the Delphi methodology is to gain
consensus through iterative polling. The assumption is that
the collective opinion of the group is better than that of any
single person. It should be mentioned that the current
UM/SME Delphi forecast is an interim report and does not
yet meet the usual Delphi requirements for consensus and
precision.
One pertinent aspect of the UM/SME Delphi forecast for
our study is a ranking of the importance of various robot ap
plication areas by industry for 1980, 1985, and 1990. Tables
2-3 and 2-4 summarize these rankings for all industry and for
autos. Once again, the growth in importance of assembly ap
plications is clear, particularly in autos.
It is even more interesting to examine the percentage or
relative usage of robots by application areas and industry.
Since the percentage shares remain more or less stable, table
2-5 presents the results for 1990 only. However, it does in
clude all of the industries specified in the UM/SME Delphi
forecast autos, casting/foundry, heavy manufacturing,
light manufacturing, electrical/electronic, and the aerospace
industry. Although the UM/SME Delphi forecast defined
the robot application areas differently here from in the rank
ings just discussed, it is apparent that welding and painting
are more important in autos than elsewhere, while machine
loading, press loading, and drilling, routing, and grinding
are slightly less important in autos.
Finally, the UM/SME Delphi estimates of the total
relative market shares by industry, i.e., the percent of total
robot shipments to each of the industrial sectors, are
presented in table 2-6 for all of the years reported in the
UM/SME Delphi forecast. The auto industry is expected to
remain a stable part of the market with slightly less than onefourth of all shipments. Light manufacturing is expected to
have a somewhat larger share, although the UM/SME
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Table 2-3
Delphi Forecast: Rank Importance of Robot Application
Areas in All Industry, 1980-1990
_______Application_________1980
Pick-and-Place
Machine Loading
Continuous Path (e.g., paint, weld)
Manufacturing Processing
(e.g., drilling)
Assembly
Inspection

1985

1990

1
1
1
1
1
2
331
455
544
666

SOURCE: Donald N. Smith and Richard C. Wilson, Industrial Robots: A Delphi Forecast
of Markets and Technology, Society of Manufacturing Engineers, Dearborn, Michigan,
1982, p. 52.
NOTE: Ranked from most frequent (1) to least frequent (6).

Table 2-4
Delphi Forecast: Rank Importance of Robot Application
Areas in the Auto Industry, 1980-1990
_______Application_________1980

1985

1990

334
Pick-and-Place
222
Machine Loading
1
1
1
Continuous Path (e.g., paint, weld)
Manufacturing Processing
455
(e.g., drilling)
442
Assembly
Inspection ____ __________6_____6_____6
SOURCE: Donald N. Smith and Richard C. Wilson, Industrial Robots: A Delphi Forecast
of Markets and Technology, Society of Manufacturing Engineers, Dearborn, Michigan,
1982, p. 53.
NOTE: Ranked from most frequent (1) to least frequent (6).

Table 2-5
Delphi Forecast: Relative Importance of Robot
Application Areas by Industry, 1990

Application
Gas/Metal & Arc Welding
Resistance Welding
Machine Loading
Painting
Press Loading/Unloading
Drilling, Routing, Grinding
Other
Total

Automotive
11
17
23
14
11
11
11
100

Percentage of robots within industry category
Heavy
Light
Casting/
manu
manu
Electrical/
foundry
facturing
facturing
electronic
6
6
33
6
22
16
11
100

12
6
23
12
23
12
12
100

9
11
23
11
17
11
17
100

9
4
27
9
13
16
22
100

Aerospace
5
21
16
11
11
21
16
100

SOURCE: Donald N. Smith and Richard C. Wilson, Industrial Robots: A Delphi Forecast of Markets and Technology, Society of Manufactur
ing Engineers, Dearborn, Michigan, 1982, pp. 56-58.
NOTE: Totals may not equal 100 percent due to rounding.
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Table 2-6
Delphi Forecast: Percent of Total Robot Shipments
by Industry
Industry
Automotive
Casting/Foundry
Heavy Manufacturing
Light Manufacturing
Electrical/Electronic
Aerospace
Other
All Industry

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

17.8
21.3
9.9
36.6
11.1
0.9
2.4

20.0
19.4
9.7
33.3
11.1
1.1
5.4

22.2
20.0
8.9
33.3
9.8
1.3
4.5

23.3
20.0
8.3
33.3
11.7
1.7
1.7

23.3
14.0
8.1
27.9
9.3
2.1
15.3

23.3
13.3
7.5
31.7
10.0
2.1
12.1

22.5
11.3
6.3
25.0
8.1
2.0
24.8

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

SOURCE: Donald N. Smith and Richard C. Wilson, Industrial Robots: A Delphi Forecast of Markets and Technology, Society of Manufactur
ing Engineers, Dearborn, Michigan, 1982, p. 51.
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Delphi forecast does not provide a specific definition for this
industry. Notice also the small market shares expected for
aerospace and the electrical/electronic industries.

Tanner and Adolfson Forecast
William R. Tanner, a robotics expert and engineering con
sultant, and William F. Adolfson have conducted a study of
the application of robots in the North American motor vehi
cle industry for the U.S. Department of Transportation. The
report presents a wealth of information about robots in the
auto industry not obtainable from any other source.
The estimates by Tanner and Adolfson of the North
American robot population in autos for various years are
presented in table 2-7. These projections are classified ac
cording to various assumptions about conditions in the auto
industry and the nation. The "minimum effort" estimates
assume continuation of the status quo which includes lagging
auto sales and strong foreign competition, at least through
the mid-1980s. The "moderate effort" estimates assume a
modest recovery in the domestic auto market and some
decline in interest rates. The "strong effort" estimates in
clude the moderate effort assumptions and add assumed im
provements in general investment incentives such as tax
credits and accelerated depreciation allowances. They also
anticipate advances in robotics technology which might in
clude low-cost sensory feedback systems. Finally, the "max
imum effort" estimates assume, in addition to the foregoing,
direct investment incentives for robots and government pro
vision of retraining/relocation assistance for displaced
workers. In sum, Tanner and Adolfson forecast a 1990 robot
population in the North American auto industry ranging
from a low of 18,500 units to a high of 35,700 units.
Tanner and Adolfson also present representative cost
breakdowns for a single robot installation for machine
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loading and for a major robot welding system. These detail
ed estimates are presented in tables 2-8 and 2-9, respectively.
The single installation carries a price tag of $125,000, while
the major system of 12 robots costs $2.5 million. The specific
cost estimates are not as important as the fact that even in
the case of a single robot installation (frequently called a
stand-alone robot), the robot itself represents less than onehalf of the total cost of the installation. That percentage
shrinks to one-third or less in the case of a major robot
system. Tanner and Adolfson project the auto industry may
have a cumulative investment in robots of $2.3 to $4.0 billion
by 1990.

Table 2-7
Tanner and Adolfson: Projected Industrial Robot Population
in North American Automobile Industry, 1980-1990
Assumption

1980

1983

1985

1988

1990

Minimum effort
Moderate effort
Strong effort
Maximum effort

1,065
1,065
1,065
1,065

2,600
4,050
4,500
4,500

4,700
7,500
10,000
11,200

10,800
16,200
20,000
25,000

18,500
22,600
28,000
35,700

SOURCE: William R. Tanner and William F. Adolfson, Robotics Use in Motor Vehicle
Manufacture, Report to the U.S. Department of Transportation, February 1982, p. 100.
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All of the available forecasts were valuable aids in the
development of our methodology and forecasts. Not surpris
ingly, however, none were exactly compatible with our need
to project application areas with specific occupational and
industrial content. This was especially true in view of the
need to apply those estimates to the State of Michigan. Fur
thermore, it is clear, regardless of the desire of policymakers
and others for detailed information about the future of
robots, that only general and tentative information is possi
ble today.

Table 2-8
Tanner and Adolfson: Cost Elements of Typical
Single Robot Installation for Machine Tending

Element
Robot
System design
End-of-arm tooling
Conveyors and part orienters
Controls and interfacing
Safety devices, guard rails, etc.
Rearrangements and site
preparation
Equipment relocation
and revision
System installation, robot
programming and debugging
Personnel training
Efficiency and production
losses during start-up
Total

Representative
cost
(thousands)

Percent of
total systems
costs

55
10
5
15
7
5

44
8
4
12
6
4

5

4

5

4

5
3

4
2

10
$125

8
100

SOURCE: William R. Tanner and William F. Adolfson, Robotics Use in Motor Vehicle
Manufacture, Report to the U.S. Department of Transportation, February 1982, p. 42.

44

Forecasts of the Robot Population

Table 2-9
Tanner and Adolfson: Cost Elements of Typical
Major Robot System for Body Assembly Welding

Element
Twelve robots
System design
Welding guns, trans
formers and controls
Conveyors
Locating and positioning
fixturing
Controls and interfacing
Safety devices, guard rails, etc.
Site preparation
System assembly, tryout
and shipping
System installation, robot
programming and debugging
Personnel training
Efficiency and production
losses during start-up
Total

Representative
cost
(thousands)

Percent of
total systems
costs

850
250

34
10

150
150

6
6

250
200
50
150

10
8
2
6

250

10

100
25

4
1

75
$2,500

3
100

SOURCE: William R. Tanner and William F. Adolfson, Robotics Use in Motor Vehicle
Manufacture, Report to the U.S. Department of Transportation, February 1982, p. 41.

Upjohn Institute Forecast
The purpose of this section is to present our forecasts of
the 1990 U.S. robot population and the Michigan robot
population. That requires selection of a projection date,
economic scenarios, robot application areas, and user in
dustries. Second, a logical relationship between the robot
population in the U.S. and the State of Michigan is
developed to specifically estimate Michigan's robot popula
tion.
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Methodology
Unquestionably, the easiest methodological decision was
the selection of a projection date. Few forecasts of the im
pacts of robotics have ventured beyond 1990. Post-1990
technology is problematical, and it is difficult enough just to
project the impact of an infant industry to that date. In
short, the terminal projection date of this study of the
human resource implications of robotics is 1990.
Single point estimates of future unit sales of robots, dollar
value of sales, and population of robots are inadvisable. Our
judgment is that such specificity is misleading, however wellintentioned the estimates may be. Consider, for instance, the
impact of a 5 percent variation in Engelberger's expected 35
percent average annual growth rate in the population of
robots, 1983-1990, assuming the 1982 year-end stock ap
proximates 6,800. If the growth rate is 30 percent (a healthy
growth trend for any industry) the stock of robots at the end
of 1990 is 55,470. On the other hand, with a growth rate of
40 percent, the stock of robots at the end of 1990 would be
100,354. A variation of plus or minus 5 percent around
Engelberger's expected growth rate of 35 percent causes
nearly a 100 percent variation in the 1990 stock of robots. Of
course, such a result reflects the small existing stock of
robots and the assumption of exponential growth.
Nonetheless, this example clearly illustrates the difficulty
with point estimates for the population of robots.
Two scenarios are developed in this study. The low-growth
scenario for robotics assumes relatively high interest rates
and slow real GNP growth, approximating the late 1970s an
nual average of 2.0 percent. The implications for the auto in
dustry in the low-growth scenario are some recovery of
domestic auto sales from their current depressed levels, but
failure to achieve the vigorous rebound that has so often
characterized auto sales in the past. The high-growth
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scenario for robotics envisions further interest rate declines
and real GNP growth that approximates the post-World War
II annual average of 3.5 percent.
Neither scenario includes any specific assumptions of
breakthroughs in robotics technology, although clearly, as
will be pointed out later, the growth in importance of
assembly robots requires some technological improvements.
There are three reasons why specific technological assump
tions appear unwise. First, the available economic research
indicates that there can be a considerable lag between a
specific technological breakthrough and successful
marketing of the resultant product, particularly in the case
of process technology. 4 Second, the same economic research
indicates there can be considerable delay in application of
new process technology across industries even after suc
cessful adoption in one industry. The reason is that the
technical requirements of each industry tend to be unique,
and cross-industry adoption frequently requires further
adaptation of the original process. Third, as stated by the
Chairman of the Board of Prab Robots, Inc., "the present
level of robot technology seems to be much more than U.S.
industry can readily absorb." (Prab Robots, Inc. Annual
Report, 1981, p. 4)
The implication, strongly confirmed by our interviews, is
that diffusion of robotics technology will be limited more by
a lack of human understanding of the existing technology
than by a lack of new hardware. Perhaps surprisingly, this
lack of understanding applies even to the major corporate
user firms of today, including the auto industry. In any
event, it appears unwise and unnecessary to make any
specific technological assumptions for the forecast period,
except as already noted.
4. See the works of Mansfield, Sahal and Gold for an elaboration of these points.
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Several other factors specifically included in our alter
native growth scenarios must also be mentioned. First, con
tinued strong foreign competition in autos is expected
throughout the decade. Second, special investment incen
tives for robots are unlikely. Third, there is the usual caveat
about unforeseen economy-wide shocks that may completely
invalidate the forecast.
In short, our low-growth scenario for robotics presumes a
continuation of slow GNP growth, lagging auto sales, and
high interest rates, while the high-growth scenario maintains
a return to our historical GNP growth trend and decline in
interest rates to more reasonable levels as well. Obviously,
the extremes of major economic depression or "booming"
reindustrialization are avoided.
The selection of specific robot application areas to be
enumerated in this study is important because the applica
tion areas must have related occupational content to be
meaningful. The need for occupational content coincident
with available data restricts the application areas to five in
the study: welding, assembly, painting, machine
loading/unloading, and other. Clearly, more specificity
would be desirable, but it is necessary to develop the robot
data in a way that maximizes the comparability with employ
ment data. Thus it seems preferable to aggregate robot ap
plication areas somewhat differently from other authors for
our purposes.
The robot application area of welding includes resistance
or spot welding and arc welding. Resistance welding applica
tions dominate in industry today, especially in autos. Utiliza
tion of arc welding robots will grow in the 1980s now that
seam-following arc welding robots are available, although
there is still some disagreement about the likely extent of that
growth.
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Assembly robots exist in research and development
laboratories and pilot applications in industry, but most
assembly operations are incredibly complex for today's
robots. The future importance of assembly robots depends
on several intertwined factors: the adequacy of sensory
perception, adaptability to the workplace environment, and
the rationalization or orderliness of the workplace environ
ment. Rudimentary vision systems are available, but adap
tability remains extremely limited and reliability has yet to be
conclusively demonstrated in an industrial environment. In
part, it is simply a problem of consistency the robot or
robots must assemble a workpiece of perhaps 8 to 16 parts
(or more) perfectly for 14 hours a day.
In a joint project, Unimation and General Motors have
developed a robot for small parts assembly called the Pro
grammable Universal Machine for Assembly (PUMA). In
itial applications of the PUMA robot are now in progress.
Engelberger describes these robots as designed to do
automotive subassemblies; they will work alongside their
human counterparts doing the simpler assembly tasks.
(Engelberger, p. 137) He also believes that assembly robots
are closer to reality than any other new application.
(Engelberger, pp. 134-135)
The robot application area of painting includes robots that
are capable of spray painting and application of other
finishes, coatings, and sealants. It should be noted that the
workplace environment here is particularly unhealthy for
human workers. In addition, consistency of the final product
can be improved with robot application, and significant sav
ings in materials are also reported. Painting now ranks with
welding as a proven robot application.
The application area of machine loading/unloading is very
broad in this study. It encompasses casting, forging, press
loading, machine tool loading, and heat treatment. Machine
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loading robots are currently more important, both absolute
ly and relatively, outside the auto industry, and that relation
ship is expected to continue.
The final category of "other" includes robots that are
used primarily for parts transfer or material handling, in
spection and other new application areas. The auto industry
does not foresee a large role for robots in parts transfer in
their operations, but the possibilities may be significant in
other manufacturing areas.
The specific application areas of robots are closely related
to the industries that will most likely use robots. Virtually all
robots today can be found in the manufacturing sector, and
that is not expected to change significantly in the forecast
period. In this study, industrial detail is shown for autos and
all other manufacturing only. The dichotomy of autos and
all other manufacturing was chosen for a number of reasons.
First, considerably more information is available about the
auto industry. It is not only the largest current user of
robots, but also the auto firms have publicly announced their
future plans for utilization of robots. Second, the auto in
dustry is dominant in the State of Michigan, and it is only in
the auto industry that robots will have a significant impact in
the state during the forecast period, as discussed later. Third,
since the auto industry is beset with such severe problems
and challenges at the present time, it may well serve as a pro
totype for the general impact of robotics on manufacturing
technology in the U.S.
U.S. Robot Population in 1990
Our forecast of the U.S. robot population by application
and industry is presented in table 2-10. Although we utilized
all available information in formulating these projections,
including other forecasts and our interviews with leading ex
perts in the industry, the forecast represents our own judg-

Table 2-10
Forecast of U.S. Robot Population
by Application, 1990

Application

Autos
Range of estimate
Low
High

All other manufacturing
Range of estimate
Low
High

•n
o

Total
Range of estimate
Low
High
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Welding

3,200
(21.3%)

4,100
(16.4%)

5,500
(15.7%)

10,000
(13.3%)

8,700
(17.4%)

14,100
(14.1%)

Assembly

4,200
(28.0%)

8,800
(35.2%)

5,000
(14.3%)

15,000
(20.0%)

9,200
(18.4%)

23,800
(23.8%)
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Painting

1,800
(12.0%)

2,500
(10.0%)

3,200
(9.1%)

5,500
(7.3%)

5,000
(10.0%)

8,000
(8.0%)

Machine loading/unloading

5,000
(33.3%)

8,000
(32.0%)

17,500
(50.0%)

34,000
(46.0%)

22,500
(45.0%)

42,000
(42.0%)

800
(5.3%)
15,000

1,600
(6.4%)
25,000

3,800
(10.9%)
35,000

10,500
(14.0%)
75,000

4,600
(9.2%)
50,000

12,100
(12.1%)
100,000

Other
Total
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ment. In general, we concentrated on forecasting the in
dividual application areas by industry first, rather than the
overall totals. For the convenience of the reader, however,
we begin with a discussion of the overall forecast and then
proceed to the industries and specific application areas
within those industries.
We expect strong growth in the utilization of industrial
robots in the decade of the 1980s. By 1990 the total robot
population in the U.S. will range from a minimum of 50,000
to a maximum of 100,000 units. Given our estimate of the
year-end 1982 population of approximately 6,800-7,000
units, that implies an average growth rate from 30 percent to
40 percent for the eight years of the forecast period, or
roughly a seven- to fourteenfold increase in the total popula
tion of robots.
It may be worth mentioning that our range for the total
population of robots in 1990 is not dependent in any way on
the 1982 year-end stock (or some hypothetical growth rate).
There is no universal agreement on the U.S. population of
robots in 1981, although RIA's estimate of 4,700 units is the
one most frequently accepted, 5 and our estimate of 1982
sales may be in error. In short, regardless of near term
market conditions and/or re-evaluations of the existing
population of robots, we believe our forecast range
represents an appropriate and reasonable minimum and
maximum for the U.S. population of robots in 1990.
The overall forecast may appear similar to other available
forecasts, but it differs from them in at least one major way.
Other industry forecasts for the 1990 U.S. population of
robots tend to be near 100,000 units or above. Presumably,
these are "most likely" or "most probable" forecasts, since
5. There appear to be two problems. RIA's definition of a robot was only officially
adopted in 1979. It excluded mechanical transfer devices and thus required downward revi
sions in the stock estimates. Second, the imports of robots are very difficult to estimate.
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they are single point estimates only, whereas our 100,000
unit forecast is a maximum which we are reasonably confi
dent will not be exceeded. In other words, we predict strong
growth for the robotics industry in the 1980s, but that
growth will likely be slightly less rapid than other forecasts
would indicate.
There are many factors that support our conclusion of
strong growth for robotics, but perhaps less spectacular than
generally anticipated. Some of these factors have been
discussed previously, but they are mentioned once again to
highlight the important points. First, and perhaps most im
portant, American industry lacks trained personnel both to
implement robotics technology and to maintain and support
that technology once installed. One corporate user reported
advertising for a graduate engineer with experience in
robotics and then receiving only one application showing any
experience whatsoever (and that experience was minor).
Another complaint mentioned in our interviews was that
American universities produce engineers who are overly
specialized, rather than a generalist who understands
manufacturing technology and how to make it work. There
were even complaints about the lack of salesmen who truly
understand the capabilities and possibilities for utilization of
robotics technology. As stated previously, the lack of skilled
manpower applies to major current corporate users and to a
lesser extent to robot manufacturers. Although educational
programs for skilled robotics technicians (two-year degree)
are expanding rapidly, the supply of graduate engineers is
much less elastic. The lack of engineers with meaningful and
practical robotics work experience will likely continue for
quite some time. These matters are discussed more fully in
chapter 4.
A second factor that will limit the growth of industrial
robots is the financial commitment necessary to implement
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robotics technology. A system of four to six robots can cost
in excess of $1 million. Even three stand-alone units can cost
from $300,000 to $400,000. Engelberger reports that utiliza
tion of less than three robots at a particular location is un
wise and uneconomical due to maintenance requirements.
(Engelberger, p. 86) Others might place this figure slightly
higher, but the important point is that robotics technology
requires more than a nominal commitment of funds. Fur
thermore, although advertised robot prices are falling, the
robot itself usually represents less than 40 percent of the total
cost of installation, so dramatic price relief is not likely.
Finally, our interviews with robot users consistently in
dicated one warning about the cost of robot installations: be
prepared for a longer than expected start-up time. Given that
the primary motivation in adopting robots is the labor sav
ings, start-up delays can erode some of the cost savings
rather quickly.
The third limit to the growth of industrial robots, closely
allied with the financial commitment just discussed, is the
management commitment needed to successfully adopt in
dustrial robots. Pilot installations of robots almost in
variably identify some part of the factory that can operate in
isolation from the rest of the factory to ease the initial in
troduction of robots (and assure their success), but those
types of installations are limited. Eventually, user firms must
rethink and fundamentally restructure the factory to accom
modate robots. According to Bela Gold, however, the em
phasis of American industry on short-run payback does not
facilitate such fundamental rethinking. (Gold, 198la, p. 37)
The UM/SME Delphi survey asked respondents for the
payback period required by user industries to justify an in
vestment in a robot. The response was that the required
payback period today is two to three years. (Smith and
Wilson, p. A-60) More important, the respondents also said
that the required payback for a robot investment is expected
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to remain stable or decrease in most industries. (Smith and
Wilson, p. A-60) In that light, it should come as no surprise
that the Carnegie-Mellon survey found that the bulk of all
respondents expected to install robots as retrofits in existing
plants over the period 1980-1985. (Ayres and Miller, 198la,
p. 142) The apparent conclusion is that the emphasis of
American industry on short-run payback to justify expen
ditures on new plant and equipment applies to robots as well.
The fourth limit to the growth of industrial robots might
be termed general economic conditions. Very few economists
expect vigorous GNP growth in the decade of the 1980s, and
most would probably argue that even average GNP growth
consistent with the post-World War II annual average of 3.5
percent is unlikely. Furthermore, the robotics industry will
not likely be immune from the business cycle, so several
years of 50 percent growth may be followed by no growth or
even sales declines. Although we are aware of the reports
that American industry must reindustrialize rapidly to sur
vive in world markets and that such capital investment is in
evitable due to the aging of the existing stock of capital in the
U.S., we expect economy-wide investment will be more in
cremental and gradual, consistent with slow GNP growth.
Finally, much more rapid diffusion of robotics technology
than earlier process technologies appears highly unlikely.
Not only are there significant time lags between innovation
and successful marketing but also there can be significant
lags between successful adoption in one industry and adop
tion in other industries, as discussed earlier in the study.
More important, and in sharp contrast to the CarnegieMellon study, we expect diffusion of robotics technology to
be limited primarily to large firms, and perhaps even Fortune
500 firms, for the foreseeable future. Just as small firms
have not adopted numerically controlled machine tools,
small firms will not risk their very existence by the adoption
of robots.
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The foregoing limits notwithstanding, we do expect sus
tained growth for industrial robots. It is only because of the
almost euphoric expectations for this industry that we em
phasize our doubts: the lack of trained personnel, the large
financial and management commitment required, the unlike
ly prospect of vigorous GNP growth to support robot in
vestments, and the difficulties of diffusion of process
technology in general, including the likely prospect that
robots will remain large firm "big ticket" items for the
foreseeable future. In short, the robots are coming, but we
believe the change will be incremental and evolutionary
rather than revolutionary.
Turning to the industry forecasts, we project that the 1990
U.S. population of robots in the auto industry will range
from 15,000 to 25,000 units. If the auto industry firms were
to exactly meet their announced plans, there would be nearly
20,000 robots in the U.S. auto plants by 1990. The range of
our forecast thus allows for approximately a 25 percent
variation in those plans. It is roughly comparable to the
minimum and strong effort forecasts for the auto industry
by Tanner reported in table 2-7 (less Canada and Mexico).
This small range, much smaller than for the remainder of
manufacturing, reflects our judgment on a number of mat
ters about the auto industry. First, the auto industry is the
recognized pioneer and largest current user of robotics
technology. Second, the auto industry has undertaken con
siderable research and development efforts in robotics
technology. Third, international competitive pressures and
one of the highest average wage rates in U.S. manufacturing
lend economic support to the robotization of auto plants.
Finally, although considerable retooling of auto plants has
already been accomplished to accommodate the new down
sized, front-wheel drive, fuel-efficient autos, U.S. auto
manufacturers plan strong capital expenditures throughout
the decade of the 1980s to continue product changes and
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meet government-mandated standards. (Arthur Andersen &
Co., 1979, p. 14) Of course, if there is no recovery from the
current depressed state of the auto industry, then robot in
vestment plans and the very survival of the industry will be
jeopardized. However, we do not think such gloomy
possibilities are reasonable.
Within the auto industry, the relative magnitudes of the
estimates were strongly influenced by the public an
nouncements and plans of the auto firms. Assembly robots
are the most important application area within the high
range of the estimate, with 8,800 units or 35.2 percent of the
total of 25,000 robots in the auto industry, while assembly
robots are second in importance within the low range of the
estimate. Machine loading/unloading is the most important
application in the low-growth case, with 5,000 units or 33.3
percent of the total of 15,000 robots in the auto industry,
while machine loading/unloading is second in the highgrowth case. Thereafter, the relative rankings are the same in
both the low and high range of the estimate, with welding ap
plications third, painting applications fourth and other ap
plications fifth. In the auto industry in the decade of the
1980s, there is little doubt that the proven applications of
welding, painting, and to a lesser extent, machine
loading/unloading will be pursued most aggressively first,
followed by assembly applications later.
The forecasts of the specific application areas within autos
and all other manufacturing reflect more technical con
siderations than anything else. In general, the range of the
estimates for each of the application areas in autos is nar
rower than for each of the application areas in all other
manufacturing due to the greater uncertainties in all other
manufacturing. The range of the estimates for welding,
painting, and machine loading/unloading tend to be nar
rower than the other application areas in both autos and all
other manufacturing because these three application areas
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are technically feasible today. Likewise, the range of the
estimates for assembly robots and "other" robots is broader
because assembly robots are not currently proven applica
tions and the other category of robots allows for the develop
ment of new applications as well.
The diffusion of industrial robots in all other manufactur
ing is more difficult to predict than in autos. While the major
auto firms have announced their robot investment plans,
much less information is available about other industries.
Whereas the auto industry is almost totally dominated by
large firms likely to adopt robotics technology, other
manufacturing is less dominated by large firms. The auto in
dustry is clearly the pioneer in the successful utilization of
robotics technology, but its technical applicability to other
industries may require further adaptation, and the costeffectiveness of those applications is not as certain. For these
reasons and others, we project a rather broad range for the
population of robots in all other manufacturing of 35,000 to
75,000 units in 1990.
Within all other manufacturing, machine
loading/unloading applications are expected to continue
their dominance in both the high and low range of the
estimates with nearly 50 percent of the total population of
robots performing machine loading/unloading tasks.
Assembly applications are second in the high-growth case,
while they are third in the low-growth case. The range of the
estimate for assembly robots is especially broad 5,000 to
15,000 units reflecting both the technological uncertainties
and the possible difficulties of adaptation across industries.
In that regard, it should be mentioned that research and
development in assembly robots is being conducted by the
electronics and office computer industries within all other
manufacturing.
Welding, a proven application, is the second most fre
quent application in all other manufacturing within the low
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range of the estimate, while it falls to fourth in the high
range of the estimate as newer applications, especially
assembly, become relatively more important. Finally, paint
ing remains in fifth position in both the high and low range
of the estimates in all other manufacturing, with 3,200 to
5,500 units expected to be installed by 1990.
As stated earlier, we focused on forecasting the specific
application areas by industry rather than the overall totals,
so the overall totals by application areas are simply the sum
of the individual industry estimates by application areas.
Overall in our forecast, it turns out that machine
loading/unloading is first, assembly is second, welding is
third, and painting and the "other" category exchange the
fourth and fifth positions depending on the assumed growth
scenario.
Some final comments about our robot forecast are in
order. Although autos represent about one-fourth of the cur
rent robot market, there is no necessary reason for that rela
tionship to continue. It is reasonable to think that the market
share of autos as a proportion of total robot sales will de
pend on economic conditions in the auto industry itself.
Also, there is little reason to select the mid-point of the range
of any of our estimates (including the range for each of the
specific application areas) as the most likely single point
estimate possible. Uncertainties about the development and
diffusion of industrial robots are so great that more specifici
ty than the range itself is impossible at this time.
Michigan Robot Population
The forecast of the U.S. robot population in 1990 is used
to derive the Michigan robot population in that same year.
The specific methodology is illustrated in table 2-11. Accord
ing to the 1977 Census of Manufactures, 35.5 percent of all
the production workers in the U.S. motor vehicle and equip-
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ment industry (SIC 371) are located in Michigan, while only
4.1 percent of production workers in the remainder of
manufacturing are located in the state. These percentages,
indicating the relative importance of a particular industry in
Michigan as a proportion of the same industry in the U.S.,
are utilized to assign robots to the state by industry and ap
plication area.

Table 2-11
Production Worker Employment
in Michigan and the U.S., 1977

Industry
Motor vehicles
and equipment
All other
manufacturing
Total manufacturing

Michigan
production
workers
(thousands)

Percent of
U.S. industry
in Michigan

727.6

258.4

35.5

12,963.4

531.0
789.4

4.1

U.S.
production
workers
(thousands)

13,691.0

5.8

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 7977 Census of
Manufactures: General Summary, Vol. 1, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
DC, 1981, pp. 1-59 and 1-94.

Although the foregoing appears to be the only feasible
alternative to estimate the number of robots in Michigan in
1990, there are a number of implications and/or limitations
that must be explicitly stated. First, this method assumes that
the relative importance of autos and all other manufacturing
in the state vis-a-vis the nation will remain the same during
the forecast period. That is not at all clear. David Verway
reports that a centralized auto industry utilizing the Japanese
"kan-ban" system of producing and delivering parts exactly
when they are needed strongly favors the Midwest, not only
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because the Midwest and Michigan are already the center of
the auto industry, but also because strong import competi
tion on the East and West Coasts argues against expansion
there. (Verway, p. 6)
On the other hand, Verway also argues that the passage of
domestic content legislation would work against the Midwest
because the Japanese would probably locate their U.S.
plants near their major markets, the East and West Coasts.
(Verway, p. 6) Complicating matters more, GM announced
recently that discussions were under way with Toyota for
joint production of a subcompact car, probably utilizing two
California plants which were only recently shut down.
Chrysler recently announced similar joint plans with Mit
subishi for a subcompact automobile utilizing a Missouri
plant.
All of these potential locational influences and others can
not be untangled sufficiently to support any other assump
tion than relative stability in Michigan's proportion of pro
duction in the U.S. auto industry during the forecast period.
Michigan's proportion of all other manufacturing may fall
slightly during the forecast period, but that is of little impor
tance since the number of robots in all other manufacturing
in Michigan is expected to be small.
A second implication of the methodology utilized to
estimate the number of robots in the State of Michigan is
that it directly assumes that on average the auto firms and
other firms will install robots in Michigan in the same pro
portion as the relevant production worker employment in the
state. The presumption is that production worker employ
ment represents an adequate measure of the likelihood of
robotizing Michigan's factories. That appears reasonable
since robots will replace such workers, but it remains only a
very rough approximation. In particular, decisions to
robotize could be expected to reflect wage differentials and
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other determinants of production techniques. In addition,
the rate of introduction of robots is expected to be more
rapid where new plants are opened, thus reflecting choices of
the location of new productive capacity. Influences such as
these on the probability of robotization of Michigan fac
tories cannot be accurately predicted at this time.
The derived forecast of the Michigan robot population can
be found in table 2-12. Since the relative importance of the
application areas within each industry remains the same as in
the U.S. forecast, no discussion of those estimates is needed.
The relative importance of the estimates across industries in
Michigan, however, differs sharply from the U.S. totals.
Specifically, three-quarters of the robots in Michigan are ex
pected to be in the auto industry, while in the U.S. only
about one-fourth of the robot population will be in autos.
In absolute terms, the number of robots in the auto in
dustry in Michigan in 1990 is expected to range from a low of
5,327 units to a high of 8,879 units; the same figures for all
other manufacturing in Michigan are 1,434 to 3,072 units.
The combined total 1990 population of robots in Michigan is
then 6,761 units to 11,951 units. Since about one-third of
Michigan employment is in the auto industry, but threefourths of Michigan's robots are expected to be applied
there, it is obvious that the impacts will be much more
dramatic in the auto industry.
The remainder of the monograph addresses the human
resource impacts expected to result from this projected
population of industrial robots in both the U.S. and in
Michigan. The next chapter specifically addresses the ques
tion of job displacement, while the following chapter
discusses those jobs that will likely be created by the spread
of robotics technology. It will become clear as we proceed
that the forecast of the robot population is the key link in
our procedure. The robot forecast establishes the scale to

Table 2-12
Forecast of the Michigan Robot Population
by Application, 1990

Application

Autos
Range of estimate
Low
High

All other manufacturing
Range of estimate
Low
High

to

Total
Range of estimate
Low
High

Welding

1,136

1,456

225

410

1,361

1,866

Assembly

1,492

3,125

205

614

1,697

3,739

639

888

131

225

770

1,113

Machine loading/unloading

1,776

2,841

111

1,393

2,493

4,234

Other
Total

284
5,327

569
8,879

156
1,434

430
3,072

440
6,761

999
11,951

Painting

Pothe
lRobot
of
epuaslatison
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which the specific employment impacts are adjusted. In our
opinion, it is the consistency of these human resource im
pacts with the robot population forecast that is one of the
major contributions of the study.

3
Displacement Effects
of Robots
Before attempting to estimate the displacement effects of
robots, it is important to insure that the meaning of the term
"displacement" is clear. We use displacement to refer to the
elimination of particular jobs, not to the layoff of individual
workers. Certainly it is possible that the displacement of a
particular job by a robot might lead to the layoff of the occu
pant of that job, but it is not necessary. Layoff refers to the
involuntary separation of the worker from the firm,
displacement refers to the elimination of the job itself
without any assumption as to whether the worker in that job
is separated from the firm, either voluntarily or involuntari
ly. Later in this chapter, after the discussion of the potential
displacement effects of industrial robots in Michigan, the
issue of unemployment resulting from this displacement will
be discussed.
The basic methodology of this study proceeds from the
forecast of the robot population presented in the last
chapter. Once the number of robots by application area and
industry can be specified (even within a broad range), it is
only necessary to determine the average job displacement ef
fect of each robot. Then these estimates of displacement by
application and industry can be compared to the employ65
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ment totals for the same application and industry to derive
an estimate of the relative magnitude of job displacement
associated with the projected robot population.

Average Rate of Job Displacement
by Robots
Our interviews strongly supported the following conclu
sion about the average displacement effect of robots: one
robot replaces one worker per shift. That conclusion should
not be surprising. Robots are not any faster than human
workers, and regardless of the protestations of some in the
industry that robots should not be compared to humans,
robots do in fact perform functions that were previously
done by human workers. Engelberger admits that one focus
of the development effort of the PUMA robot for small
parts assembly was to make it human size to work alongside
human workers. (Engelberger, p. 137) In several articles
discussing cost justification of robots, John A. Behuniak,
program manager of Automation Manufacturing
Technology, General Electric Company, stresses that
managers should guard against overly optimistic estimates of
labor savings. (Behuniak, 1979 and 1981) He states,
"Robots, unlike other forms of automation, usually only
replace humans on a one-for-one basis." (Behuniak, 1979,
p. 1)
There is a possibility that the average displacement effect
may increase as technological improvements occur, as robot
systems become more prevalent, and as the fund of human
knowledge of robot applications increases. Tanner and
Adolfson, in their study of the U.S. auto industry, conclude
that one robot replaces 0.9 workers today in the auto in
dustry, but that will improve to 1.2 workers by 1990. (Tan
ner and Adolfson, p. 103) Of course, these data relate to new
installations only and not to the total stock of robots. So
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even if robot productivity improves, a substitution rate of
one robot for one worker will not be far off.
It should be reiterated that stand-alone robot installations
are expected to dominate over the next few years. By 1985
the UM/SME Delphi forecast anticipates only 20 percent of
robot sales will be for inclusion in robot systems, and by
1990 that figure is expected to rise to 40 percent. (Smith and
Wilson, p. 46) Currently it appears that the displacement ef
fect of isolated robot systems or cells in production facilities
is not much different from that of stand-alone robots
themselves. However, as we slowly move toward the factory
of the future and these cells are themselves linked together,
some observers expect the displacement effect to rise
dramatically.
On the other hand, it may be far too easy to overestimate
the productivity (displacement) impact of technological
change in general. Bela Gold, who has studied this question
in many industries, concludes that even major technological
changes have ''fallen far short of their expected effects."
(Gold, 198 Ib, p. 91) The source of the overestimate is the
tendency to focus only on the change itself and thereby
neglect the totality of the production process. (Gold, 1981b,
p. 91) It is somewhat akin to recognizing the important dif
ference between potential effects and actual effects, as
discussed in chapter 1, and may in part account for the warn
ing by Behuniak not to overestimate the labor savings at
tributable to robots.
There are several factors that will tend to mitigate the job
displacement impact of industrial robots. First, as robots
become more common in manufacturing processes, they will
replace hard automation such as mechanical transfer
devices, as well as human workers. This kind of substitution
follows from the fact that industrial robots represent an in
termediate technology between dedicated or hard automa
tion and manual or human labor.
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Second, as robots become more numerous, the need arises
for redundancy in some robot installations. That is already
occurring today in body assembly welding applications in the
auto industry, where one or two robots at the end of the line
are actually spares, available in the event of robot failure.
Third, there will eventually be a need for replacement
robots, although it is still too early to establish an average ex
pected lifespan for a robot. Our interviews revealed
estimates from 10 to 15 years; one person even maintained
that with proper maintenance and replacement of parts the
lifespan of a robot is indefinite, except where the work en
vironment is unusually harsh, such as painting applications.
The problem, of course, is that without specific information
about discards, we may mistakenly count replacement robots
as new robots and subsequently new displacement when in
fact no new displacement has actually occurred. In any
event, dramatic changes in the average displacement ratio
are highly unlikely during the forecast period, and it is our
judgment that the one-to-one relationship between robots in
stalled and workers displaced represents the best approxima
tion to the actual gross displacement impacts that will occur.
A closely related question is the number of shifts per day.
This typically varies depending on the industry, stage of the
business cycle, and sometimes seasonal factors. On the one
hand, simple formulas suggested to evaluate robot acquisi
tions imply that single-shift operation of robots is not
generally cost-effective, although some robots today are be
ing so used. (Engelberger, pp. 104-106) On the other hand,
most American manufacturing industry does not currently
operate three shifts. The UM/SME Delphi forecast foresees
little impact of robots on the number of daily shifts (Smith
and Wilson, p. 82) but a careful reading of the rationale pro
vided by the experts supporting their opinions reflects con
siderable disagreement on this issue. (Smith and Wilson, p.
A-88) Some of the experts polled did point out that once
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robots are implemented in significant numbers, time must be
allowed for robot maintenance. So industry movement to
three-shift operation may not be likely even with widespread
robot application.
Given the vagaries of product demand over the business
cycle and direct maintenance requirements, it appears that
an average number of shifts in excess of two is highly unlike
ly. But economic constraints appear to prevent widespread
robot utilization in single-shift applications. Thus, in this
study two-shift operations are assumed; so, on the average,
two workers are displaced for each robot installed. As robot
utilization becomes more common in production facilities,
this simple ratio assumption may need to be re-examined,
but with a 1990 focus two jobs displaced for each robot ap
pears to be very reasonable.

U.S. Job Displacement
The robot population forecasts presented in the previous
chapter can be translated directly into the number of jobs
displaced on the basis of an average of two jobs per robot for
each functional application. Table 3-1 reports these results
for the U.S. as a whole. Clearly, the forecast of 50,000 to
100,000 robots operational in the U.S. by 1990 means that
100,000 to 200,000 jobs will have been displaced by robots
during the decade of the 1980s.
Further, we expect job losses of 30,000 to 50,000 in the
U.S. auto industry as a result of the application of robots,
and 70,000 to 150,000 jobs lost in other manufacturing in
dustries. These totals can be broken down to specific func
tional areas as well. For instance, our robot population
forecast implies that 6,400 to 8,200 jobs will be eliminated by
welding robots in the auto industry. Similarly, 11,000 to
20,000 welding jobs in other manufacturing industries will be
lost by 1990.

Table 3-1
Estimate of Job Displacement in U.S.
by Application, 1990

Application

Autos
Range of estimate
Low
High

All other manufacturing
Range of estimate
High
Low

Total
Range of estimate
Low
High

Welding

6,400

8,200

11,000

20,000

17,400

28,200

Assembly

8,400

17,600

10,000

30,000

18,400

47,600

Painting

3,600

5,000

6,400

11,000

10,000

16,000

Machine loading/unloading

10,000

16,000

35,000

68,000

45,000

84,000

Other
Total

1,600
30,000

3,200
50,000

7,600
70,000

21,000
150,000

9,200
100,000

24,200
200,000

lEfof
Robot
acefmectenst
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A larger number of assembly jobs are expected to be
eliminated by industrial robots during this decade. Table 3-1
reports that from 18,400 to 47,600 such jobs are at risk of
robotization. The range of prediction for assembly displace
ment is wider than that for welding, owing to the uncertain
ties of robot assembly capability as discussed in chapter 2. If
robots enjoy early success at more complicated assembly
tasks, the job displacement will range to the higher end of
our estimates. Painting robots will displace fewer jobs than
either welding or assembly robots as shown in table 3-1.
However, as we will see later, the relative impact on employ
ment in this area looks to be very significant.
The greatest number of jobs will be eliminated by pickand-place robots performing machine loading and unloading
functions. These functions include casting, forging, press
loading, machine tool loading and other similar operations.
Table 3-1 suggests that roughly 40 percent of all robot job
displacement will occur in this area. Machine loading and
unloading is the best known general use of robots in U.S. in
dustry today and will continue to be the most prevalent kind
of industrial robot in the future. It is worthy of note that this
area is significantly less concentrated in the auto industry
than those discussed heretofore.
But these numbers have only limited meaning without
reference to an employment base to put them in relative
perspective. That is, it is interesting to know that there may
be 3,200 to 4,100 welding robots in the auto industry by
1990, and that these robots can be expected to eliminate
6,400 to 8,200 jobs. But the impact of such a development
depends to a considerable degree on the relative magnitude
of this displacement. Does this represent 1 percent or 10 per
cent or 100 percent of the welding jobs? The answer to such a
question is required before any conclusions about the
seriousness of this situation can be reached.
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For instance, if the welding jobs eliminated represent only
a tiny fraction of welders employed in the auto industry, lit
tle disruption or distress would be expected. Normal
employee turnover could be expected to effectuate the reduc
tion in force required, and displacement of jobs need have
no implications of layoff or unemployment. On the other
hand, if a large proportion of jobs is represented, there is
more cause for concern.
What is needed is an occupational data base organized by
industry that makes possible the comparison of these poten
tial job displacement figures with the existing employment
levels in the same geographical area, function, and industry.
Fortunately, such a detailed occupational data base does ex
ist. It is called the Occupational Employment Statistics
(OES) survey published by the U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The OES survey was developed during the 1970s to fill the
need for a relatively current, detailed data base for making
occupational projections. The BLS had used industryoccupation matrices based on the 1960 and 1970 Decennial
Censuses but found that a more frequent survey was desired.
The 10-year intervals between observations just proved too
infrequent to serve the purpose of projecting occupational
needs. (U.S. Department of Labor, 1981b)
The OES survey is conducted jointly by the federal and
state governments on a 3-year rotating schedule. All
nonagricultural employers are divided into one of three
groups according to industry. A sample of establishments
from one of these groups is surveyed each year. Manufactur
ing employers were surveyed in 1971, 1974, 1977 and 1980,
although coverage by state was rather spotty before 1977.
(U.S. Department of Labor, 1980b, p. 91) Detailed occupa
tional information is collected for a total of 1,678 occupa
tional titles and 378 industries. The information is gathered
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from each employer using no more than 200 job titles that
have been previously found appropriate to that industry.
Employment is reported according to the highest skill level
performed by an individual employee as of the 12th of April,
May, or June, depending on which month shows the least
seasonality in employment in the industry.
From this raw data, the BLS produces national industryoccupation matrices. In addition, most states participating in
the joint effort also produce statewide matrices based on a
common set of procedures developed by the BLS. To
evaluate the relative magnitude of job displacement, we can
compare the gross displacement estimates from table 3-1 to
employment levels reported in 1980 in the OES survey of
manufacturing employers.
This procedure should prove sufficient to put the
magnitude of projected job displacement in perspective, but
there are problems with misinterpreting the precision of such
estimates. We discuss four of these problems. First, the
utilization of employment data from any given year implies
the assumption of constant output. Thus, using a 1980
employment data base to assess the significance of job
displacement carries the assumption that output and employ
ment in 1990 would be comparable to 1980 levels, except for
the influence of robots. Of course, this is highly unrealistic;
there are a multitude of forces that will cause output and
employment levels in 1990 to differ from those in 1980.
The only alternative to this unrealistic fixed output
assumption is to forecast the influence of all these other fac
tors and then use the projected output and employment
levels as a base for determining the relative impact of robots.
Results of this type will be presented later in the chapter.
Suffice it to say that there is some merit in using known facts
as a basis to assess the significance of a change rather than a
projection of unknown accuracy.
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Second, in addition to the implicit assumption of fixed
output, choice of a particular base year also carries with it
the peculiar circumstances of that year. This can best be il
lustrated by recent employment trends in the auto industry.
Auto sales and auto industry employment peaked in 1978.
For the U.S. as a whole, employment in the auto industry
declined precipitously from 1979 to 1980 and has shown no
improvement since. In fact, 1982 employment levels reflect a
further decline over the depressed 1980 and 1981 totals.
Table 3-2 reports these totals with an index number showing
the employment level relative to the 1978 peak for all
employees and for production workers. It is clear from the
table that employment in the auto industry has declined by
roughly 30 percent from 1978 through May of 1982. Between
1979 and 1980 alone, the average total employment in the
auto industry declined by over 20 percent, due to the impact
of the recession and foreign imports.

Table 3-2
Employment in U.S. Motor Vehicle and Equipment
Industry (SIC 371)
1978 to 1982

Year

Total
employment
(thousands)

Index
(1978 = 1.00)

Production
workers
(thousands)

Index
(1978 = 1.00)

1978
1979
1980
1981
May 1982

1,004.9
990.4
788.8
783.9
717.0

1.000
.986
.785
.780
.714

781.7
764.4
575.4
582.8
533.2

1.000
.978
.736
.746
.682

SOURCES: Data for 1978 through 1981 from Supplement to Employment and Earnings:
Revised Establishment Data, Bureau of Labor Statistics, June 1982, p. 88. The 1982 data
are from Employment and Earnings, Bureau of Labor Statistics, August 1982, Table B-2,
p. 40.
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But if one is trying to assess the relative displacement ef
fect of robots, which employment level is appropriate? If the
reduction in employment in 1980 is regarded as a permanent
change, clearly 1980 is an adequate base year. If, however,
the reduction is seen as a short term phenomenon, using 1980
employment numbers will significantly distort the results.
Clearly, the reduction of 20 percent in auto employment in
1980 would cause an increase of 20 percent in the calculated
displacement rate with the methods used here.
Actually, we would not regard either the peak 1978
employment levels or the depressed 1982 employment levels
as a fair baseline. It is probably not reasonable to predict a
return to 1978 employment totals in the auto industry, even
if sales do recover to the 13 million level. The U.S. auto in
dustry must raise the productivity of its labor force (or
reduce the levels of compensation) if it is to meet the foreign
competition. Thus it is appropriate to anticipate a declining
labor input requirement for a given level of sales. The ap
plication of industrial robots is obviously one of the ways the
industry is attempting to meet the challenge.
On the other hand, if profitability cannot be restored to
the industry through significant sales gains in the short term,
the capacity to finance the capital improvements (including
robots) needed to meet the long term competitive goals will
be seriously impaired. From the perspective of anticipated
employment levels in the industry, these considerations lead
us to believe that an employment base somewhere between
the 1978 level and the 1982 level is most reasonable. The 1980
employment base utilized here thus appears overly
pessimistic, but it represents the most recently available data
from the OES base. Utilizing an employment base that
underestimates the true level will serve to bias the job
displacement rates upward. This issue will be discussed brief
ly again when the Michigan displacement figures are
presented later in the chapter.
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The third reason to be cautious about the precision of our
estimates involves the definition of the auto industry itself.
Up to now it has not been necessary to specify precisely what
is meant by the term auto industry. Implicitly we have used
the term to refer to the major auto producers, General
Motors, Ford, Chrysler and American Motors. This is
primarily a matter of convenience, but also reflects the judg
ment that robots will continue to be large firm technology
through at least 1990. At the other definitional extreme
would be what the Michigan Employment Security Commis
sion has called "Motor-Vehicle-Related" employment.
(Michigan Employment Security Commission, 1981b, p. 2)
This includes not only the assembly of motor vehicles, but
component parts suppliers, raw material providers, and tool
and die shops as well.
Unfortunately, neither of these options are workable when
matching up against an occupational data base. The OES
uses three-digit SIC codes as the minimum level of aggrega
tion available to the public. This poses a potential problem
of comparability with the robot forecasts presented earlier.
The only workable definition of the auto industry at the
three-digit SIC level is SIC 371, Motor Vehicles and Equip
ment. This will include auto parts and accessory manufac
turers, but excludes stamping plants, engine plants, and
other major component manufacturing from the industryoccupation data base. The result is that there can be a
discrepancy between the areas of application of the robots
and the occupational employment figures against which the
displacement should be measured. Given the lack of more
specific information, these inaccuracies must be tolerated.
The final reason to question the precision of our estimates
is the problem of determining what, if any, displacement im
pacts have already been registered in the U.S. economy.
Ideally, an employment observation dating before any
substantial robot deployment would eliminate the possible
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question of intermediate impacts. That is, if the employment
profile available predates the application of robots, there is
no necessity to try to determine what effects have occurred to
date and are therefore already imbedded in the measured
employment base. Unfortunately, there is insufficient infor
mation to determine the industry of use or application areas
for the less than 2,000 robots installed in the U.S. by the time
of the survey. Thus, we must disregard these intermediate
impacts, which are quite small in any event, when using a
1980 employment base.
In summary, there are many reasons to be wary of the
precision of our displacement rates. There are serious ques
tions about the assumption of constant output, the ap
propriateness of the base year, the definition of the auto in
dustry, and the neglect of intermediate impacts. Thus the
estimates of the relative magnitude of job displacement must
be regarded as representing a general range rather than a
precise point. We do believe, however, that we can identify
the general order of magnitude of robot impacts, even if
specific estimates are inaccurate. Further, we submit that it is
the order of magnitude that should shape any policy
response to the challenge of robotics at this early date.
Table 3-3 presents the estimated displacement impact of
industrial robots in the U.S. Since employment levels are
from 1980 and the robot population forecast is for 1990, the
job displacement is a cumulative total over the 1980 to 1990
period. For each of the application areas listed, a specific oc
cupational correlate was selected from those available in the
OES. For the welding robot application area, the occupa
tional title "welders and flamecutters" was selected as
representing the job content against which the projected
number of welding robots would be applied. For assembly
robots, the "assembler" titles were judged to be the employ
ment base. For painting robots, the "production painter"
occupation in the OES was chosen. For the machine loading

Table 3-3
Displacement Impact of Robots in the United States
by Application, Cumulative 1980 to 1990

Application

Autos
1980
Displacement
employment
range
level
(percent)

All other manufacturing
Displacement
1980
employment
range
(percent)
level

Total
Displacement
1980
range
employment
(percent)
level

Welding

41,159

15-20

359,470

3- 6

400,629

4- 7

Assembly

175,922

5 - 10

1,485,228

1 - 2

1,661,150

1 - 3

Painting

13,556

27 -37

92,622

7 - 12

106,178

9- 15

80,725

12-20

988,815

3- 7

1,069,540

4- 8

467,846
773,797

6- 11
4- 6

9,954,048
19,587,771

1 - 2
0- 1

10,421,894
20,361,568

1 - 2
0- 1

Machine loading/
unloading
All operatives
and laborers
All employment

SOURCE: Employment data based upon unpublished OES data provided by Office of Economic Growth and Employment Projections, Bureau
of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC.
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and unloading applications, the semi-skilled metalworking
operative group (with the exclusion of welders and flamecutters) was selected. This includes drill press operatives, grind
ing and abrading machine operatives, lathe and milling
machine operatives, punch and stamping press operatives,
and other precision machine operatives.
Clearly, the choice of the specific occupational content
against which to apply the robot displacement figures is
somewhat arbitrary. For instance, we chose to apply the
painting robots against employment in the production
painter occupational category. But it is quite likely that some
of the jobs actually displaced will come from other occupa
tions, say, materials handlers or general laborers. This is par
ticularly likely if a robot system is installed rather than just a
stand-alone retrofit robot. Again, the conclusion is that
these numbers should be taken as indicative of the general
range of impact on occupational employment.
Table 3-3 indicates that the robot population forecasts
presented in chapter 2 will have widely varying impacts on
different occupations. The most dramatic displacement rate
is for production painters in the auto industry. Our results
show that from 27 to 37 percent of these jobs may be
eliminated by 1990. In addition, table 3-3 shows that 7 to 12
percent of production painter jobs in other manufacturing
industries may be displaced. Overall, 9 to 15 percent of these
jobs are threatened by robots in this decade. These results
should not be surprising. Painting is a prime robot applica
tion, in that it is based on existing technology, and painting
itself is a particularly dirty and potentially hazardous job.
Significant job displacement is also anticipated for
welding occupations, another prime robot application. Table
3-3 indicates that 15 to 20 percent of welder jobs in the auto
industry will be displaced by welding robots. A lesser impact
on other manufacturing welding jobs is also shown, with 3 to
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6 percent displacement forecast. For all manufacturing, 4 to
7 percent of welder jobs are expected to be eliminated by
1990.
Very similar results apply to the machine loading and
unloading robot application area. Overall, 4 to 8 percent of
this large employment group can expect to be displaced by
1990, with autos showing three to four times the impact of
other manufacturing. Since this job content is already
automated to some degree, robot application here calls for
integrating the robots into the existing production facilities.
This is notoriously difficult to accomplish smoothly.
This is even more true for the assembly robots, the task
which shows the least impact in table 3-3. While 5 to 10 per
cent of auto assembly jobs are expected to be robotized, only
1 to 2 percent of such jobs in other manufacturing are at
risk. The aggregate manufacturing displacement rate for
assembly will only be 1 to 3 percent. As mentioned earlier,
this impact depends on continued refinements in robot
capability, adaptability, and reliability. The projections here
are clearly more speculative than those for welding or paint
ing.
Some may question why some of the specific occupational
displacement rates are not higher, particularly in the auto in
dustry. For example, in chapter 2 it was pointed out that the
installation of welding robots in the auto industry will slow
down after 1988. Presumably that represents maximum ap
plication of robotics technology to welding functions. Why,
then, isn't the displacement of welders approaching 100 per
cent?
There are a number of reasons for this apparent discrepan
cy. First, it is clear that the OES occupation of welders and
flamecutters in the auto industry includes people doing work
other than welding auto bodies together on the assembly
line, the primary robot application. Second, the auto in-
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dustry as defined in the OES data base includes many small
firms producing auto parts and accessories. As discussed
earlier, we do not expect small firms to adopt robotics
technology in substantial numbers before 1990. So there is a
considerable population of welders in smaller firms who may
not even see a welding robot by 1990.
Third, even though we have tried to be as careful as we can
in formulating our estimates and applying them to the
available occupational data base, there are bound to be
many inaccuracies associated with such a procedure. For in
stance, actual job classification schemes utilized in most
large firms tend to be much more detailed than the occupa
tional data available in the OES data base. Thus when we
think of occupational displacement, we may be utilizing a
broader definition of an occupation than some other
observers.
In general, without a detailed case study at the plant level
of labor input vectors before and after a specific
technological change, it is difficult to say how much our
simplifying assumptions may have influenced particular oc
cupational displacement rates. This is yet another reason to
regard our relative displacement rates as estimates of the
general order of magnitude of job elimination rather than
precise point estimates. It is also one of the reasons that we
will next assess the impacts of robots against more general
measures of employment, where occupational classification
is not a factor.
The two bottom rows of table 3-3 express the relative
displacement impact in this more aggregated manner. The
job displacement expected is calculated as a proportion of all
employment and of all operatives and laborers, in other
words, the semi-skilled and unskilled manufacturing labor
force. As shown in the table, aggregate job displacement of 4
to 6 percent in the auto industry is anticipated. However, this
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represents 6 to 11 percent of operatives and laborers, the
"blue collar"workforce. Thus, during the decade of the '80s
production worker employment in the auto industry is pro
jected to be up to 11 percent lower than it otherwise would be
due to the introduction of robots.
Table 3-3 also reveals that anticipated impacts are much
lower in other manufacturing industries. From 1 percent to 2
percent of all semi-skilled jobs will be eliminated by 1990 in
these areas. Of course, individual industry impacts would
tend to be higher than the average in those industries where
robots are well suited to production techniques. On the other
hand, we are not aware of any other industry that will show a
gross impact equal to the auto industry. Thus it is not
unreasonable to suppose that our displacement figures for
the auto industry represent an upper bound for other
manufacturing industries during the forecast period.
In summary, table 3-3 indicates that robots will not have a
significant direct impact on overall employment levels in the
U.S. between now and 1990. Robots in total will eliminate
less than 1 percent of all jobs in this period. In the auto in
dustry, however, overall displacement impact does appear
significant. In particular applications like welding and paint
ing, the job displacement impact is quite dramatic. The im
portance of these job displacement results is that they in
dicate a wide range in the impact of robotics. While there is
no cause for concern in an aggregate sense, there will be
pockets of significant job displacement. Later in the chapter
we will attempt to describe the possible unemployment im
pact of this job displacement.
Before going on to discuss the potential displacement in
duced by robots in Michigan, it may be useful to compare
our U.S. results with others, especially the Carnegie-Mellon
study and the UM/SME Delphi forecast. Table 3-4 presents
these comparative results organized according to the applica-
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tion areas used for this study. Maximum comparability was
sought here, but comparisons across studies must always be
interpreted cautiously because of differing scope, puposes,
methods, definitions, time periods, etc. Even the occupa
tions themselves are not identical across the studies,
although they are similar. In general, our estimates of
displacement are the lowest ones shown. This is especially
marked when comparing our total displacement rates with
those from the Carnegie-Mellon study. But the results from
the UM/SME Delphi forecast may help make it clear why
this is so.
Recall from chapter 1 that the Carnegie-Mellon study ask
ed what proportion of the work done by given occupations
could be performed by Level 1 or Level 2 robots. Thus the
question corresponds most closely with the potential
displacement figure from the UM/SME Delphi survey. In
fact, the Carnegie-Mellon displacement rates are even
higher, though the rates shown are the average response for
Level 1 robots only. It is also interesting to note that the
Carnegie-Mellon displacement rates are rather close to the
top end of our range for the automobile industry.
This result may be due in part to the Carnegie-Mellon
weighting procedure which gives greater importance to large
employers. The large firms in their survey are more likely to
be auto or auto related firms, since there is a dispropor
tionate concentration of both robot users and large
establishments within the auto industry. (Ayres and Miller,
198la, p. 100) This raises the possibility that the CarnegieMellon displacement estimates could be more descriptive of
the auto industry than an all-industry average, at least
through 1990. Our total manufacturing gross displacement
rates agree more closely with the UM/SME Delphi survey ac
tual expected displacement rates than with the UM/SME
Delphi potential rates. This is to be expected since our pro
jections are also targeted on the actual rather than
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theoretical or potential impacts. In fact, our estimates tend
to be slightly lower than the UM/SME Delphi estimates of
actual expected displacement.
In summary, the Carnegie-Mellon displacement results are
quite similar to our projections for the auto industry. Given
that the auto industry is the leader in the application of
robots, this may corroborate their theoretically possible
levels of displacement for Level 1 robots. We do not feel,
however, that their displacement results can be generalized
across all manufacturing industries. Our gross displacement
rate estimates coincide much more closely with the results of
the UM/SME Delphi forecast. We are not dismayed by the
fact that our estimates tend to be somewhat more conser
vative than even the UM/SME Delphi actual projections.
We discussed the reasons for our reservations extensively in
chapter 2. We repeat our belief that most of the observers of
robotics are erring on the side of technical progress without
full consideration of the human, organizational, and finan
cial limits to changes in process technology.

Michigan Job Displacement
For the State of Michigan, OES surveys of manufacturing
employers were conducted in 1977 and 1980. However, the
1980 survey data are not yet available for public release, so
the 1977 survey is actually the only such detailed data base
currently available for the State of Michigan. (Michigan
Employment Security Commission, 198la) Actually, we will
be using a BLS standardized 1978 update of these raw 1977
Michigan numbers to maximize consistency of the informa
tion. These unpublished data were provided by the MESC at
the three-digit SIC level, in contrast to the published 1977
data which are at two-digit industry level only.
Table 3-5 shows the estimates of job displacement
resulting from the application of robots in the State of

oo
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Table 3-5
Estimate of Job Displacement in MicMgan
by Application, 1990

Application

Autos
Range of estimate
High
Low

All other manufacturing
Range of estimate
Low
High

O
co*
T3

Total
Range of estimate
High
Low

Welding

2,272

2,912

450

820

2,722

3,732

Assembly

2,984

6,250

410

1,228

3,394

7,478

Painting

1,278

1,776

262

450

1,540

2,226

Machine loading/unloading

3,552

5,682

1,434

2,786

4,986

8,468

568

1,138
17,758

860
6,144

880
13,522

1,998

10,654

312
2,868
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Michigan. It is based on the Michigan robot forecast
presented in chapter 2 and the assumption of two jobs
displaced per robot applied. Overall, we project that between
13,522 and 23,902 jobs will be displaced in Michigan by
1990. Because of the structure of employment by industry in
the State of Michigan, the impact of robots in the auto in
dustry looms much larger than for the U.S. as a whole.
Table 3-5 shows that 75 percent of the job loss in Michigan
is expected to be in the auto industry (SIC 371) with gross
displacement of 10,654 to 17,758 auto jobs. Nearly 2,000
painting jobs, 3,000 welding jobs, 6,000 machine tending
jobs, and over 6,000 assembly jobs in the auto industry could
be lost to robotization by the end of the decade in Michigan.
The results in the table also show that gross job displacement
in Michigan will be very minor outside the auto industry.
Table 3-6 presents these same job displacement results ex
pressed in relative terms. Each gross job displacement
figure in table 3-5 is divided by the corresponding occupa
tional employment from the OES for Michigan in 1978.
Thus the displacement rates presented in table 3-6 represent
the cumulative total gross displacement proportion for that
occupational group over the period from 1978 to 1990.
In addition to these specific occupational rates, the bot
tom lines of the table show the overall displacement rates
calculated against all employment and against employment
in the operative and laborer sectors, generally encompassing
the semi-skilled and unskilled workers. From the table it is
apparent that the projected Michigan robot population in
1990 will displace somewhere between 1 and 2 percent of all
1978 manufacturing jobs in the state. When assessed against
only the semi-skilled and unskilled employment base, the
proportion of job displacement exactly doubles to between 2
and 4 percent. In both instances, the Michigan displacement
impact is roughly twice that of the U.S.

Table 3-6
Displacement Impact of Robots in Michigan
by Application, Cumulative 1978 to 1990

Application

Autos
1978
Displacement
employment
range
level
(percent)

All other manufacturing
1978
Displacement
employment
range
level
(percent)

00
00

Total
1978
Displacement
employment
range
level
(percent)

Welding

14,910

15 -20

22,694

2- 4

37,604

7- 10

Assembly

65,764

5- 10

50,678

1 - 2

116,442

3- 6

Painting

4,378

29-40

4,387

6- 10

8,765

17-25

42,149

8- 14

86,906

2- 3

129,055

4- 7

206,927
409,506

5 - 9
3 - 4

397,598
769,841

1 - 2
0- 1

604,525
1,179,347

2- 4
1 - 2

Machine loading/
unloading
All operatives
and laborers
All employment

SOURCE: Employment data based upon unpublished OES data provided by Office of Economic Growth and Employment Projections, Bureau
of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC.
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Outside the auto industry, robot job displacement in
Michigan during the decade of the '80s will be minimal, with
one exception. It appears likely that production painters in
all other manufacturing will experience significant displace
ment. Table 3-6 indicates that the application of painting
robots can be expected to eliminate 6 to 10 percent of these
production painter jobs by 1990.
The significant job displacement in Michigan will be con
centrated in the auto industry. This results from Michigan's
dependence on the auto industry and the circumstance that
the auto industry will continue to lead other industries in
robotization. According to table 3-6, from 3 to 4 percent of
Michigan 1978 auto industry employment can be expected to
be eliminated by industrial robots by 1990. When the
displacement is expressed as a percentage of only the semi
skilled and unskilled labor component, the rate rises to 5 to 9
percent.
When attention is confined to the prime robot applica
tions, once again it is seen that 15 to 20 percent of the
welding jobs in the Michigan auto industry are expected to
disappear by 1990. For production painters the proportion is
even higher, from 29 to 40 percent eliminated. These must be
deemed significant job displacement rates by anyone's stan
dards. They will in all probability create some labor market
dislocation in Michigan in the absence of some intervention,
either private or public. Furthermore, these impacts can be
predicted with lower ranges of uncertainty because the
technology is already known. In these applications it is
primarily a question of the rate of diffusion of currently ex
isting techniques.
In summary, the Michigan displacement estimates are
similar to those of the U.S. Robots will not have an enor
mous impact on overall employment levels in the State of
Michigan between now and 1990. Robots are projected to

90

Displacement Effects of Robots

have no significant negative impact in nonauto manufactur
ing with the possible exception of production painters. In the
auto industry, however, overall displacement does appear
significant; it is quite dramatic in particular applications like
welding and painting.
Before moving on to the question of possible labor market
implications, there are two other issues which must be dealt
with. The first is the question of the effect of the 1978
employment base on the displacement figures reported in
table 3-6. Outside the auto industry, there appears to be no
problem because of the relative stability of manufacturing
employment. But, as mentioned earlier, 1978 represented a
cyclical peak for the auto industry. Indeed, if one compares
table 3-3, the U.S. estimates of displacement, with table 3-6,
the Michigan estimates of displacement, these points are il
lustrated quite well. The displacement rates are generally
similar for all other manufacturing in both cases. The ag
gregated displacement rate in the auto industry for all
operatives and laborers, however, is 20 to 25 percent less in
Michigan than the U.S., reflecting the effect of the 1978
cyclical employment peak. The all employment figures for
the auto industry cannot be compared because of the relative
concentration of automotive adminstrative headquarters and
research facilities in Michigan. Likewise, the total estimates
cannot be compared because of the rather significant dif
ference in industrial structure between Michigan and the na
tion as a whole. In short, at the aggregate level the utilization
of the 1978 employment base for the Michigan auto industry
estimates appears to confirm our expectations of the effect
of using a different employment base.
However, it is puzzling that the specific occupational
displacement rates in the auto industry in Michigan are not
generally lower than the corresponding U.S. estimates. This
puzzle may be explained by recalling the method used to
derive the Michigan robot population. Production worker
employment in the auto industry in Michigan relative to the
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nation as a whole was assumed to adequately reflect
robotization potential. Thus, a gross production employ
ment figure was used to assign robots to the State of
Michigan. Presumably the unique structure of auto employ
ment in Michigan was not captured by this procedure.
For these reasons we think the 1980 estimated displace
ment rates for the U.S. auto industry may be more mean
ingful even for Michigan, although it bears repeating that the
aggregate employment levels in the auto industry in 1980 ap
pear overly pessimistic. Thus the U.S. job displacement
results may provide an upper bound for our estimates.
The other major question is the location of the jobs dis
placed within the State of Michigan. While there are no data
available that would make is possible to accurately represent
the occupational profile of sub-state regions, it is reasonable
to assume that the job displacement will occur throughout
the industry. The best assumption, absent a major effort to
delineate exactly what job content is present in each autorelated establishment in Michigan, is simply to assume that
the job displacement will occur where the current production
worker jobs are located.
Table 3-7 is adapted from MESC data collected for a study
of Michigan's auto dependency. It shows that, in March of
1979, 60 percent of the "motor-vehicle-related" employment
in the state was located in the Detroit SMSA. An additional
17.6 percent was located in the outlying Flint and Ann
Arbor-Ypsilanti SMSAs. If the 9.4 percent accounted for by
Saginaw and Lansing-East Lansing is added to these
numbers, 87.0 percent of the auto employment is in the
southeast Michigan quadrant. Accordingly, we would
assume that 87 percent of the job displacement resulting
from the application of robots will occur in Southeast
Michigan as well. 1
1. This situation has not changed since 1979. In 1981, 88.1 percent of employment in SIC
code 37, transportation equipment, was in Southeast Michigan.
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Table 3-7
Motor-Vehicle-Related Employment
in Michigan SMSAs, March 1979
SMSAs
Detroit SMSA
Ann Arbor- Ypsilanti SMSA
Flint SMSA
Lansing-East Lansing SMSA
Saginaw SMSA
All other areas
Michigan total

Motor-vehicle-related employment
Number
Percent
393,100

60.0

36,300

5.5
12.1

79,100
32,300
85,200

4.9
4.5
13.0

655,200

100.0

29,200

SOURCE: Adapted from Motor Vehicle and Related Industries in Michigan, Michigan
Employment Security Commission, Bureau of Research and Statistics, Summer 1981,
Table VI, p. 14.

Anticipated Impact of Job Displacement
Having completed the discussion of which jobs are likely
to be displaced by robots by 1990, it is time to turn to the
more critical issue of the possible unemployment impact of
the elimination of up to 200,000 U.S. jobs in this decade.
That is, how much labor market distress is likely to result
from the job elimination which has been described here?
The first point that should be made is that we do not
believe that the impact of robotics can truly be separated
from other forces influencing employment levels between the
present and 1990. However, for the purpose of assessing the
possible unemployment impacts of robotics, we will examine
this one development in isolation, as if it were the only
change. Once again our purpose is to affix the order of
magnitude of job elimination due to robotics relative to
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other (more ordinary) labor market developments, not to
reach precise estimates of the impact of robotics on the
unemployment rate. 2
While the gross displacement results presented thus far ap
pear to give relatively little cause for concern except in the
auto industry, a fuller appreciation of the level of projected
job displacement can be obtained from table 3-8. This table
compares the simple average annual job displacement rate
over the 1980 to 1990 period from our projections with
average annual replacement needs and total openings as
estimated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Office of
Economic Growth and Employment Projections.
The BLS projects employment levels and demand for
labor as a part of their labor market information system to
assist program planners and individual decisionmakers in
career choices. As reported in table 3-8, they also derive
estimates of average annual replacement needs and total
average annual openings. Average annual replacement needs
are those job openings due to deaths, disabilities, and
retirements only, while total average annual openings also
include the BLS projected change in demand for that oc
cupation. Neither data series, however, includes occupa
tional transfers, i.e., the extent to which people voluntarily
change occupations; so the relative rates in the table
understate true annual labor market needs or vacancies.
The last column in table 3-8 shows that for welders, the
BLS projects that job openings will average 5.1 percent an
nually over the period 1978 to 1990. Further, replacement
needs alone, without any expansion in welding employment,
would require filling 2.3 percent of all welder jobs every
year. As the first three columns show, this is far above the
2. For an interesting account of a much more elaborate input-output version of this type of
exercise in assessing the impact of technological change on the Austrian economy, see the
article by Leontief listed in the bibliography.

Table 3-8
Displacement Impacts of Robots
Compared to BLS Estimates of Job Openings

Application

Simple average annual
displacement impact of robots
1980 - 1990*
All other
Autos
manufacturing
Total

BLS total average
annual openings
1978 - 1990

8

All industries

All industries

fS
O
rt-

BLS average annual
replacement needs
1978 - 1990

3
o

m

"-h

Welding

2.0

.6

.7

2.3

5.1

Assembly
Painting

1.0
3.7

.2
1.2

.3
1.5

3.0
2.4

6.5
3.9

Maching loading/
unloading

2.0

.7

.8

2.5

3.0

All operatives
and laborers

1.1

.2

.2

2.9

4.0

All employment

.7

.1

.1

3.8

5.5

SOURCE: Replacement needs and total average annual openings from The National Industry-Occupation Employment Matrix, 1970-1978, and
Projected 1990, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 2086, Vol. 2, April 1981, pp. 495-502.
*Assuming maximum growth in robot population.
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annual displacement rate for all manufacturing industries
estimated earlier. It is even slightly above the annual job
displacement rate projected in this study for welders in the
auto industry.
These BLS projections were made prior to any significant
sales of robots, so it is unlikely that the BLS made any
specific allowance for robots in their occupational forecasts.
It is also important to note that the actual job content of
each occupational category in table 3-8 is not identical to
those used in this study. The BLS 1978-1990 forecast used
the 1970 Census of Population as a base; hence it employed
the Census Bureau occupational classification structure.
This scheme is considerably less detailed than the OES base
underlying our displacement projections. 3 But with the
caveat that it is the most comparable data we can get,
analysis of job openings and job displacement can be very il
luminating. Any distortions should be small in most cases
because we are looking at relative rates rather than absolute
levels.
In no case do our job displacement rates exceed the BLS
average annual openings figure. In fact, our manufacturing
displacement numbers do not even come close to the replace
ment needs for all industries except in the case of painters.
Whereas the BLS forecasts total job openings of 3.9 percent
per year and replacement needs of 2.4 percent per year, our
displacement rate ranges as high as 1.5 percent annually for
painters in all manufacturing. If both forecasts were ac
curate, the introduction of industrial robots could be ex
pected to eliminate roughly 62 percent of the painter jobs
that would be opened through death, disability, or retire
ment. The point is, there still would be job openings for
painters available each year, as well as additional vacancies
due to occupational transfers.
3. For a comparison of the two occupational classification schemes, see U.S. Department
of Labor, 1981b.
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Using the same reasoning, our estimated robot job
displacement impacts will eliminate about one-third of the
welding and machine loading and unloading job openings
due to replacement needs. Only about one-tenth of replace
ment assembly jobs would be eliminated. Even less than one
in ten replacement positions for all operatives and laborers
will be affected. Thus, if our most optimistic robot forecast
proves accurate, the net result is that about 5 percent of pro
jected annual job openings for operatives and laborers
through 1990 will not materialize. About 7 percent of labor
replacement needs for this group will be nullified. This is not
a trivial result, but it is also not the end of the world for the
blue collar worker.
There is another way to use the BLS occupational
forecasts to illuminate the magnitude of job displacement by
robots. One can compare the BLS projected employment
growth by occupation to 1990 with the gross displacement
projections by occupation reported earlier in this chapter. In
this case, the occupational classifications are identical since
the BLS results are also built upon the OES data base. This
approach has the further significant advantage of
eliminating the unrealistic assumption of constant output
which was implicit in our displacement rates calculated on
today's known employment base.
In accord with the economic assumptions behind the lowgrowth and high-growth variants of the BLS occupational
employment projections, 4 we have deducted our gross job
displacement figures from the corresponding employment
projection. Thus we subtracted our low robot growth
displacement figures from BLS low employment growth pro
jections and similarly our high-growth forecast displacement
from their high-growth projections. This approach is
4. For more information about the BLS 1990 projections, the interested reader should con
sult Monthly Labor Review, October 1981 (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics).

Table 3-9
Projected U.S. Employment Changes 1980-1990 Utilizing Bureau of Labor Statistics
Estimates Adjusted for Displacement Caused by Robots

1980
Application
Welding
Assembly
Painting
Machine
loading/
unloading

employment
level

Total

All other manufacturing

Autos
Percent
change
1980-1990
High
Low
growth growth

1980
employment
level

Percent
change
1980-1990
Low
High
growth growth

1980
employment
level

Percent
change
1980-1990
Low
High
growth growth

41,159
175,922
13,556

3
14
-8

15
25
-2

359,470
1,485,228
92,622

17
18
15

29
28
22

400,629
1,661,150
106,178

15
18
12

28
28
19

988,815

14

25

1,069,540

14

24

80,725

6

15

AH operatives
and laborers

467,846

12

24

9,954,048

11

19

10,421,894

11

20

All employment

773,797

15

29

19,587,771

14

23

20,361,568

14

23

SOURCE: Employment data based on unpublished OES information provided by Office of Economic Growth and Employment Projections,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC.
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reasonable because the economic assumptions of the BLS
correspond closely with our economic assumptions stated in
chapter 2. Table 3-9 reports the result.
In each case, the 1980 employment in the occupational
group is reported, together with the net employment change
from 1980 to 1990 under both the low-growth and highgrowth variants. Last, the percentage change in employment
from 1980 to 1990 is reported. Frankly, this procedure at
tributes too much accuracy to both forecasts, but it is an in
teresting exercise that helps to put the job displacement ef
fects of robots in perspective.
What table 3-9 tells us is that our job displacement totals
are not sufficient to offset BLS predicted expansion of
employment for any impacted occupation, except in the case
of production painters in the auto industry. This is the only
declining employment cell in the table. Even welders in the
auto industry are forecast to expand in numbers during the
1980 to 1990 decade. In fairness to the BLS, it should be
made clear that these forecasts were completed before the
depth and breadth of the current auto slump were apparent.
We would not regard the results of this exercise as serious
forecasts of 1980 to 1990 employment change in light of
more recent developments. But table 3-9 does put the job
loss projected to result from the application of industrial
robots in perspective. It will have little influence on employ
ment trends to 1990 except in highly specialized situations.
Another analysis of the labor redundancy issue has been
done in an unpublished General Motors Institute thesis by
Jeffrey Krause. Using the announced General Motors target
of 14,000 robots installed by 1990 and a displacement of two
jobs per robot, Krause finds 28,000 GM workers potentially
displaced by 1990. On the other hand, he cites a projected
natural attrition rate for GM hourly employees through 1990
of 4.1 percent annually. (Krause, p. 104) Applying the stated
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attrition rate to the 1981 hourly labor force, Krause finds
that a predicted turnover of 97,000 GM employees by 1990 is
implied. His conclusions were: "First, by itself, robotics will
contribute a relatively small amount to the overall reduction
in the workforce; second, the rate of employee displacement
due to new robotic applications will be gradual, relative to
the rate of natural attrition." (Krause, p. 104)
Krause goes on to discuss other possible influences on the
employment levels at General Motors, concluding with the
following statement: "The displacement of 28,000 workers
in General Motors should be compared to the approximately
140,000 workers presently laid off, due to lagging sales, poor
economy, and intense foreign competition." (Krause, p.
105)
It would seem that even for the auto industry, the overall
displacement induced by robot applications by 1990 will not
be a major problem. Only for specific occupations within the
auto industry, those particularly amenable to robotization
with current technology, will job displacement be likely to
cause significant labor market dislocations.
This result is also reflected in the UM/SME Delphi survey.
When the Delphi survey sample was asked about the ex
pected disposition of the workers displaced by robots during
the 1980s, they responded with the following results. (Smith
and Wilson, p. 75) Twenty-five percent of the workers were
expected to be transferred to other jobs without additional
training. Fifty percent were expected to be retrained for new
positions in the same plant. Thirteen percent were expected
to be retrained for new positions at another plant of the same
employer. A total of 6 percent of displaced workers were ex
pected to be terminated. An additional 6 percent were ex
pected to be retired early. Thus, a maximum of 12 percent of
all displaced workers were expected to be separated from
their current employers.
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The comparisons so far presented have been made on the
basis of simple annual averages and decade long impacts.
One might plausibly argue that this approach overstates the
displacement impact of robots early in the decade but
understates it later in the decade when sales of robots
become much more significant. That is true in the aggregate,
but not necessarily for individual occupations. The reason is
that some robot applications, such as welding and painting,
are expected to be much more important early in the decade.
Others, such as assembly, are expected to rise in importance
later in the decade. Furthermore, the timing of robot pur
chases on an annual basis by application area is even more
uncertain than the total cumulative plans themselves, and
there is no such data base available in any event. For these
reasons we conclude that the simple annual averages by oc
cupation such as those in table 3-8 are the most meaningful
available.
However, we can determine the aggregate displacement
impact of robots in 1990 alone. We estimated maximum
sales of robots of 28,350 units in that year. The aggregate
displacement effect of this maximum level of sales in 1990 is
.3 percent of all 1980 manufacturing employment or .5 per
cent of all 1980 operatives and laborers. These single-year
gross displacement impacts are also much less than replace
ment needs. If the BLS replacement numbers reported in
table 3-8 are accurate, the 1990 single-year job displacement
effect would eliminate roughly one blue collar job opening
out of eight; one out of six for replacement openings. While
this single-year impact appears more significant, it is still not
cataclysmic by any means.
From at least four different perspectives then, the
magnitude of worker displacement appears even less signifi
cant than the magnitude of job displacement presented
earlier in the chapter. Even in the areas of most dramatic im
pact, the best evidence is that robots alone will not generally
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be enough to offset projected growth in employment. Job
displacement levels to be produced by robots in this decade
are small even when compared to replacement requirements
of the labor force. Thus, on the basis of the evidence
presented here, it appears that we will continue to need
welders, machine operators, and assembly workers for the
immediate future, even in the auto industry.
From the broad perspective, it is apparent that the rapid
spread of robotics technology through American industry
will not throw any significant number of American workers
out of their jobs in this decade. It may still be true in 1990, as
is claimed by industry sources today, that "no worker in
American has lost his or her job because of a robot." The
conclusion of this examination of job displacement by
robots and the possible unemployment implications is that
robots will have very little influence on aggregate levels of
employment and unemployment in the decade of the 1980s.
However, this conclusion must be tempered somewhat by a
number of observations.
First, it is important to point out that robots could still
add to the unemployment problem, even if no one actually
loses their job due to a robot. If jobs that would have been
created in the absence of robots are not created, there is a
loss in the demand for labor, a loss in the total number of
jobs. In these circumstances, it seems likely that the burden
of unemployment generated by robots, if any, will fall on
labor market entrants. Those who have not secured an entry
to the factory before the robots arrive may be excluded.
Thus robotics will play a role in the continuing loss of job
opportunities for the relatively unskilled worker. This is part
of a process of substitution of machines for humans in pro
duction that began over 200 years ago. The application of
robots is yet another step in this evolutionary process.
It should also be noted that job elimination can have
positive implications too. Robotics technology is generally
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being applied first to dirty, dangerous work situations. One
of the guidelines for robot installations is, "look for the con
centration of workers' compensation claims arising for
prime robot applications." So there can be gains in social
welfare associated with replacing humans in hazardous oc
cupations with machines. This may even be true of the ma
jority of robot installations in the U.S. to date. However, as
robotics technology diffuses more widely, such as to
assembly applications, the elimination of dirty and
dangerous tasks will probably become a less important
criteria for specific applications.
Last, it is clear from the evidence presented here that the
job elimination impacts of robots will not be evenly spread
occupationally, industrially, or geographically. We have
shown that production painters will be most heavily im
pacted in the next few years. We have demonstrated that the
auto industry will experience much more job elimination
than the average manufacturing industry. We have also ex
amined the potential impact on a single state and found that
the job displacement impact of robotics will be concentrated
in the southeast quadrant of Michigan. There will be other
such pockets of localized impact where current employment
is concentrated in manufacturing areas particularly suscepti
ble to robots technology. So even if the overall unemploy
ment implications of robotics are negligible, there will still be
specific sites or specific occupations where the impact may
be significant in this decade. Thus, there could be a displaced
worker problem in such areas even if there is no general
problem.
We will return to these displacement issues again in the
conclusions chapter when policy implications of the study
are discussed. Let us turn now to the other side of robotics
technology: the jobs that will be created as robots spread
through American industry, and the requirements for
worker training or retraining that those jobs will impose.
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Only after this side of the picture is fully discussed will the
final conclusions about job displacement and potential
unemployment emerge.

4
Job Creation
Introduction
Currently there are only scattered general statements
about the job creation potential of robotics. A study by the
Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress concluded
that "even if the most optimistic forecasts of sales growth
materialize, total employment in robotic manufacture would
not exceed 50,000 at any time in the next decade." (Vedder,
p. 24) The UM/SME Delphi forecast estimated that 70,000
to 100,000 robotics-related jobs would be created by 1990.
(Smith and Wilson, p. 67) The Carnegie-Mellon study in
dicated that the job creation potential of robotics was quite
small and concentrated on the displacement question entire
ly. (Ayres and Miller, 1981a, pp. 134-135)
No primary data base exists from which to estimate the
number of jobs that will be created by the robotics industry
in the U.S. or Michigan. Normal U.S. government statistical
sources are no help whatsoever since robotics is not a
separately identified industry. According to the Michigan
Employment Security Commission (MESC), the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) instructions are to place firms that
produce lifting and handling robots in SIC code 3537 (In
dustrial Trucks and Tractors), and firms that produce all
other types of robots in SIC code 3569 (General Industrial
Machinery, Not Elsewhere Classified). Given the small size
of robot manufacturing today, such a classification scheme
105
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insures that no meaningful information about robot
manufacturing will be available from government sources
for some years.
Yet, there remains a significant need for such data, par
ticularly occupational data. Interest in community college
curricula for robotics technicians appears high nationwide,
and formal course offerings are proliferating. True, there
may be a shortage of trained technicians today (not to men
tion engineers with robot applications experience); but
robotics is a "glamour" field, so there is also the possibility
of turning a shortage of technicians into a glut in the near
future. In any case, meaningful projections of employment
by occupation in robotics are needed to guide potential new
entrants to the labor force as well as those who may be seek
ing retraining.
Given the paucity of data, and other factors that will
become apparent shortly, this chapter is necessarily more
speculative than previous chapters. It is an initial effort to
estimate the potential for job creation due to robotics in the
U.S. and Michigan by industry and occupation. We will ex
plain our forecast and assumptions sufficiently to enable (or
encourage) those who follow to improve on our efforts.
Our estimates were developed from interviews, secondary
sources, and where necessary, our own judgment. The data
for the robot manufacturing occupational profile were pro
vided under conditions of strict anonymity and with the
understanding that only broad aggregates would be publish
ed. Although the occupational profile is only an informal
representation of the robotics industry, it does represent the
bulk of the output of that industry. Complete data for the
occupational profile were obtained from firms representing
well over 50 percent of the output of the industry.
The chapter is organized as follows. A brief description of
the robot industry today is provided first. Then, the general
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methodology to estimate the employment impacts in 1990 is
presented, including the limitations of that methodology.
Third, the total 1990 employment impacts and the specific
occupational impacts are discussed, for the U.S. and then
for Michigan. The chapter concludes with an examination of
the training implications of robotics.

Robot Manufacturing Employment
The U.S. robot manufacturing industry today is still em
bryonic, accounting for approximately $150 million of sales
in 1981. Conigliaro's estimates of sales by firm for 1981 are
provided in table 4-1. The firms with Michigan production
facilities Prab Robots, Inc., Copperweld Robotics, and
DeVilbiss accounted for 19 percent of the estimated sales.
Clearly, however, the industry is dominated currently by
Unimation in Danbury, Connecticut and Cincinnati
Milacron, whose headquarters and research facilities are
located in Ohio and whose production facilities are located
in South Carolina. Conigliaro says that roughly 20 percent
of U.S. production is exported (Conigliaro, June 19, 1981,
p. 2) while the UM/SME Delphi forecast estimates that im
ports today are 20 percent of sales. Given the European and
Japanese expertise in robotics technology, it is somewhat
surprising that the UM/SME Delphi forecast expects the lat
ter percentage to remain constant through 1990. (Smith and
Wilson, p. 45)
Our interviews revealed considerable disappointment in
1982 sales, but that must be weighed against the optimistic
(perhaps overly optimistic) sales expectations that prevailed
earlier in the year, as discussed in chapter 2. Of course, there
also has been some entry of new firms, so smaller-thanexpected sales may in part reflect smaller market shares.
There are reports, however, that the new entrants are not do
ing well in terms of orders. ("A Robotics Mecca in
Michigan? Car Sales Must Rebound First")
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Table 4-1
Estimated Sales of U.S. Robot
Manufacturers, 1980-1981*
Sales
Robot manufacturers
Unimation
Cincinnati Milacron
Prab Robots, Inc.
ASEA
Copperweld Robotics
Advanced Robotics Corp.
Automatix
Cybotech
Nordson Corp.
DeVilbiss
Mobot Corp.
U.S. Robot
Other
Total

1981
1980
(in millions)
$ 42
30
6
7.5
4.5
0.4
1
8
0.7
1
$100**

$ 55
40
10
12
6
5
3
3
3
12
1
0.8
2
$150**

SOURCE: Laura Conigliaro, Robotics Newsletter, No. 3 (New York, NY: PrudentialBache Securities, Inc., March 25, 1981), p. 2.
*Conigliaro actually provides a range for sales. We show only the lower end estimates
because actual total sales in both years were near the lower end of her range according to
most sources.
**Total sales is itself an estimate, so the individual estimates of firm sales do not sum to the
total sales estimates.

As stated in chapter 2, we expect sales revenues were flat in
1982 or perhaps showed a small increase. In any event, sales
growth in 1982 was much less than that required to support
some of the higher growth projections. Although prospects
for 1983 are difficult to assess at this time, there appears no
basis to expect near term improvement unless a vigorous
economic recovery begins soon.
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The consensus of economic forecasters is that general
economic growth in 1983 will be modest at best. The U.S.
auto companies, after experiencing the worst year since 1961
in the 1982 model year, remain cautious about production
plans for 1983 models even though there was some sales im
provement in late 1982. ("Motor Vehicles, Model Year
1982," p. 23) Economy-wide reports of 1983 capital spend
ing plans, including machine tool orders, are especially slug
gish. ("Business Outlays to Rise Modestly in '83 First Half";
"Little Corporate Zest for Leading a Recovery," p. 14;
"Capital Spending's Sickening Fall," p. 36) In short, strong
recovery in robot sales, at least in the first half of 1983, ap
pears unlikely.
We estimate employment in U.S. robot manufacturing
currently to be approximately 2,000 workers nationwide.
Consistent with normal BLS practices, this estimate includes
foreign firms with U.S. production facilities such as the
Swedish firm, ASEA, but it excludes the sales and service of
fices of robot importers, even those with U.S. affiliates who
serve as distributors. The BLS intent is simply to limit the
definition of a particular manufacturing industry to actual
domestic producers without regard to ownership. Given the
rather rapid entry of new firms in this industry, our estimate
of 2,000 workers is only a rough approximation of 1982
employment levels.
Our estimate of the current occupational profile of U.S.
robot manufacturers is presented in table 4-2. For com
parative purposes, the occupational structure of the motor
vehicle and equipment industry, all manufacturing, and all
industries are also presented. The employment profiles have
been aggregated in the listed occupational groupings
primarily to facilitate comparison and to highlight the
technical labor input component. Unquestionably, the most
surprising finding is that slightly over two-thirds of the
workers in robot manufacturing are in the traditional white

Table 4-2
Current U.S. Occupational Profiles:
Robot Manufacturing, Motor Vehicles and Equipment,
All Manufacturing, and All Industries

Occupation
Engineers
Engineering technicians
All other professional and technical workers
Managers, officials, proprietors
Sales workers
Clerical workers
Skilled craft and related workers
Semi-skilled metalworking operatives
Assemblers and all other operatives
Service workers
Laborers
Farmers and farm workers
Total
Columns may not add to total due to Founding.

Employment distribution (percent)
Motor vehicles
Robot
All
manufacturing & equipment manufacturing
23.7
15.7
4.2
6.8
3.4
13.9
8.4
4.2
19.0
0.7
-

2.3
1.2
2.4
3.3
0.5
6.2
20.8
15.8
38.6
2.8
6.1
-

2.8
2.2
4.0
5.9
2.2
11.3
18.5
7.2
36.2
2.0
7.7
-

100.0

100.0

100.0

g
^
g!
n

All
industries
1.2
1.4
13.5
8.1
6.3
19.9
11.8
1.7
13.1
15.8
6.0
1.0
100.0
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collar areas of the professions, technicians, administrators,
sales and clerical workers, while only one-third are in the
traditional blue collar areas of the crafts, production
operatives, and laborers. To some extent that is simply a
reflection of a young, high technology industry with low
sales, where the firms tend to be assemblers with little
fabrication of parts. However, it is also indicative of a pro
duct that cannot be produced and sold like a loaf of bread;
there are significant requirements for engineering design,
programming and installation for each specific application.
Engineers are the dominant occupation in robot manufac
turing (and a large number of the managers, officials and
proprietors are trained engineers also). We estimate that 23.7
percent of the robot manufacturing employees currently are
engineers. The bulk of these jobs are held by mechanical and
electrical engineers, although there are a large number of
electronic/computer specialists as well. There are also "pro
posal sales engineers" who prepare detailed plans and cost
estimates based upon information from sales represen
tatives. One manufacturer described "proposal sales
engineers" as the heart of the business and claimed that only
the best engineers are assigned the task. We did not classify
these people as sales workers because it would not be in
dicative of the training required for the job. We estimate that
no more than one-fourth of the engineers are working in
research and development efforts at present.
The second most prevalent occupation, engineering
technicians, represents 15.7 percent of the workforce. The
bulk of these jobs could be called "robotics technicians,"
although there are also drafters, mechanical engineering
technicians, and electrical and electronic technicians. The
term robotics technician is more generic today than descrip
tive of a specific occupation with clearly defined training re
quirements. One manufacturer was not even aware of com
munity college graduates in this field. It is likely that as two-
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year graduates become readily available, manufacturers will
mold the job to the tasks for which the technician is best
trained or for which an aptitude exists. Currently, the most
prevalent tasks for robotics technicians in robot manufactur
ing are testing, programming, installing and
troubleshooting, both in the manufacturer's plant and onsite with purchaser of the robot. Some robotics technicians
also function as trainers and manual writers. One manufac
turer speculated that perhaps some might become sales
representatives. To some extent, robotics technicians are the
key to ameliorating any possible shortage of trained robotics
personnel in the short run. Robotics technicians are also
needed for maintenance tasks by corporate users of robots, a
topic which is discussed later.
Together, engineers and technicians constitute nearly 40
percent of all employment in robot manufacturing. That
must be tempered with the knowledge that the industry is
very small absolutely, so 40 percent of robot industry
employment probably represents less than 1000 jobs nation
wide. The future prospects for engineers and technicians in
robot manufacturing are discussed later.
The concentration in the technical areas is offset by a
relative lack of jobs in the production worker occupations
typical of more conventional manufacturing industries.
Table 4-2 shows a marked lack of craft workers, semi-skilled
metalworking operatives, assemblers, and laborers when
compared to other manufacturing. Clearly, this reflects the
low level of robot production, but it also reveals the high
technology component of robotics.
In general, robot manufacturing can be contrasted with
other manufacturing by the rather obvious "skill-twist" of
the occupations. Over two-thirds of the jobs are white collar
versus much less than one-third in all manufacturing. Well
over 50 percent of the jobs in robot manufacturing require
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two years or more of college training versus less than 20 per
cent in all manufacturing. Even assemblers in robot
manufacturing generally perform higher-order assembly
tasks than most assemblers in other manufacturing in
dustries.

Robot-Related Employment
Besides employment in robot manufacturing itself, there
are also numerous jobs created directly in other industries as
a result of the spread of robotics technology. Robot-related
employment exists today in firms that are direct suppliers to
robot manufacturers and in firms that use robots. Some
employment is also beginning to emerge in what we designate
as robot systems engineering primarily the installations or
applications engineering required for robot systems. This
area may or may not actually develop into an identifiable
sector but it will likely create additional employment oppor
tunities nonetheless.
Direct Suppliers to Manufacturers
Robot manufacturing directly creates jobs in firms that
supply the parts and components (material inputs) to make a
robot. Table 4-3 details the major components of a com
posite robot, the industry of origin by SIC code (3-digit level
of aggregation), and the value of the material inputs supplied
by each industry as a percent of the total value of material in
puts. The information in the table was provided by William
R. Tanner, a robotics expert and engineering consultant. The
total value of material inputs makes no allowance for shop
labor to assemble a robot, applications engineering, or any
overhead costs. Naturally, these parts and components ac
tually vary somewhat depending on the in-house capabilities
of the robot manufacturer and the type of robot being pro
duced.

Table 4-3
Major Component Parts of Robot by Industry of Origin
SIC
code
304
306
307
329

Industry
Rubber and plastics hose and belting
Fabricated rubber products, not
elsewhere classified
Miscellaneous plastics products

Major parts of robot
Pneumatic hose, rubber belting, V-belts
Rubberized fabrics, grommets, tubing

Percent of
total value of
material inputs3
1

Vulcanized fiber, foams, molded plastic
parts, custom compounds of resins
Gaskets, grease seals, oil seals

Abrasive, asbestos, and miscellaneous
nonmetallic mineral products
331 Blast furnaces, steel works, and
Steel pipes and tubes
rolling and finishing mills
332 Iron and steel foundries
Malleable iron castings
335 Rolling, drawing, and extruding
Copper wiring and tubing
of nonferrous metals
336 Nonferrous foundries (castings)
Aluminum castings
339 Miscellaneous primary metal products Heat treated metal parts
343 Heating equipment, except electric and Heat exchangers, radiators
warm air, and plumbing fixtures
344 Fabricated structural metal products
Manufactured sheet metal forms
and machine guards

1
1

1
<3

ocr
O

345
346

Screw machine products, and bolts,
nuts, screws, rivets, and washers
Steel forgings and stampings

349 Miscellaneous fabricated metal
products
356 General industrial machinery and
equipment

Office, computing, and accounting
machines
359 Miscellaneous machinery, except
electrical
362 Electrical industrial apparatus

357

364 Electric lighting and wiring equipment

Bolts, nuts, screws, rivets, washers
Electronic enclosures, perforated
stamped metal
Valves and pipe fittings, wire springs,
fabricated pipe and pipe fittings
Pumps, ball and roller bearings,
blowers for exhaust fans, air filters,
speed changers, gears, ball joints,
clutches, couplings, drive chains,
sprockets, pulleys, fluid power
motors, fluid filter elements
Electronic computing equipment

<3

Cylinders, machined parts on job basis

30

Electric motors, synchros, electro
magnetic brakes and clutches,
electric motor controls and starters,
positioning controls, solenoid
switches, controls and control
accessories
Current-carrying wiring devices, noncurrent-carrying wiring devices

18

1
17

14

o
o*
O

Table 4-3 (continued)
Major Component Parts of Robot by Industry of Origin
SIC
code
367

Industry
Electronic components and
accessories

382 Measuring and controlling
instruments

Major parts of robot
Semiconductors and related devices,
electronic capacitors, resistors,
electronic coils, transformers,
inductors, electronic connectors,
printed circuits, switches
Industrial instruments for measurement,
display and control of process
variables, totalizing fluid meters
and counting devices, instruments
for measuring and testing of
electricity, other measuring and
control devices

Percent of
total value of
material inputs3

<2

SOURCE: William R. Tanner, Productivity Systems, Inc., Farmington, Michigan.
a. Total value of material inputs does not allow for shop labor to assemble robot, applications engineering, or any other overhead costs.
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Table 4-3 is important because it indicates the direct sup
plier industries that will experience the greatest employment
impacts due to the growth of robot manufacturing itself. Ac
cording to these results, five industries account for the bulk
(83 percent) of the value of all material inputs. The computer
or microprocessor and other associated electronic hardware
are provided primarily by the SIC code 357 (Office, Com
puting, and Accounting Machines) and SIC code 367 (Elec
tronic Components and Accessories) sectors respectively.
Together, these two industries account for approximately 18
percent of the value of material inputs. That percentage may
appear low to those unfamiliar with robotics technology but
today's robot does not require a complicated general pur
pose computer. SIC code 356 (General Industrial Machinery
and Equipment) provides various pumps, motors, gears,
speed changers, etc., and accounts for 17 percent of the
value of material inputs. Electric motors and controls and
other electrical apparatus is provided by SIC code 362 (Elec
trical Industrial Apparatus). These items account for ap
proximately 18 percent of the value of material inputs. Final
ly, machine shops that provide precision-cut steel or steel
alloy parts constitute the largest single proportion of the
value of material inputs, approximately 30 percent. These
machine shops are classified in SIC code 359 (Miscellaneous
Machinery, Except Electrical).
As shown in table 4-3 there are numerous other industries
involved in supplying component parts to robot manufac
turers, but each of them is relatively minor. In total, these
other industries provide about 17 percent of the material in
puts for a typical robot. The listing of the major parts of a
robot is long but the components themselves do not stretch
the bounds of existing technology or the manufacturing
capabilities of supplier firms. To some extent it is true that
the robot itself represents old technology. The challenge is to
extend robot capability and reliability while successfully in
tegrating them into specific production processes.
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Robot Systems Engineering
The process of integrating robots with other plant equip
ment is usually called installations or applications engineer
ing. The bulk of the installations engineering today is being
performed by robot manufacturers or by the purchasers
themselves. There is no evidence yet, however, that in-house
plant engineering staffs of user firms are being expanded to
accommodate the introduction of robots, although some
think that must (or should) be done. Robots today simply are
an added responsibility for plant engineering staffs of user
firms. Thus, the current situation raises few interesting
robot-related employment questions. As robot systems
become more numerous, however, there may be significant
changes in applications engineering responsibilities.
According to the UM/SME Delphi forecast, 20 percent of
industrial robots will be purchased as part of robot systems
(versus individual stand-alone units) by 1985. That figure is
expected to climb to 40 percent of all sales by 1990. (Smith
and Wilson, p. 46) Even small robot installations of one or
two units can be complicated, but larger installations of
robot systems present many more predesign and technical in
tegration problems. The robots must be interfaced not only
with other plant equipment but also with each other; the
details of planning and design expand geometrically. Addi
tional applications engineering capability will be mandatory
with such complex systems. The question is who will provide
these applications engineering services.
In our interviews, considerable interest on the part of users
was expressed in outside engineering assistance for robot in
stallations. Some even indicated a desire for so-called "turn
key" robot systems. The term "turn-key" is applied (as in
computer systems applications) to systems providers who are
able to completely install one or more robots and all
associated peripheral equipment, including any special pur-
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pose or hard automation. The "turn-key" provider
guarantees operation of the system and turns it over to the
purchaser only after successful operation, hence the name
"turn-key." Some robot manufacturers, independent robot
systems consultants (who are not robot manufacturers), and
traditional machine tool or dedicated automation providers,
have all indicated interest in the market for "turn-key"
systems. A partial list of the firms who have either an
nounced entry or who are expected to enter this market in
clude: Unimation, Cincinnati Milacron, Bendix, Cross and
Trecker, F. Joseph Lamb, General Electric, IBM and Texas
Instruments. This market is attracting so much attention
because the systems provider acts as a general contractor and
therefore may come to be influential in total factory automa
tion purchase decisions.
It is not necessary in this study to determine either who
will provide robot systems or whether significant markets
will emerge for "turn-key" robot systems. However, it is im
portant to note that robot systems will require significant ap
plications engineering capabilities that will likely add to
robot-related employment. In part, the strong desire of users
of robots for outside assistance in performing robot applica
tions engineering is just another reflection of the lack of ade
quately trained personnel who truly understand the
capabilities and limitations of robotics technology.
Besides applications engineering, installation of robot
systems also requires considerable peripheral equipment and
special purpose or dedicated machinery, usually denoted as
the hard automation in the system. In general, such equip
ment has been provided by the traditional machine tool or
capital goods sector. Thus one might plausibly argue that the
hard automation in robot systems may create net new
employment in the traditional machine tool sector; but that
scenario appears to be of dubious validity, at least judging
by the experience in the auto industry.
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The bulk of all robot investments in the auto industry are
being made during normal retooling or major overhauls of
plant and equipment to produce new models. It does not ap
pear logical to expect robot systems to create additional
demands for the special purpose (and custom designed)
machinery for the fabrication of auto parts. The composi
tion of some of the support equipment like conveyors will
certainly change but not necessarily substantially increase. In
brief, the bulk of the hard automation in robot systems may
be the identical machinery or slightly different machinery
from what would have been used in the absence of robots.
Economists call this capital for capital substitution. The true
extent of the substitution is uncertain and beyond the scope
of this study to determine empirically. However, it will likely
be greatest in industries that are using significant amounts of
automated equipment already, the same mass production in
dustries most likely to adopt robots in the first place. Thus it
appears doubtful that the installation of robot systems will
be a significant plus for the traditional machine tool sector in
terms of net new employment.
It should also be emphasized explicitly that the traditional
machine tool firms may increasingly experience serious com
petition from the new providers of robot systems. The poten
tial loss to the old-line firms includes not only the general
contracting and design but also the possibility that at least
some of the hard automation will not be sub-contracted to
these firms either. In short, the introduction of robot
systems may significantly alter long-standing relationships
between firms and their traditional machine tool providers.
No doubt, that is the very reason that some of the larger
machine tool providers to the auto industry have themselves
announced entry in the new market for robot systems.
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Robot User Firms
The final area in which a significant number of jobs will be
available is robot maintenance at corporate user locations.
Typically, production up-time requirements are so high that
maintenance must be available immediately in the case of
robot failure. There are even stories of robots literally cut
from the line and replaced with human workers to maintain
production schedules. However, experienced personnel
trained in complex machinery repair are not intimidated by
robots and in fact are performing robot maintenance today
with three months or less of training. We define these
maintenance personnel as robotics technicians, but in firms
with small numbers of robots such technicians will be re
quired to maintain a variety of automated equipment. Even
in larger firms, flexibility may be required of such techni
cians.
In the auto industry currently, robot maintenance techni
cians are primarily skilled electricians who have received
specialized training in robot maintenance. Since robots are
production equipment and all production equipment is
maintained by members of the skilled trades bargaining unit
of the UAW, these jobs will remain within the UAW in
autos. As developed later in the chapter, it is doubtful that
any of these jobs will be available to new graduates of twoyear robotics technician programs in the near term.
At least two other job specialties are sometimes mentioned
as potentially significant new robotics-related employment
opportunities at corporate user firms: robot operators and
robot programmers. We believe there is little potential for
either. Presumably, robot operators would have minimal
robotics training and oversee the operation of one or more
robots. Such a function however, appears contradictory and
self-defeating if the robot or robots were purchased to
replace human workers (save labor costs). Provided suffi-
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cient electrical and/or mechanical limit or stop-switches were
installed originally to properly interface the robot with other
plant equipment, an operator should not be required in nor
mal circumstances. In short, the term robot operator appears
to be a misnomer, logically inconsistent and unlikely to
emerge as a separate new occupation or employment oppor
tunity.
The employment possibilities for robot programmers at
corporate user locations are slightly more difficult to deal
with. In nontechnical terms, today's robots are preprogram
med with a general software package that will enable the
robot to accept (and remember) a specific routine. The
specific routine itself is usually programmed and fully tested
by the manufacturer on behalf of the purchaser of the robot.
Once installed at the purchaser's location, today's industrial
robots are usually not reprogrammed. However, to the ex
tent that reprogramming is necessary for some specific ap
plications, robot software packages, like other computer
software packages, are made to be "user friendly." In our
interviews, one robot manufacturer claimed that robot pro
gramming can be learned in two hours or less. That may be
optimistic but certainly robotics technicians or others with
similar skills can quickly learn to program robots with
specific routines and in fact are doing so today as part of
their regular duties.
Highly skilled computer specialists are required to develop
the general software packages for robots, and more
sophisticated robots and robot systems will increase the com
plexity of that software, particularly the requirements for in
terfacing the robots with plant equipment. However, as long
as reprogramming tends to be infrequent or does not require
changes in the general software, these positions will remain
small in number and likely will continue to be found at robot
manufacturers, specialty suppliers to robot manufacturers,
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or possibly with robot systems providers, rather than at user
sites.
The purpose of the discussion of robot-related employ
ment was to lay the necessary groundwork for our projec
tions of job creation associated with the spread of robots in
the U.S. and Michigan. Robotics-related jobs exist today in
direct suppliers to robot manufacturers and in robotics
maintenance at corporate user sites. As of now, the robotics
applications engineering is being done largely by robot
manufacturers and/or by the purchasers. However, the
growth of robot systems will likely create new employment
opportunities in this area. With these general categories of
employment established, we are prepared to present our
forecast of specific job creation accompanying the spread of
robotics technology.

Forecast of Job Creation
Due to Robotics
One of our goals in this study was to develop a consistent
economic framework within which to estimate the impact of
industrial robots in the U.S. and Michigan. To some extent,
the specific methodology to forecast job creation is predeter
mined or conditioned by other parts of the study, although
there are some unique issues in job creation. General
methodological issues are discussed first; this includes the
range of the estimates, the specific industries and/or areas in
which jobs will be created, and the limitations of our ap
proach. Then the individual industry forecasts are presented
with an explicit discussion of any unique assumptions that
apply to each. Finally, a summary occupational structure of
the jobs created is presented.
As stated earlier, some of the methodological issues in job
creation are predetermined or conditioned by other parts of
the study. The projection date remains 1990. The range in
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the expected U.S. population of robots from 50,000 to
100,000 implies an annual robot sales level in 1990 of 14,175
to 28,350 robots, assuming a constant rate of growth
throughout the forecast period. The exponential growth
assumption is artificial, but no one can predict the peaks and
valleys of the business cycle; so there really is no viable alter
native to assuming a 1990 sales level which is consistent with
the average growth needed to achieve the projected 1990
population of robots.
As mentioned earlier, Conigliaro estimates robot exports
as 20 percent of production today, and the UM/SME Delphi
study estimates imports at a constant 20 percent of sales
through 1990. In the absence of any better information, we
have assumed imports and exports will roughly offset each
other. Consequently, a 50,000 to 100,000 range in the U.S.
population of robots in 1990 is still consistent with U.S. pro
duction of 14,175 to 28,350 robots in 1990.
However, there is no guarantee that American producers
will hold their share of the worldwide robot market. If ex
ports were to fall or imports were to rise significantly, the
employment effects would be correspondingly reduced in the
manufacture of robots and in robot manufacturing sup
pliers. This threat is especially menacing because of Japanese
and European expertise in robotics technology. It is impor
tant not to delude ourselves; just because the U.S. may be a
large market for robots, there is no guarantee that those
robots will be manufactured here.
There is also the question of robot replacement demand in
1990, although this is less difficult to deal with than the ex
port/import market. Because the population of robots is so
small today and because the lifespan of robots is expected to
be a decade or more, there will be very little replacement de
mand until well into the 1990s. Even if there are significant
breakthroughs in robotics technology in the near future, we
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do not expect obsolescence to become a factor in the demand
for robots, since they are capital goods and can be expected
to generate productive services for many years.
The industries and/or areas within which jobs will be
created directly by industrial robots were introduced in our
earlier discussion of the robotics industry today; namely,
robot manufacturing, direct suppliers to robot manufac
turers, robot systems engineering, and corporate users of
robotics technology. Corporate robot users are again
separated into autos and nonautos to maintain comparabili
ty with the job displacement figures in the previous chapter.
We will estimate the likely applications engineering re
quirement for robot systems without specifying the industry
within which that employment will occur. It might be argued
that corporate users will increase their engineering staffs to
support the development of robot systems; but there is little
evidence of that so far. It is possible that the robot manufac
turers will best understand robot systems and therefore will
sell their products inclusive of applications engineering ser
vices. It may be that machine tool builders who already act
as general contractors for automated systems are best suited
to provide the new robot systems. Finally, one could argue
that independent robotics specialists (consultants) will evolve
to supply robot systems. Our interviews supported all of
these viewpoints and more. However, the truth is that no one
knows the likely market outcome, so we attempt to estimate
the applications engineering requirement without regard to
industry of employment.
In summary, we estimate total employment in the U.S. in
1990 directly due to robotics in four broad areas: robot
manufacturing, direct suppliers to robot manufacturers,
robot systems engineering, and corporate robot users, the
latter to identify maintenance requirements for robots. The
projected employment impacts are based upon estimates of
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annual sales in 1990 that are consistent with the total popula
tion of robots forecast in chapter 2.
Although we believe that the above is the best possible
procedure to estimate job creation given the constraints of
this study, there are limitations and caveats which must be
stated. First, we have not estimated the induced income ef
fects that lead to further job creation. Clearly, the new
employees in robotics spend their income which creates fur
ther jobs in wholesale and retail trade, services, etc.
However, we have not estimated the negative induced in
come effect of jobs displaced either. Suffice it to say that the
induced income effects, both positive and negative, raise
complex issues that are beyond the scope of this study and
neither is investigated here. Our method does include the
total impact of purchases of material inputs by robot
manufacturers, however.
A closely related limitation is that we do not consider price
or competitive effects. As stated earlier, robots are intro
duced to lower costs and improve the quality of the product.
If price reductions result, this will add to demand. Thus the
productivity gains are passed along to the consumers of the
product, and the increasing level of sales induces some
"second-order" job creation. The other side of this argu
ment is that without robots there would be additional job
losses in those industries falling prey to foreign competition,
so displacement questions can be ignored. The responsiveness of demand to price (called elasticity of demand by
economists) and competitive effects are legitimate issues. We
are not able to make specific forecasts of their magnitude,
however, so these issues are not directly addressed here.
A final limitation is that we estimate total direct job crea
tion rather than the increase in jobs from now to 1990. In
other words, some jobs already exist today in robotics in the
U.S., and those impacts have already been registered in the
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national economy. In chapter 3 we disregarded any in
termediate displacement effects that had already occurred,
so we do likewise in this chapter on job creation. In any
event, the precision of our estimates is not sufficient that
2,000 employees make a significant difference. Again, we are
trying to establish the general order of magnitude of job
creation in robotics by 1990; that is all that is possible at this
early date.
The potential cumulative direct job creation in the U.S. by
1990 due to robotics is presented in table 4-4. We estimate
that the total number of jobs created will range from a low
of about 32,000 to a high of about 64,000. The low range of
the estimate assumes a 1990 impact which is consistent with a
U.S. population of robots of 50,000, and production of
14,175 robots in 1990. The high range of the estimate
assumes an impact consistent with a population of 100,000
robots in 1990 and production of 28,350 robots in 1990.
Both the low and high estimates assume no change in the
relative importance of the U.S. import or export market for
robots.

Table 4-4
Direct Job Creation in U.S.
Due to Robotics, 1990

Area or industry
Robot manufacturing
Direct suppliers to robot manufacturers
Robot systems engineering
User firms - auto
User firms - other
Total

Employment
Range of estimate
Low
High
8,700
8,091
5,297
3,000
7,000
32,088

17,400
16,182
10,594
5,000
15,000
64,176
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Robot Manufacturing
We estimate employment in robot manufacturing in the
U.S. to range from a low of 8,700 to a high of 17,400 in
1990. This was estimated in the following way. Gross sales
volume per employee by robot manufacturers exceeded
$90,000 according to our interviews, while Conigliaro's
estimated average price in 1981 slightly exceeded $70,000.
(Conigliaro, June 19, 1981, p. 9) That implies an average
output per employee of just under 1.3 robots. 1 Productivity
was assumed to improve by a conservative 3.4 percent per
year, the forecasted rate for all manufacturing contained in
the National Planning Association's projections of the U.S.
economy. (Terleckji and Holdrich, p. 4) So average output
per worker in robot manufacturing would be slightly over
1.6 robots by 1990. Total U.S. employment in robot
manufacturing in 1990 was then determined by dividing the
potential market of 14,175 units to 28,350 units by average
output per employee.
We believe that 1990 employment in robot manufacturing
is likely overestimated using our procedure. First, 1982 has
not been a good year for robot manufacturers, so sales per
employee may not reflect average conditions in the industry.
Also, there may have been overstaffing due to expected
strong growth that did not materialize. Both these facts lead
us to think that sales per employee, the numerator in
estimated robot output per employee, is probably
underestimated. Second, Conigliaro's average price (the
denominator in estimating average robot output per
employee) was a 1981 price, while prices are know to be fall
ing in 1982. So the denominator is probably overestimated.
In addition, the productivity improvement factor of 3.4 per1. Our rough estimate of employment in robot manufacturing of 2,000 included an
estimate of employment in some firms with little or no robot sales in 1982. For obvious
reasons, such firms were excluded from the calculations for average robot sales per
employee and therefore average robot output per employee.
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cent annually appears extremely modest for such a young in
dustry. These industries are the very ones that sometimes ex
hibit spectacular productivity gains. All of these factors lead
us to think that average robot output per worker is
underestimated in our calculations. This has the effect of
overestimating the employment in robot manufacturing con
sistent with a given level of sales. This approach was used
nonetheless because of our decision to use known facts and
conservative assumptions throughout the study.
Direct Suppliers to Manufacturers

We estimate employment in firms that are direct suppliers
to robot manufacturers in the U.S. to be from about 8,000 to
16,000. We followed the approach of Burford and Katz
where the direct supplier jobs or interindustry effects can be
found as a multiple of the jobs in the primary industry,
robotics in our case. (Burford and Katz, p. 152) The
Burford-Katz technique can be applied in a nation or region
(the latter will be helpful later in developing estimates for the
State of Michigan) to estimate the direct supplier jobs where
an input-output table which details the interindustry rela
tionships is not available for the industry in question, or the
industry itself is new so the interindustry relationships are
unknown. Specifically,
Wj

M; =
J l -w
where
Mj = relative effect of industry j on supplier industries in the
region.
wj = expenditures within the region of the jth industry as a
proportion of total shipments.
w = average expenditures of all industries in the region as a
proportion of total shipments.
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Descriptively, the Burford-Katz technique is simply saying
that the direct supplier effect in a nation or region is depen
dent on the uniqueness of the industry in question, which is
measured by the purchases the industry makes from other in
dustries as a proportion of its total shipments (wj) and on the
average interrelations among all industries that exist within
the nation or region (w). Burford and Katz tested their ap
proach against several regions where input/output tables
were available and found their short-cut method to be very
precise. Of course, that kind of precision will not be achieved
here, but it is possible to obtain a reasonable estimate of the
direct supplier effect of robot manufacturing in the U.S.
Estimation of the direct supplier effect using the BurfordKatz approach is relatively straightforward. Step one was to
estimate w, essentially the material purchases of all firms in
the nation as a proportion of total shipments. The total
materials purchased by all U.S. manufacturing industries as
a proportion of sales was 57 percent in 1977 according to the
1977 Census of Manufactures. (U.S. Department of Com
merce, 198la, pp. 30-31) So a reasonable estimate of w is
.57.
The second step was to estimate wj, the average material
purchases of robot manufacturers in the U.S. Our interviews
revealed a remarkable consistency in estimates of material
purchases as a percent of sales in robot manufacturing 40
percent. So, if 40 percent of total sales of robot manufac
turers are material purchases, and 57 percent of total sales of
all manufacturing firms in the nation are material purchases,
that leads to a direct supplier effect of .93. This implies that
for every job created in robot manufacturing in the U.S.,
another .93 jobs are created in direct supplier industries.
Thus, 8,700 to 17,400 jobs in robot manufacturing lead to
8,091 to 16,182 jobs in other manufacturing industries in the
U.S.
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In assessing the estimates of the direct supplier effect of
robot manufacturing utilizing the Burford-Katz technique,
several cautions and comments are worth mentioning. First,
we do not account for import purchases of robot manufac
turers or for all industries, the net effect of which may either
lower or raise the direct supplier effect. If import purchases
of materials are relatively more important for robot
manufacturers than for all industries, then the direct supplier
effect will be lower. Second, we do not allow for industry
growth that sometimes increases interindustry dependence
and the associated multiplier effect, especially for new in
dustries like robot manufacturing. In both of these cases
there is no empirical basis to determine the likelihood or
magnitude of the possible change.
The third caution is that we utilize output relationships
estimated with the Burford-Katz technique to determine
employment impacts in the direct supplier industries. The
resultant estimates will be true if and only if the supplier in
dustries hire at the same rate as robot manufacturing. In this
case that is probably acceptable since sales per employee in
robot manufacturing is near the U.S. average for all
manufacturing and the supplier effect itself is approximated
by the U.S. average; but it remains a rough approximation
only.
Given these cautions, we sought some confirmation of our
estimate that (on average) for every job created in robot
manufacturing .93 jobs are created in direct supplier in
dustries. 2 That was done by examining related industries in
the national input/output table for the U.S. where complete
2. Wassily Leontief, Institute for Economic Analysis, New York University, has under
taken a large project with support from the National Science Foundation to determine the
impact of technological change on employment to the year 2000. The effort by Leontief
holds the prospect of yielding more definitive information about the direct supplier effect
of robot manufacturing and other emerging high technology industries.
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interindustry relations are available, imports are accounted
for, and employment to output relations are known directly.
Unpublished data from the 151 sector national input/output
table were provided by the Office of Economic Growth and
Employment, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Specifically the
1981 total employment requirements table was utilized. This
table shows total employment impacts per one million
dollars of sales of the product of each industry to final users,
based upon the interindustry relationships in the 1977 in
put/output table (the most recently available) and 1981
employment to output relationships.
As discussed earlier in the study, the most closely related
industry to robot manufacturing is generally acknowledged
to be numerically controlled machine tools; a more distant
second might be computers. In the national input/output
table, numerically controlled machine tools are a part of
metalworking machinery. For that sector (SIC code 354) the
1981 employment requirements table indicates that on
average, for every job created in metalworking machinery
.73 jobs are created in supplier industries. 3 Similarly, for
every job created in computers and peripheral equipment
(SIC codes 3573-3574), 1.53 jobs are created in supplier in
dustries.
When compared to our estimate of the direct supplier ef
fect of .93 for robot manufacturing, the national input/out
put table indicates that the direct supplier effect of
metalworking machinery is less than that for robot manufac
turing, but the effect of computers and peripheral equipment
is significantly greater. Of course, such comparisons are
never clear-cut (metalworking machinery encompasses much
more than numerically controlled machine tools) and do not
constitute empirical proof in any event. Nonetheless, it is in3. The direct supplier effect was approximated as the total employment impact of the in
dustry per million dollars of sales minus the impact in the primary industry itself with the
result divided by the employment impact in the primary industry.
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teresting that the national estimates of related industries do
not contradict our estimates of the direct supplier effect for
robot manufacturing; they even support the notion that
robot manufacturing is more closely aligned with
metalworking machinery, its most closely related industry in
the national input/output table, than with computers.
Besides computers, we also calculated the direct supplier
effect for the four other major parts and components sup
pliers for robots. The results are .71 for SIC code 359
(Miscellaneous Machinery, Except Electrical), 1.05 for SIC
code 362 (Electrical Industrial Apparatus), .90 for SIC code
367 (Electronic Components and Accessories), and 1.19 for
SIC code 356 (General Industrial Machinery and
Equipment). If the direct employment impact of robot
manufacturing is assumed to be the weighted average of
these five industries which supply 83 percent of the value of
material inputs to robot manufacturers, where the weights
are the relative percentages from table 4-3, the direct supplier
effect is 1.03, once again close to the impact estimated with
the Burford-Katz technique.
In short, we conclude that the order of magnitude of our
estimate of the direct supplier effect of robot manufacturing
is very reasonable. The direct supplier effects of robot
manufacturing may appear modest to some observers, but
any industry where material purchases are only 40 percent of
sales will likely have a small relative effect on other in
dustries.
Robot Systems Engineering
Total employment in robot systems engineering in the
U.S. was estimated as 5,300 to 10,600 in 1990. This is a net
figure that represents the likely applications engineering
employment, without specifying the actual industry of
employment. As discussed earlier, that means these jobs may
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be with corporate users, robot manufacturers, machine
toolmakers, or independent robot systems consultants. Since
robot systems are not a separate market at this point, both
total employment and the occupational profile are based on
very sketchy information. First, total system sales in 1990 are
estimated. According to the UM/SME Delphi study, the
total robot market in 1990, including total system sales and
individual unit sales of robots, will be nearly $2 billion in
terms of 1980 dollars. (Smith and Wilson, p. 50) The
UM/SME Delphi forecast also estimates that the 1990
average price for a robot will be $30,000 in terms of 1980
dollars. In addition, 40 percent of all robot sales will be
system sales, and 30 percent of the cost of a system is the
robots themselves. (Smith and Wilson, pp. 37, 46 and 47)
That implies that the nearly $2 billion robot market in 1990
consists of $.6 billion in individual units, $.4 billion pack
aged for systems, and $.93 billion in other systems hardware.
So total system sales in 1990 in terms of 1980 dollars would
be $1.33 billion.
The UM/SME Delphi estimate of the total systems market
in 1990 must be adjusted downward to reflect our smaller
forecast of unit sales of robots in 1990. We estimate 1990
robot sales at 28,350 (maximum) while the UM/SME Delphi
forecast implies unit sales of 33,333 ($1 billion divided by the
average price of $30,000). Using the ratio of our estimate of
unit sales to the UM/SME Delphi estimate of unit sales, our
derived estimate of total systems sales of $1.13 billion in
1990 emerges.
The second step is to estimate the applications engineering
required for system sales of $1.13 billion. According to our
interviews, applications engineering constitutes about 30 per
cent of the cost of a robot system, so the applications
engineering required for $1.13 billion total system sales
would be approximately $340 million. We then assumed that
approximately 80 percent of the applications engineering re-
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quirement is personnel costs, which results in $272 million
wage income for applications engineering in robot systems.
The third step is to estimate employment, given that the ap
plications engineering represents approximately $272 million
(1980 dollars) of wage income in 1990. That requires estima
tion of the occupational content of the jobs as well as
average pay for those jobs. Those estimates are presented in
table 4-5.
The occupational distribution for the applications
engineering of robot systems is unknown today, so a
hypothetical distribution was constructed based upon the oc
cupational profile of robot manufacturers. The relative im
portance of (1) all other professional and technical workers,
(2) managers, officials, and proprietors, (3) sales workers,
and (4) clerical workers is the same as that for robot
manufacturers. The remainder of the occupational profile,
engineers and robotics technicians, assumes a two-to-one
ratio between these occupations. That is based on the oc
cupational profile of robot manufacturers who limit robotics
technicians to testing, programming, troubleshooting, and
installation of robots. Given that our estimates of the dollar
value of the applications engineering of robot systems is
stated in terms of 1980 dollars, the relative distribution of
occupations can be used in conjunction with estimates of
average earnings for these occupations in 1980 to arrive at
total employment for robot systems engineering of 10,594 as
illustrated in table 4-5. The identical procedure was followed
for the low growth scenario which assumes a smaller market
for robots in 1990. Although the details of those calculations
are not discussed here, the net result is a minimum estimate
of employment in robot systems engineering of 5,297.
Of course the separate estimation of approximately 5,300
to 10,600 jobs in robot systems engineering in 1990 and the
occupational content of those jobs is highly speculative. This
market barely exists today, and the future structure of the

Table 4-5
Robot Systems Engineering Employment in 1990

Occupation
Engineers
Robotics technicians
All other professional and
technical workers
Managers, officials, proprietors
Sales workers
Clerical workers
Total

Employment
distribution
(percent)

ON

O
cr

Total
employment

Annual average
pay in 1980
(dollars)3

Total pay
(millions)

47.8
23.9

5,064
2,532

29,806
19,896

150.9
50.4

4.2
6.8
3.4
13.9
100.0

445
720
360
1,473
10,594

24,984
32,461
27,253
17,993

11.1
23.4
9.8
26.5
272.1

a. Source of average annual pay data is U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Money Income of Households, Families, and
Persons in the United States: 1980, Series P-60, No. 132, p. 195.
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market is unknown. At one extreme one might argue that we
are guilty of double-counting, in that employment in robot
manufacturing of 8,700 to 17,400 sufficiently accounts for
the applications engineering requirement of robot systems.
However, we think that future development of robot systems
will cause a significant increase in the need for applications
engineering to successfully install those systems, even though
we cannot at this time identify the specific industry within
which that employment will occur. At the other extreme one
might argue that we are guilty of under-counting the jobs
that will be created to provide the hard automation in robot
systems. However, as discussed earlier, we think much of the
hard automation in robot systems will be capital for capital
substitution. Therefore the traditional machine tool sector
will not experience significant net expansion due to the in
troduction of robot systems, although there certainly may be
changes in the composition of the hard automation required
and in the specific firms which provide it.
Robot User Firms
The estimates of the jobs created in the corporate user in
dustries in the U.S. are 3,000 to 5,000 in autos and 7,000 to
15,000 in all other manufacturing. All of these jobs are
assigned to robot maintenance, loosely called robotics
technicians in this study, although such technicians may be
required to maintain other automated equipment as well. In
troduction of robot systems may require additional engineer
ing support at corporate user firms as well, but those jobs
have already been accounted for in our estimates of robot
systems engineering employment.
The specific requirements for robotics technicians at cor
porate user firms were derived from Tanner and Adolfson's
estimate that the maintenance standard is one person to ten
robots per shift. (Tanner and Adolfson, p. 107) In some
cases it is a low estimate, especially where total robot usage is
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low, but it is likely more accurate for more substantial in
stallations and those installations should predominate by
1990. By that year, robot dependability should have improv
ed significantly, but prudence dictates a conservative
estimate. Using our assumption of an average of two shifts,
two maintenance workers are needed per ten robots and the
estimate of robotics technicians for maintenance of robots at
corporate user industries follows directly.

Occupational Distribution of New Jobs
The occupational distribution of the jobs created by
robotics in the U.S. is presented in table 4-6. The current
robot manufacturing occupational profile was used in
developing the 1990 profile, except that engineers were
reduced to 20 percent of the total and assemblers were in
creased to 23.7 percent of the total. That corresponds to our
expectation that engineers, especially in research and
development, will not expand as rapidly as output, but
assemblers will become relatively more important as output
increases. The occupational profile for the direct suppliers to
robot manufacturers was constructed as the weighted
average of the individual occupational profiles for the five
industries which account for 83 percent of the value of
material inputs to a robot. The weights were determined bas
ed on the percentages in table 4-3. The individual occupa
tional profiles (SIC codes 356, 357, 359, 362 and 367)
themselves, are from the OES data base for 1980 and were
provided by the Office of Economic Growth and Employ
ment, Bureau of Labor Statistics. The robot systems engi
neering estimates utilized the occupational profile discussed
earlier in this chapter. Finally, corporate user positions were
all assigned to robotics technicians.
We estimate 4,600 to 9,300 engineering jobs will be created
in the U.S. due to robotics and 13,000 to 26,000 engineering
technicians will be required. The bulk of these technicians

Job Creation

139

will be robotics technicians, but if one assumes that none of
the jobs in autos will be available to two-year graduates of
robotics technician curricula, then that figure should be
reduced to 10,000 to 21,000, a rather significant difference.
The training/retraining implications of these estimates are
discussed later in this chapter.

Table 4-6
Direct Job Creation in U.S.
Due to Robotics, by Occupation, 1990

Occupation
Engineers
Robotics technicians
Other engineering technicians
All other professional and
technical workers
Managers, officials, proprietors
Sales workers
Clerical workers
Skilled craft and related workers
Semi-skilled metalworking operatives
Assemblers and all other operatives
Service workers
Laborers
Total

Employment
Range of estimate
High
Low
4,636
12,284
664

9,272
24,568
1,328

936
1,583
581
2,908
2,163
2,153
3,763
138
279
32,088

1,871
3,166
1,162
5,817
4,326
4,306
7,526
276
558
64,176

The other potential job creation in table 4-6 directly due to
robotics does not appear to raise particularly significant
training issues. The numbers are rather small and well within
current supply capacity. It is important to note, however,
that there is an extremely poor job match between the jobs
that robots will likely displace and similar jobs that will be
created through the introduction of robots. Specifically, in
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chapter 3 we estimated total job displacement of 100,000 to
200,000, with all of these tasks in the traditional blue collar
areas, while from table 4-6 only 8,500 to 17,000 similar blue
collar jobs will be created. Thus very few workers can expect
to transfer to the new robotics sector but continue to per
form essentially their old job tasks.
The shocking feature of table 4-6, the occupational profile
of those jobs created, is that well over half of all of these
jobs require two or more years of college training. That is
consistent with the occupational profile of the robot
manufacturing industry, but it is still a startling revelation
and attests to the high technology nature of robotics.

Forecast of Job Creation in Michigan
Due to Robotics
The job creation potential of robotics in the State of
Michigan follows logically from the U.S. estimates. For that
reason the organization of this section parallels that of the
previous one. Additional assumptions and methodology are
discussed as needed.
The level of the U.S. production of robots in 1990 alone is
not sufficient to estimate the number of jobs created in
Michigan, for we must also determine Michigan's market
share of this production. Just as a single point estimate of
the population of robots in 1990 was deemed unwise, it is
also unwise to consider a single point estimate for
Michigan's market share of that production. Since it is
beyond the scope of this study to do a thorough locational
analysis of the robotics industry, it is assumed that
Michigan's share of the U.S. market in 1990 will range from
a low of 20 percent to a high of 40 percent.
Both figures are speculative, but the low end of the
estimate is conditioned by Michigan's current market share
of the production of robots, approximately 19 percent in
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1981. At first glance the high end of the estimate may appear
overly optimistic, but it is not necessarily so. First, robotics
is the number one (immediate) ''target industry" in Gover
nor Milliken's plan to attract high technology industry to the
State of Michigan. (Milliken, 1981b, p. 13) Second, the pro
posed program of the nonprofit Industrial Technology In
stitute should help to attract robot manufacturers as well as
other manufacturing process suppliers. Third, there is no
doubt that the auto industry centered in Michigan is the
single largest market for robots today. Fourth, some market
entrants who have announced plans to produce robots or are
producing robots already have a Michigan base. These in
clude Bendix, General Motors, United Technologies, and a
number of other small firms in the state.
There are no guarantees that these factors will increase
Michigan's market share in the future. There are also no
guarantees that imports or other factors will not reduce
Michigan robot production below the low end estimate.
While a market share of 20 to 40 percent for Michigan is op
timistic, it is not unreasonable.
The potential cumulative direct job creation in Michigan
by 1990 due to robotics is presented in table 4-7. We estimate
that the total number of jobs created will range from a low
of about 5,000 to a high of about 18,000. The low range of
the estimate assumes a 1990 impact which is consistent with a
U.S. population of robots of 50,000, production of 14,175
robots in 1990, and a 20 percent share of the market for
Michigan. The high range of the estimate assumes an impact
consistent with a population of 100,000 robots in 1990, pro
duction of 28,350 robots in 1990, and a 40 percent share of
that production for Michigan. The range of the estimate for
job creation is large because of the dual uncertainties of
growth in the U.S. production of robots and the relative
share of that production accounted for by Michigan.
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Table 4-7
Direct Job Creation in Michigan
Due to Robotics, 1990

Area or industry
Robot manufacturing
Direct suppliers to robot manufacturers
Robot systems engineering
User firms - auto
User firms - other
Total

Employment
Range of estimate
High
Low
1,740
974
1,059
1,065
287
5,125

6,960
3,898
4,238
1,776
865
17,737

We estimate employment in robot manufacturing in
Michigan to range from about 1,700 to 7,000 in 1990. That
was estimated in the following way. Michigan's share of
robot manufacturing employment was found by multiplying
the low estimate of 8,700 employees nationwide by the low
estimate of Michigan's share of the production for that
market (20 percent). The same was done for the high produc
tion estimate and the high estimate of Michigan's share of
that production. That leads directly to the final result.
We project employment in firms that are direct suppliers
of robot manufacturers in Michigan to be about 1,000 to
4,000. Once again, we followed the approach of Burford and
Katz to determine the direct supplier effect. The estimates
are more difficult and tentative here because utilization of
the Burford-Katz technique requires knowledge of material
purchases of all industries and robot manufacturing within
the state. That information is not available, but it is possible
to obtain an upper bound for the direct supplier effect of
robots in the State of Michigan.
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Step one was to estimate w for Michigan, essentially the
material purchases of firms within the state as a proportion
of total shipments. The total materials purchased by all
Michigan industries as a proportion of sales was 61 percent
in 1977 according to the 1977 Census of Manufactures (U.S.
Department of Commerce, 1981a, p. 101), so an upper limit
of w is .61. Burford and Katz, however, suggest that seldom
do the material purchases within a region exceed .40 as a pro
portion of total shipments. (Burford and Katz, p. 158) We
assumed w equals .50 in Michigan, which, if true, means that
over 80 percent of material purchases of Michigan manufac
turing firms are made from other manufacturing firms in the
state.
The second step was to estimate wj for Michigan, the
average material purchases of robot manufacturers in the
state from other industries in the state. Specifically, the
estimation of wj for a region depends not on the total
material purchases of all firms in the industry but on the
regional proportion of material purchases of such firms in
the region. We assumed that total materials purchased by
robot manufacturers in Michigan as a proportion of total
shipments approximated the national average of 40 percent
and that by 1990 a maximum of 75 percent of the material
purchases of robot manufacturers in Michigan would be
spent with the state. So, if 40 percent of total sales of robot
manufacturers are material purchases, and for those
manufacturers in the State of Michigan 75 percent of that
figure is spent within the state, then w; equals .28, or 28 per
cent.
Given our estimates of w and wj for Michigan, we can use
the Burford and Katz formula from the previous section.
That leads to a supplier effect of .56 which implies that for
every job created in robot manufacturing in Michigan
another .56 jobs are created in direct supplier industries.
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Thus, the approximately 1,700 to 7,000 jobs in robot
manufacturing lead to about 1,000 to 4,000 jobs in other
manufacturing industries in Michigan.
Although the estimates of the direct supplier jobs in
Michigan may appear small, we believe these estimates are
reasonable or perhaps overestimated. First, the average
material purchases of all Michigan firms within the region is
almost certainly less than the 50 percent used in our calcula
tions, which would lower the direct supplier effect. Second,
the average material purchases for robot manufacturing
firms in Michigan from other firms in the state is much less
than 28 percent of total shipments today (75 percent of total
material purchases) and likely in 1990 as well. The State of
Michigan is not a significant producer of microprocessors
and the other electronic/computer-related components of a
robot. Furthermore, very few industries in any region pur
chase as much as 75 percent of their material inputs locally
from firms that are actually local producers (not
wholesalers). In general, the direct supplier effect of an in
dustry in an open region tends to be less than the direct sup
plier effect for that same industry in the nation.
Total employment in robot systems engineering in
Michigan was estimated as approximately 1,000 to 4,200 in
1990. Once again, this is a net figure that represents the ap
plications engineering employment likely in Michigan
without specifying the actual industry of employment. It was
found in exactly the same way as robot manufacturing
employment in Michigan. Specifically, Michigan's share of
robot systems engineering employment is the national
employment in robot systems engineering (5,297 to 10,594),
multiplied by the associated share of robot production in the
state (20 to 40 percent). The implied assumption is that the
hypothesized share of robot production in the state is also
applicable for robot systems engineering. That may or may
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not be true, but there appears to be no better alternative at
this time.
The stakes are not small in robot systems for Michigan's
auto-dominated economy where employment in the Detroitbased machine tool sector accounted for over 50,000 jobs in
1977. (Institute of Science and Technology, p. 67) That sec
tor, of course, has primarily supported the auto industry.
Thus, Michigan's traditional machine tool providers and
other general contractors in the state may experience serious
competition from firms outside the state to provide robot
systems to the auto industry. The potential loss includes not
only the general contracting and design, which is con
siderable in a robot system, but also the possibility that at
least some of the hard automation will not be provided by
Detroit-based capital goods firms either.
Of course, this pessimistic scenario is only one possibility,
and Michigan's success in developing the expertise for robot
systems engineering may also serve to retain jobs in the tradi
tional machine tool sector in the state. Robot systems
engineering is an important area where the Industrial
Technology Institute may come to play a role. The program
of the Institute is to include an Applications Consultant Pro
gram which will aid with specific automation application
problems. The Institute also plans to initiate a continuing
program of research on the integration of manufacturing
automation which will be essential to full implementation of
the flexible automated manufacturing concept. It is entirely
possible that Michigan could develop a manufacturing
systems design capability that would lead to significant ex
port of both goods and services to other states.
The estimates of the jobs created in the corporate user in
dustries in Michigan are about 1,100 to 1,800 in autos and
300 to 900 in all other manufacturing. These numbers follow
directly from the projection of the robot population in
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Michigan and the assumption that one robotics technician is
needed per ten robots per shift for maintenance work. In
sharp contrast to the national estimates, almost 75 percent of
the robotics technicians in corporate user industries in
Michigan will likely be in the auto industry. This occurs
because the auto industry will likely continue to be the
largest single user of robots and because of the relative con
centration of the auto industry in the State of Michigan.
The total occupational impact of the jobs created in
Michigan is presented in table 4-8. This table was con
structed in exactly the same way as the national estimates.
We estimate about 900 to 3,600 engineering jobs will be
created in Michigan due to robotics and 1,900 to 4,900
engineering technicians will be required. The bulk of these
technicians will be robotics technicians, but if one assumes
that none of the jobs in autos will be available to two-year
graduates of robotics technician curricula, then that figure
should be reduced to 750 to 2,700, a rather significant dif
ference for the state. The training/retraining implications of
these estimates are discussed in the next section.

Training Implications
On the whole, these job creation numbers are rather
modest. It might even be assumed that there are no serious
training questions arising from the creation of less than
65,000 jobs over an 8-year period; however, there are a few
areas that should be mentioned as possible problems. The
first is engineers; electrical and mechanical engineers will be
required in significant numbers if the industrial robot
population is to grow as we project. There will also be needs
for industrial engineers and computer specialists as well.
Engineers. As described repeatedly throughout the study,
industrial robots do not just come "off-the-shelf" and onto
the factory floor fully functional from the time they are
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Table 4-8
Direct Job Creation in Michigan
Due to Robotics, by Occupation, 1990

Occupation
Engineers
Robotics technicians
Other engineering technicians
All other professional and
technical workers
Managers, officials, proprietors
Sales workers
Clerical workers
Skilled craft and related workers
Semi-skilled metalworking operatives
Assemblers and all other operatives
Service workers
Laborers
Total

Employment
Range of estimate
High
Low
898
1,810
108

3,593
4,469
430

159
266
108
505
318
288
610
17
38
5,125

638
1,065
432
2,020
1,275
1,154
2,441
66
154
17,737

plugged in. A significant number of graduate engineers will
be required to help robots find their place in U.S. factories.
Specifically, we forecast a need for 4,600 to 9,300 engineers,
primarily for robot system design and implementation as
well as for design work with robot manufacturers.
What are the prospects of obtaining the required engineer
ing talent to support the development of robotics? Clearly,
the answer to this question can only be obtained by looking
at the total market for engineers rather than focusing on
specific industries within that market. First, we will examine
the likelihood of a sufficient supply of engineers. Then we
assess the prospects for the overall demand for engineers. In
general, this supply-demand approach leads us to think that
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there is no reason to be optimistic that sufficient engineers
will be available in the decade of the 1980s to support all of
the requirements for engineers.
Table 4-9 shows the experience with the supply of
engineers at the bachelor's, master's, and doctorate levels
for the period 1960 to 1980. The absolute numbers of both
bachelor's and master's degrees in engineering have increas
ed, although the proportion of all U.S. bachelor's and
master's degrees that are awarded in engineering declined
from nearly 10 percent in 1960 to 6 percent in 1980. From
1970 to 1980 alone there has been an absolute decline in the
number of doctorates awarded in engineering while the
number of master's degrees awarded has increased only
slightly.
Labor market analysts are well aware of the volatility in
engineering enrollments. Post-World War II production of
engineers has had at least three distinct cycles. First,
enrollments increased explosively 1946-50 as veterans return
ed in large numbers to the campuses with the educational aid
available under the GI bill. That was followed by a
precipitous decline in enrollments of over 50 percent by 1955
as these same benefits were terminated. The second cycle
began in the late 1950s due to the Soviet launching of "Sput
nik" and the subsequent American response which included
various kinds of student aid and research support in the
sciences and engineering. The student aid was authorized as
part of the National Defense Education Act of 1958.
Thereafter there was a long sustained rise in engineering
enrollments which peaked 15 years later in 1973, although in
absolute terms enrollments never exceeded the level of the
early 1950s. Finally, after a decline in enrollments through
1976, the third and current cycle began when engineering
enrollments began to rise once again.

Table 4-9
Engineering Degrees Conferred in U.S.
B.S.

M.S.

Year

Engineering
degrees

Percent of
all degrees

1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969
1968
1967
1966
1965
1964
1963
1962
1961
1960

59,240
53,720
47,411
41,581
39,114
40,065
43,530
46,989
46,003
45,387
44,772
41,553
37,614
36,188
35,815
36,795
35,226
33,458
34,735
35,866
37,808

5.9
5.4
4.8
4.2
3.9
4.1
4.3
4.8
4.9
5.1
5.4
5.4
5.6
6.1
6.4
6.8
7.0
7.4
8.3
8.9
9.6

Engineering
degrees
16,846
16,193
17,015
16,889
16,170
15,434
15,393
16,758
16,802
16,347
15,597
15,243
15,188
13,885
13,678
12,056
10,827
9,635
8,909
8,178
7,159

Percent of
all degrees
5.6
5.4
5.4
5.3
5.2
5.3
5.5
6.3
6.6
7.1
7.4
7.8
8.6
8.8
9.7
10.7
10.7
10.5
10.5
10.4
9.6

Ph.D.
Percent of
Engineering
all degrees
degrees
7.7
2,519
7.7
2,517
7.6
2,442
7.8
2,599
8.3
2,835
3,151
9.2
9.9
3,336
10.2
3,560
11.1
3,704
11.4
3,654
12.3
3,681
12.9
3,377
12.7
2,932
12.7
2,614
12.6
2,304
12.9
2,124
11.7
1,693
10.7
1,378
10.4
1,207
943
8.9
786
8.0

SOURCE: National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Degrees: 1950-80, NSF 82-307, Washington, DC, 1982, pp. 21-32.
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Because of this record there is very little reason to be con
fident that recent increases in engineering enrollments will be
maintained in the decade of the 1980s. (Freeman, pp.
111-117) In addition, the total number of science and
engineering degrees awarded has been falling since the midseventies, so recent gains in engineering degrees appear to
have come at the expense of other scientific fields. There is
also no evidence that the proportion of people in the labor
force with engineering degrees is increasing. (National
Science Foundation, 1982a, pp. 60-62) Finally, the
unemployment rate for engineers is extremely low, 1.5 per
cent in 1980, and the National Science Foundation reports
that few engineers are working outside their professional
specialties involuntarily. (National Science Foundation,
1981c, pp. 15-16) So we cannot expect the supply of
engineers to expand much in the decade of the 1980s through
reabsorption of unemployed engineers or the reentry of
engineers who are currently working in nonengineering jobs.
A closely related question about the supply of engineers is
the adequacy of the training received. Specifically, are
engineers prepared in such a way as to facilitate the introduc
tion of new technologies such as robotics? An adequate
answer to this question is far beyond the scope of this study,
but some comments are offered briefly. First, as mentioned
in chapter 2, our interviews did reveal some criticisms of to
day's engineers particularly that they are over specialized.
That sentiment is echoed in an article by Gail Martin which
discusses manufacturing engineering as a much needed
multidisciplinary engineering specialty. (Martin, 1982b, pp.
22-26) Second, the National Science Foundation reports that
10 percent of faculty positions in engineering programs were
vacant in the Fall of 1980. (National Science Foundation,
198la, p. 1) Moreover, approximately 90 percent of all
engineering colleges reported that in the last five years, staff
ing had become more difficult because of their increasing in-
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ability to match private industry salaries. The schools
responded to this shortfall of faculty by both cancelling
classes and increasing teaching loads.
Finally, the National Science Foundation also reports that
the proportion of science and engineering faculty with recent
doctorates (within the last seven years) has fallen to approx
imately 20 percent in 1980 from almost 40 percent in 1968.
(National Science Foundation, 1981b, p. 1) That decline is
typical of all the engineering fields. It indicates that our
academic teaching and research staffs in engineering schools
are not receiving the infusions of young talent generally
believed necessary to remain vigorous. From table 4-9 it is
clear that we are training fewer Ph.D.'s in engineering than
even five years ago at the very same time that engineering
enrollments are increasing and the proportion of engineering
faculty with recent doctorates is reaching new lows. These
divergent trends are largely explained by the strong market
demand for engineers, but they are very disturbing
nonetheless. We cannot continue to borrow from the future
human resource pool indefinitely for the sake of immediate
needs. We fear that the supply of engineering graduates may
prove to be a limiting factor in the spread of robotics
technology in the U.S.
Turning our attention to the demand for engineers, it is
clear first of all that there is no current surplus of engineers.
Unlike the market for most other college graduates, the
market for engineering graduates remains tight. That is at
tested to by the low unemployment rate for engineers, but
there are even better indicators of the short-run labor market
tightness for engineers. According to a National Science
Foundation survey of the recruiting experience of private in
dustries, there is a definite shortage of electrical engineers.
Employers were only able to achieve 41 percent of their hir
ing goals for electrical engineers in 1981. (National Science
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Foundation, 1982b, p. 4) Only computer engineering person
nel were in a tighter supply situation. The same publication
reports that the supply of industrial engineers and
mechanical engineers were roughly in balance with demand.
The signals were somewhat confusing for industrial
engineers, however; they could be in current shortage also.
Employers who reported shortages of engineers attributed
the problem to the growth of needs in their industry.
The longer run prospects for engineers can be assessed by
examining the occupational projections of the BLS, using
the OES survey data base. The BLS projected change to 1990
in employment for engineering personnel as a percent of the
1980 employment base is shown in table 4-10. Once again, a
range is provided reflecting the low- and high-growth
scenarios for the national economy. It may be helpful to
keep in mind that the total labor force is expected to grow in
the decade of the 1980s, so it may be more meaningful to
discuss the growth of engineers relative to all occupations.
Table 4-10
Projected Change in Employment
for Engineering Personnel
1980-1990

Occupation
Electrical engineers
Industrial engineers
Mechanical engineers
Computer specialists
All engineers
All occupations

Percent change 1980 -1990
Total manufacturing Total employment
High
Low
High
Low
35
29
34
48
30
15

47
42
49
62
42
24

35
26
29
58
28
17

47
37
41
70
38
25

SOURCE: Based on data from OES survey provided by the Office of Economic Growth
and Employment Projections, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor,
Washington, DC.
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The relative increase projected for all engineers ranges
from 50 to 100 percent greater than that for all occupations
depending on the specific forecast. In relative terms, the
greatest projected increase is for electrical engineers and
computer specialists, although the needs for industrial and
mechanical engineers are well above average as well. The
specialties projected to have the greatest relative increase are
also the largest specialties today in absolute terms. So the
order of magnitude in relative terms is identical to the order
of magnitude in absolute terms for these four fields com
puter specialists, electrical engineers, mechanical engineers,
and industrial engineers. In general, in the longer run, the
need for engineers is projected to grow at a much faster rate
than that for all occupations.
There is also anecdotal evidence which seems to support
an increased need for engineers. More engineers will be re
quired for the coming defense buildup that may not be
reflected in the data today. Moreover, recent federal budget
trends suggest a shift in demand away from teachers and
social workers and toward engineers and scientists. It can
also be anticipated that any acceleration in the rate of capital
investment or plant modernization in U.S. industry will lead
to additional requirements for engineers. If America is going
to be reindustrialized, we will require the assistance of a
great many engineers. So there may be a significant increase
in the demand for engineers in the U.S. in the decade of the
1980s, perhaps even more than currently anticipated.
Viewed in isolation, the need for 4,600 to 9,300 engineers
to support the growth of robotics technology appears in
consequential. The high range of the estimate for total
engineers required for all robotics applications by 1990
represents less than one-fifth of one full year's graduates
utilizing the 1980 data as shown in table 4-9. This hardly ap
pears to be an insurmountable goal, but some concerns arise
when we look at the broader supply-demand conditions for
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engineers within which robotics must compete for personnel.
On the supply side, engineering degrees conferred have been
increasing recently, but the historical precedent of extreme
volatility in engineering enrollment leaves doubt that the re
cent increases will be maintained throughout the decade of
the 1980s. There have also been no increases in degrees con
ferred at the master's and doctorate levels, and colleges
report that they are finding it more difficult to retain
qualified faculty, particularly younger faculty. So, among
the many other supply issues, there are serious questions
about the ability of our colleges to continue to increase
engineering enrollments without possibly compromising the
quality of engineering education.
On the demand side we begin the decade of the '80s with a
short-run deficit of engineers, and longer run projections an
ticipate an increasing demand for engineers relative to all oc
cupations. Thus, any decline in enrollments or further in
creases in demand (which appear likely) would have the
potential of creating a severe shortage of engineers in the
decade of the 1980s. Even if robotics employers attract more
than their fair share of engineering talent, a tight engineering
labor market may impede the growth of robotics technology
in this decade.
Robotics Technicians. The largest major occupational de
mand category identified in table 4-6 is that of robotics
technicians. We expect from 12,300 to 24,600 such jobs will
be created in the U.S. by 1990. As explained earlier, we are
using robotics technician as a generic term to refer to the in
dividuals who have sufficient familiarity with robotics
technology to be capable of testing, programming, install
ing, troubleshooting and maintaining industrial robots. In
addition, we have included robot maintenance and repair in
user industries, although this is somewhat arguable based on
the auto experience discussed below. In a supply sense, we
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expect this emerging occupation will be dominated by
graduates of 2-year community college programs. Again,
this may be less true of the maintenance and repair function
in user industries, especially in the auto industry.
The auto industry's demands for personnel to maintain
and repair their robots must be treated separately, because it
appears that this demand will not be expressed in the external
labor market. Judging by the plans at General Motors, these
positions will be staffed by existing employees. To begin
with, the labor agreement between the UAW and General
Motors assigns responsibility for maintaining production
equipment to the Skilled Trades Council. With the introduc
tion of welding robots at GM, a memorandum of agreement
was signed on March 15, 1972 outlining the specific work
assignments relating to the " Welding Equipment
Maintenance and Repair'' classification. This document also
sets out the training requirements for an apprentice program
for welding equipment maintenance and repair. (Agreement
Between General Motors Corporation and the UAW, pp.
176-185) In brief, the rules have already been negotiated, and
the UAW Skilled Trades Council has jurisdiction over the
jobs.
Secondly, the newly endorsed "Statement on
Technological Progress" contains very specific language ad
dressing the questions of new technology, the bargaining
unit, and retraining policies:
It is recognized that advances in technology may
alter, modify or otherwise change the job respon
sibilities of represented employes at plant locations
and that a change in the means, method or process
of performing a work function including the in
troduction of computers or other new or advanced
technology will not serve to shift the work function
from represented to non-represented employes.
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In view of the Corporation's interest in affording
maximum opportunity for employes (sic) to pro
gress with advancing technology, the Corporation
shall make available short-range, specialized train
ing programs for those employes who have the
qualifications to perform the new or changed work,
where such programs are reasonable and prac
ticable. Therefore, in the event the work performed
by employes covered by the National Agreement is
altered as the result of technological changes so
that additional short-range training may be re
quired, the Corporation is willing to train such
employes where practicable to enable them to per
form such work. (Agreement Between General
Motors Corporation and the UAW, pp. 431-432)
This statement makes it rather clear that employees will be
considered when technical change impacts unfavorably on
their job security.
Thirdly, the new agreement also established a Joint Skill
Development and Training Committee whose responsibilities
(among others) include: (1) seeking ways of arranging for
training, retraining and development assistance for
employees displaced by new technologies, new productive
techniques and shifts in customer product preference; and
(2) developing and providing training to enhance skills for
present and anticipated job responsibilities and to meet new
technology. (Agreement Between General Motors Corpora
tion and the UAW, pp. 277-288)
Furthermore, the charge to this committee is to be backed
up by a dual funding commitment by General Motors. There
is to be 5 cents contributed for every hour worked to the Ex
ecutive Board-Joint Activities. This amount will be used to
fund all joint efforts, including the Joint Skill Development
and Training Committee, the Joint Council for Enhancing
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Job Security and the Competitive Edge, and the National
Committee to Improve the Quality of Worklife. In addition
to these funds, GM has agreed to provide $80 million per
year "for current and expanded training for bargaining unit
employees." (Agreement Between General Motors Corpora
tion and the UAW, p. 425)
Taking all these elements together, it is reasonable to
believe that General Motors will be able to develop the skills
it needs for the future primarily from current bargaining unit
employees. Assuming that other auto manufacturers follow
this lead, it seems sensible to assume that the 3,000 to 5,000
robotics technicians projected for the auto industry in 1990
will represent retrained current employees rather than new
hires. The very extensive existing skilled trades apprentice
programs in the auto industry also add credibility to this
scenario. The General Motors-UAW program appears to
serve both the private and public interests in technological
change in the auto industry. Technical change and job
displacement will be accommodated without compromising
the job security of employees unduly.
It remains an open question whether the pattern being
established in the auto industry to accommodate the in
troduction of new technologies such as robotics will be
followed in other industries. However, this possibility can
not be dismissed out of hand. Several major unions have
recently announced either their intent to bargain over
retraining and job security issues or have already signed con
tracts where these issues played a role. (Ruben, 1982a, pp.
44-45; Ruben, 1982b, p. 44; "A Year of Settling for Less and Breaking Old Molds," pp. 72-74) To be sure, no
agreements to date approach the scope or magnitude of the
retraining commitment contained in the auto industry
agreements, but these issues are becoming more important to
workers.
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We also note that it may be a good human resource
management to upgrade workers wherever possible as
robotics technicians. There is the rather obvious need for a
cohesive and cooperative workforce as new technology is in
troduced. Moreover, as discussed earlier, there will likely be
experienced personnel already in the factory who are trained
in complex machinery repair and who will not be intimidated
by robots. So these experienced workers may be ideal can
didates for retraining to accommodate the introduction of
robots.
It may be helpful to briefly recap our remarks about the
demand for robotics technicians, especially for those readers
unfamiliar with the jargon of labor market analysis. We pro
ject a cumulative total requirement for 12,300 to 24,600
robotics technicians by 1990, but the auto industry will likely
meet its need through what economists generally call the in
ternal labor market, i.e., by retraining current workers to
staff the robot maintenance function. From the perspective
of the young person seeking training in robotics from a
2-year community college without a prior commitment from
an employer (the external labor market), our projections
should thus be reduced at least by the anticipated needs of
the auto industry. That results in a projection for the exter
nal labor market of 9,300 to 19,600 robotics technician jobs.
Even these estimates are a maximum, since other industries
besides autos will also likely employ a retraining strategy to
some extent.
The same interpretation of our projections applies to com
munity colleges offering robotics technician training, except
that some community colleges will probably contract with
specific employers to provide retraining for their current
employees as well as the training they traditionally provide
for the external labor market. It is very early in the game to
make any judgments about supply adequacy for robotics
technicians; the occupation barely exists today. Yet, interest
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appears extremely high among student populations, and
robotics technician curricula are expanding rapidly.
Macomb County Community College in Warren,
Michigan is generally acknowledged as the originator of the
robotics technician curriculum in the United States.
(Schreiber, pp. 78-79) Ms. Schreiber dates the beginnings of
Macomb's program to 1978 when they added a specialty in
robotics to their fluid power technology associate degree
program. Because of all the media emphasis in the last 12
months, Macomb has had to turn away hundreds and hun
dreds of students who wanted to enroll in robotics courses in
the Fall of 1982.
In addition to Macomb, robotics technician curricula are
now offered at three other Michigan community colleges
(Henry Ford, Oakland, and Washtenaw) and there are plan
ning efforts under way in at least eight more (Grand Rapids,
Highland Park, Kellogg, Lansing, Mott, Schoolcraft, St.
Clair, and Wayne). Interest is running so high in robotics
that when Oakland Community College in Michigan opened
a brand new program in the fall of the 1982-83 school year,
they immediately enrolled over 600 students in the introduc
tory course. The next semester another 900 were enrolled.
Washtenaw Community College, like Macomb, also turned
away hundreds of students this year, and interest in
Schoolcraft College's planned technician program appears
high as well.
Michigan does seem to be the clear leader in the area of
robotics technician education presently. Robotics Interna
tional of the Society of Manufacturing Engineers is currently
conducting a nationwide survey of colleges, universities, and
corporations involved in education and training for people
working with industrial robots. Results of the survey will be
published in an education and training directory later this
year. Preliminary reports indicate that there is intense in-
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terest in robotics technician programs in Tennessee and
Texas. There appear to be at least 7 colleges outside the State
of Michigan now offering robotics technician curricula.
Clearly, the Robotics International survey which will be up
dated on a yearly basis will offer much needed information
to students and educators alike.
There are other robotics technician programs besides those
in the community college system. At least two (and probably
more) private-for-profit schools are operating now, and we
have received inquiries from several others that are consider
ing such a program. These schools appeal especially to the
unemployed worker who has some technical background and
wishes to become a robotics technician in a short period of
time, generally one year or slightly less. In fact, these schools
may be appealing to any student where (for whatever the
reason) time compression of the training is a key considera
tion.
There have also been at least two federally assisted
robotics technician training programs aimed at the displaced
worker. The City of Warren, Michigan sponsored a 40-week
program under the Comprehensive Employment and Train
ing Act (CETA) in 1982. Approximately 20 students were
enrolled at a cost of 12,000 per student. ("Robotics Class
Looks Ahead") The other program was conducted by the
Downriver Community Conference, Wyandotte, Michigan,
a federal demonstration project dealing with displaced
workers. The training was done at Macomb Community
College. According to a recent letter announcing the "First
Annual Job Fair" for the Downriver graduates, 24 people
were enrolled in the program with from 5 to 20 years of prior
work experience. The placement results of these pilot pro
grams have been disappointing, but that should not be inter
preted as a sign of failure. The graduates appear to be receiv
ing numerous interviews. We are confident that these
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retrained workers will be hired as soon as the current reces
sion subsides and robot sales resume their healthy growth.
We estimate that two to three hundred students will com
plete robotics technician curricula in 1983. In the current
school year we estimate that there are 2,500 to 3,000 students
enrolled in the introductory robotics course at schools that
offer a 2-year robotics technician degree. Given the com
bination of high student interest in robotics and the apparent
responsiveness (perhaps overresponsiveness) of the educa
tional system to that interest, enrollment may climb
significantly in the next school year, 1983-84. In short, there
appears to be no need to worry about a lack of supply of
robotics technicians.
Some attention should be given, however, to ensure the
quality of supply. A Robotics Clearinghouse project is being
sponsored by the Michigan Department of Education to
assist in the development of curricula in the automated
manufacturing systems/robotics technology area. A consor
tium of Washtenaw Community College, Henry Ford Com
munity College and Macomb Community College are par
ticipating in this effort. They have developed plans for a
survey of robot users to help in determining what the needs
of potential employers might be. This effort offers the
potential to see that the educational product is the right one.
One of the dangers is that students and educators might
overconcentrate on robots. This conclusion may seem sur
prising, but there are several reasons for it. First, robots are
only one type of automated equipment, and it is important
that these technicians be flexible enough to work on other
automated equipment as well. Our interviews revealed rather
strong support for broad-based training in the fundamentals
of electronics, hydraulics, etc., rather than overspecialization in robots. Second, the demand for robotics technicians
will likely be small until the latter 1980s while supply appears
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to be expanding rapidly now, so some technicians may not
find immediate employment in robotics-related fields.
Unfortunately we are not able to adequately assess the
prospects of employing robotics technicians in other closely
related fields. Clearly, that depends on the type and ade
quacy of the specific curricula completed. The BLS occupa
tional projections foresee an above average increase in the
need for engineering and science technicians in the decade of
the 1980s of 24.5 percent to 34.1 percent, and this occupa
tional category is large with over a million members in 1980.
But we simply do not know how many of these jobs someone
trained as a robotics technician might be qualified to do. For
these reasons our advice to students is to avoid overcommit
ment to a narrowly defined robotics technician curriculum.
Likewise, schools should avoid overzealous promises of
employment directly in robotics, at least until the market for
this emerging occupation becomes more clearly delineated.
Overall supply-demand conditions for robotics technicians
are extremely difficult to evaluate now. Robotics itself is just
an infant industry, it is unknown how many of today's
enrollees will actually complete the curricula, and it is
unknown how rapidly additional schools will begin to offer
such programs. With those caveats in mind, we attempt to
draw some conclusions based on the scattered information
available.
In the near term there may be a shortage of technicians. If
a vigorous recovery from the recession ensues, demand could
pick up overnight. Obviously, supply does not respond as
swiftly because of the time required for training. But we
must note that there is at least one student enrolled in the in
troductory robots course in the 1982-83 school year for every
robot that will likely be sold in the U.S. during 1983.
Moreover, given the high interest in robotics training among
student populations and the fact that robotics technician cur-
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ricula are just beginning to proliferate nationwide, the
greatest likelihood in the 1983-84 school year is for new
enrollments to grow more rapidly than robot sales. If these
trends continue very long, we think most observers would
agree that there will likely be a surplus of robotics techni
cians.
For these reasons we strongly urge providers of education
to concentrate on quality rather than quantity. They must
ensure that their product is what employers need. The
breadth of training is also a very important consideration
because of the uncertainties in demand for robotics techni
cians. We generally prefer the educational approach that
adds robotics courses to an electronics technician or other
similar training program rather than a more specialized
robotics technician program. Students, on the other hand,
must understand that the creation of 25,000 robotics techni
cian jobs by 1990 does not mean all of these positions will be
available to new labor market entrants. We do not expect to
see hiring from outside to staff the robot maintenance func
tion in the auto industry, and it is possible that this will be
true for other industries as well.
In the final chapter, the job displacement and job creation
projections will be drawn together to describe the very
significant skill-twist that appears to be associated with the
introduction of robots. Let it suffice at this point to show
that most of the jobs created will require a high quality
technical education. On the other hand, most of the jobs to
be displaced require little formal education. This poor match
appears to be a major labor market implication of robots.

5
Summary and Conclusions
Introduction
The robots are coming; not as rapidly as anticipated by
some nor with the devastating impact predicted by others,
but they are coming. Furthermore, we all have a stake in the
impending change, at least to the extent that robots will be
part of a movement to raise the productivity of American
factories and retain the competitiveness of American goods
in national and international markets. We have argued
throughout this monograph that robots should be regarded
simply as another labor-saving technology, one more step in
a process that has been going on for some 200 years.
This study has focused on the human resource implica
tions of the introduction of industrial robots, but to begin it
was necessary to put the so-called "robotics revolution" into
some perspective. Hard data about industrial robots are
scarce today. Most of the public awareness of robots has
been shaped by the hyperbole in the popular press. Futurists
and others compete for media attention with wild projec
tions of the impacts of robotics 800,000 people making
robots, 1.5 million technicians maintaining robots, and
millions of workers displaced with little or no considera
tion of the practical issues involved. We believe the intense
media attention on robotics in the past year or so may have
seriously confused the issues.
165

166

Summary and Conclusions

First, we submit that the very use of the word
"revolution" is inappropriate when dealing with any
manufacturing process technology. Capital goods for pro
duction have long lives and are not scrapped immediately
when something better comes along. Numerically controlled
machine tools, usually regarded as the capital equipment
most closely related to robots, expanded at a growth rate of
only 12 percent for the most recent 10-year period. After 25
years, only 3 to 4 percent of all metalcutting machine tools
are numerically controlled. Even digital computers, widely
heralded as the most significant technological innovation of
the 1960s and 1970s, expanded at a growth rate of only 25
percent. Yet many are implicitly assuming much higher
growth rates for industrial robots. In terms of actual applica
tion, all process technology changes are evolutionary rather
than revolutionary because of the physical, financial and
human constraints on the rate of change of process
technology.
Second, the fear of massive unemployment caused by the
introduction of industrial machinery appears to be unfound
ed. Such fears began with the dawn of the industrial era in
the 1700s. They are particularly acute during major reces
sions. For example, the "automation" problem was of
urgent national concern in the early 1960s after a halting
recovery from the sharp recession of 1958-59. There were
grim predictions that automation was causing permanent
unemployment in the auto industry and other industries. A
national commission was appointed to study the problem
and in 1966, with the economy near full employment, the
commission rendered its final report. To no one's surprise,
they concluded that a sluggish economy was the major cause
of unemployment rather than automation.
Third, there appears to be a fundamental lack of under
standing that the association of technological change,
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economic growth, and job displacement is not just a coin
cidence; they are intertwined and inseparable. That is not to
imply that adoption of new technologies necessarily insures
economic growth, or that displaced workers will always find
new jobs. However, it does mean that we all have a vital
stake in productivity gains (i.e., in displacing jobs) because
that is what allows the possibility of economic growth. The
price of a growing, dynamic economy that makes more
goods and services available to all of us is job displacement,
or the elimination of jobs through technological change.
The intent of this study has been to provide an informed,
balanced review of the direct impact of robots on the
employment picture in the U.S. and Michigan between now
and 1990. Given the lack of universally accepted data about
robots, and a robot industry that is still in the formative
stage, it was necessary to resort to considerable projection
and estimation. This creates the opportunity to be ex
travagant; we have tried to avoid this. We have selected the
conservative, but realistic alternative wherever there was a
choice. By laying all assumptions before the reader, we hope
to make that point clear.
This method also has the advantage of focusing disagree
ment on the particular assumptions used in the study, thus
providing the opportunity for refinements or improvements.
Our hope is that this study will help restore reason and
balance to the discussion of these issues.

Findings
The projections of occupational impact in this study are
the result of first forecasting the U.S. robot population by
industry and application areas. This approach constrains the
employment impacts to reflect the actual expected sales of
robots. In this way a consistent economic framework is
established within which it is possible to estimate not only
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the population of robots and job displacement but also the
job creation resulting therefrom. This consistency is also
very helpful in avoiding unrealistic or exaggerated conclu
sions.
We expect strong growth in the utilization of industrial
robots in the decade of the 1980s. In chapter 2 we forecast
that the total robot population in the U.S. by 1990 will range
from a minimum of 50,000 to a maximum of 100,000 units.
Given our estimate of the year-end 1982 population of ap
proximately 6,800 to 7,000 units, that implies an average an
nual growth rate of between 30 and 40 percent for the eight
years of the forecast period, or roughly a seven to fourteenfold increase in the total population of robots.
This range is intended to contain the actual robot popula
tion with a high probability level, and allows for variation in
interest rates, capital investment climate, auto industry
recovery, and rate of economic growth. We are confident
this range will contain the 1990 robot population. That
means we do not expect developments such as the total col
lapse of the automobile industry, a major renaissance in the
U.S. capital investment, the early development of a signifi
cant number of nonmanufacturing robot applications, or the
widespread adoption of robotics technology by small firms.
The U.S. population of robots is developed separately for
the auto industry and all other manufacturing. This is partly
to take advantage of the fact that the auto producers have
announced goals for robot installations which could be fac
tored into our robot population forecast. It also reflects the
fact that the major impact of robots in the State of Michigan
will be in the auto industry. Our forecast sees 15,000 to
25,000 robots employed in the U.S. auto industry by 1990.
Utilizing the robot forecast by industry, and the assump
tion of a gross displacement rate of two jobs per robot which
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was strongly supported in our interviews, estimates of gross
job displacement can be derived. We estimate that robots in
the U.S. will eliminate between 100,000 and 200,000 jobs by
1990. From 30,000 to 50,000 of these will be in the auto in
dustry, while 70,000 to 150,000 jobs in other manufacturing
industries will also be eliminated.
In addition to the assignment of robots by industry, it was
necessary to forecast the applications for which they will be
used. This is required if the robot population forecast is to be
useful in predicting occupational displacement. Otherwise
there is no way to connect the robots with the work content
of specific jobs. The application areas used in this study are
welding, assembly, painting, machine loading and
unloading, and other.
When the robot forecast by application area and industry
is matched against an occupational data base similarly
organized, specific occupational displacement rates can be
estimated. In chapter 3 it was shown that while the maximum
overall job displacement rate in manufacturing of 1 percent
through 1990 is not particularly problematical, specific in
dustry and occupation displacement rates are very signifi
cant, even dramatic.
To begin with, the displacement rate derived for the auto
industry ranged from 4 to 6 percent of all employment. But
when displacement was calculated only against the produc
tion workers in the auto industry, the magnitude of displace
ment was from 6 to 11 percent. Even when considered to be
over a period of a decade, these rates of job displacement are
significant.
When specific occupational displacement rates are
calculated, even more striking results emerge. Our results
suggest that between 15 and 20 percent of the welders in the
auto industry will be displaced by robots by 1990. Even more
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dramatically, between 27 and 37 percent of the production
painter jobs in the auto industry will be eliminated by 1990.
While displacement results are generally less significant for
specific occupations in all other manufacturing, it is pro
jected that 7 to 12 percent of the production painter jobs
there will be lost in the same time frame.
The conclusion of the job displacement estimates is that
while job displacement due to robots will not be a general
problem before 1990, there will clearly be particular areas
that will be significantly affected. Chief among these will be
the painting and welding jobs for which today's robots are so
well adapted. Lesser impacts will be apparent on metalworking machine operatives and assemblers. Geographically,
states such as Michigan, especially the southeastern quadrant
with its heavy dependence on autos, will suffer greater
displacement than other states or regions.
We do not believe that this job displacement will lead to
widespread job loss among the currently employed,
however. Even in the auto industry, voluntary turnover rates
historically have been sufficient to handle the reduction in
force that might be required. In addition, the new General
Motors-United Auto Workers contract seems to provide ade
quate job security assurances, and the retraining commit
ment necessary to back them up. Thus we do not expect any
substantial number of auto workers to be thrown out of
work due to the application of robots. Any unemployment
impact is likely to be felt by the unskilled labor market en
trants who will find more and more factory gates closed to
the new employee. Therefore, if there is an increase in
unemployment as a result of the spread of robotics
technology, we fear the burden will fall on the less experi
enced, less well educated part of our labor force.
Turning our attention to the job creation issue, in chapter
4 we forecast the direct creation of about 32,000 to 64,000
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jobs in the U.S. by 1990 in four broad areas: robot manufac
turing, direct suppliers to robot manufacturers, robot
systems engineering, and corporate robot users. The jobs in
corporate robot users identify maintenance requirements for
robots, while the jobs in robot systems engineering identify
the applications engineering requirements for robot systems,
without regard to industry of employment.
In these projections we assumed that the status quo would
be maintained in both the import and export markets for
robots, primarily because of a lack of any better informa
tion. But there is certainly no guarantee that U.S. producers
will maintain their share of the national or worldwide
market. This threat is especially menacing because of
Japanese and European expertise in robotics technology.
The projections of robot-related job creation by occupa
tion are very speculative because of the limited experience to
date with robots and the uncertainties involved in predicting
the future occupational profiles of firms that do not yet ex
ist. However, the high technical component of labor demand
is quite startling. Well over half of the jobs created will re
quire two or more years of college training.
The largest single occupational group of jobs created by
robotics will be robotics technicians. This is a term which is
just coming into general usage; it refers to an individual with
the training or experience to test, program, install,
troubleshoot, or maintain industrial robots. We anticipate
that most of these individuals will be trained in community
college programs of two years duration. We project that jobs
for about 12,000 to 25,000 robotics technicians will be
created in the U.S. by 1990. We do not anticipate a supply
problem for robotics technicians, as the community college
system gives every indication that they will be ready and will
ing to train whatever numbers are needed. In fact, our cur-
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rent concern is that they may, in some instances, be increas
ing the supply too rapidly.
In the auto industry, we expect the robot maintenance re
quirement will continue to be met by the members of the
UAW Skilled Trades Council. General Motors already has
agreed to a retraining effort approximating $120 million an
nually. We believe the strong implication of the contractual
arrangements is that auto industry employers will not be re
quired to hire from the outside to meet their robotics techni
cian needs. Other major robot users may follow the lead of
the auto industry, but it is impossible to predict that with
assurance at this early date.
There also will be a relatively large number of graduate
engineers needed to implement the expansion of robotics
technology in U.S. industry. We estimated the requirement
from about 4,600 to 9,300 new engineers. While these
numbers are comparatively small, only one-fifth of one
year's production of engineers at the baccalaureate level,
there is already a clear shortage of engineers, so we start
from a deficit position. In addition, we face the challenge of
other likely engineering demand increases as well as the
historical instability of engineering enrollments. Thus it is
quite likely that a shortage of engineers could compromise
the expansion of robotics technology.
The most remarkable thing about the job displacement
and job creation impacts of industrial robots is not the fact
that more jobs are eliminated than created; this follows from
the fact that robots are labor-saving technology designed to
raise productivity and lower costs of production. Rather, it is
the skill-twist that emerges so clearly when the jobs
eliminated are compared to the jobs created. The jobs
eliminated are semi-skilled or unskilled, while the jobs
created require significant technical background. We submit
that this is the true meaning of the so-called robotics revolu
tion.
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Implications
This study has focused on the employment and training
implications of the spread of robotics technology by the year
1990. It is probably fair to say that the major determinant of
the overall impact of robotics in the '80s is the fact that
robotics is an infant industry today. There is no way that the
robotics industry can grow to be a giant in less than a decade
(the futurists notwithstanding). It has repeatedly been
demonstrated in this study that even with an extremely rapid
growth rate of 30 to 40 percent annually in the population of
robots in American industry, the robotics industry will still
be small in 1990. The consensus prediction of the size of the
industry in 1990 is $2 billion of sales annually. But General
Motors Corporation alone had sales of nearly $50 billion in
the U.S. in 1981. Chrysler had net sales of nearly $11 billion
in a depressed economy. So an industry with $2 billion sales
will still be very small in 1990.
The growth of the industrial robot population will not be
restricted because of the inability of manufacturers to pro
duce robots fast enough; there is plenty of capacity today
and we are confident it can be expanded rapidly. The limits
on the use of industrial robots will derive from the human,
financial, and physical constraints that retard changes in
manufacturing process technology. We have argued that
process technology is significantly different from product
technology. Robots cannot spread through America's fac
tories the way Rubik's cube spread through America's
homes. We have demonstrated by analogy with other process
technology innovations that such change is evolutionary
rather than revolutionary. To repeat a phrase used earlier,
we believe the very use of the word "revolution" is inap
propriate when dealing with any manufacturing process
technology. Nevertheless, this examination of the human
resource implications of the rapid growth in the robot
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population up to 1990 has revealed some potentially signifi
cant problems.
First, while we are convinced that there will be no general
worker displacement problem, there clearly will be particular
pockets of displacement that may cause labor market
distress. Particular occupations, industries, and locations
will suffer the brunt of the job displacement impact. Ex
amples include industrial welders and production painters,
the auto industry, and Southeast Michigan. In each of these
cases, substantial job displacement will occur in the decade
of the '80s because of the application of robots. While a
review of labor force attrition rates suggests that there will be
very few workers actually thrown out of work even in these
highly impacted areas, there is still some potential for
displaced workers in these situations. We do not pretend our
results are precise enough to make such calls with unfailing
accuracy.
Robotics is obviously not the only change that will be
forthcoming in the rest of the decade. There will be many in
fluences on the levels of employment by occupation and in
dustry. We have only examined the impact of robots, ignor
ing any other effects. This includes possible expansion in
volume of production due to price reductions or quality im
provements. We also ignored potential international trade
implications of robotics technology. In essence we have im
posed our assumptions about the robot population and job
displacement on an existing economic structure, without
allowing for the natural adaptation and feedback effects that
will likely occur.
In addition, we are very sensitive to the fact that we do not
begin from a satisfactory employment situation. We still
languish in the trough of a severe recession; aggregate
unemployment rates are setting post-Depression records.
Discussion of even minimal job elimination in the next few
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years as a result of the application of industrial robots seems
particularly grim in times like these. We need more job crea
tion, not job elimination. Even though it is ludicrous to
believe that the seven thousand robots now operating in
American factories have played a significant causative role in
the unemployment of 11 million Americans, job loss hysteria
has reached a point where there is a need to find scapegoats
for our desperate situation.
Auto workers particularly are caught in a difficult trap. If
it is true that the greater incidence of robots (and the
manufacturing quality they help provide) plays a role in the
success of Japanese automobiles in the American market,
the challenge of robotics must be met. But the introduction
of robots will clearly cause the direct displacement of some
auto worker jobs. It is impossible to guarantee that robots
will help regain some of the market share lost to the Japanese
and therefore result in the restoration of jobs previously
eliminated through competitive pressure. We do not know
whether the Japanese challenge will be met successfully. Nor
do we know how important robots may be in meeting this
challenge. We do believe that the robots are coming to the
auto industry anyway and must be accommodated. Those
opposing technological progress rarely change the course of
history for long.
Nevertheless, we believe it is clear that the rapid spread of
robotics technology through American industry in this
decade will not throw any significant number of American
workers out of their jobs. Therefore we do not feel compell
ed to call for a major policy response to a problem that does
not exist. Robots may add somewhat to our existing displac
ed worker problems during the 1980s, but they will not be a
major contributor. Whatever policy initiatives are designed
for the general displaced worker problem should adequately
address those displaced by robots as well. We do believe that
targeting such efforts occupationally, industrially, and
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geographically should be an important consideration in the
design of any program to address the displaced worker
problem.
The second major conclusion of the study is the skill-twist
that characterizes the jobs displaced and the jobs created by
robotics. Even though it is difficult to predict the exact oc
cupational structure of an infant industry, we think it is clear
that robotics will employ workers who are significantly more
skilled on the average than more traditional industries. As
shown earlier, over half of all the jobs created by robotics
will require a 2-year degree or more. The new jobs will re
quire much more technical background than manufacturing
jobs in the past. The major implication of this observation is
that retraining the workers displaced by robots for the new
jobs created may not be realistic. On the other hand, our
results suggest that the pace of displacement will be suffi
ciently gradual that human resource planning can obviate the
problems.
To use the auto industry as an example again, it would be
difficult to retrain a welder from the line to repair and main
tain the welding robot that will be doing his job in the future.
However, it is not particularly difficult to train skilled plant
maintenance workers to also maintain industrial robots.
Thus the most efficient human resource management
strategy may involve retraining the former welder to operate
a machine which will not be robotized, while the robotics
training is concentrated on those workers who are skilled
already, it is not likely that the very same person replaced by
the robot will be doing the new job or jobs created by the
robots. Of course, the net result of such retraining and
upgrading will be a markedly different skill mix; in other
words, the skill-twist.
We have also expressed our concern about the job outlook
for unskilled youth in the future. We believe it is likely that
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employment in manufacturing will continue to expand much
more slowly than the labor force as a whole. To the extent
that we already have a serious job deficit for unskilled youth,
the growth of robotics will tend to exacerbate the problem.
As displaced unskilled and semi-skilled workers are retrained
and transferred to the remaining blue collar jobs in the fac
tories, the outlook for hiring new unskilled workers declines
correspondingly. Thus, we fear that any unemployment
burden caused by robotics will ultimately fall on the younger
generation.
It may be a fortuitous coincidence of the baby "bust" that
the number of youth entering the labor market will be declin
ing substantially at approximately the same time as the job
displacing impacts of robotics become significant. Never
theless, we urge young people to get a solid science and
mathematics background if they want to be employable in
the manufacturing sector.
The third major thrust of the study is the question of sup
ply of the technical skills required by robotics technology.
We have identified two very different problems, a potential
oversupply of robotics technicians and a probable shortage
of engineers. The rapid spread of robotics technology will
enhance the demand for engineering talent, adding to an ex
isting shortage situation. While robotics alone will not im
pact significantly on the demand for engineers, we believe
there are other reasons for expecting the shortage to grow
more serious during the rest of the decade. Thus we add our
voices to those calling for immediate national attention to
the supply of engineers.
The supply problem of robotics technicians may well turn
out to be that of oversupply. We believe that the growth of
the robotics industry will be very rapid, but it seems clear
that student interest and the ability of the community college
system to increase the supply is growing even more rapidly.
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A continuation of the expansion of the last year or so in
course offerings and enrollments on a national scale will very
quickly swamp the ability of the industry to absorb trained
people. For that reason, we endorse careful attention to the
breadth of training. A firm grounding in theory and general
principles of electronics, controls, hydraulics, etc. will stand
the graduates of such programs in good stead whether they
actually work primarily with robots or not.
In addition, we became convinced during the course of the
study that there is an unmet need for manufacturing
technology generalists, both at the graduate engineer and
technician levels. A number of experts familiar both with
manufacturing technology and the capabilities of todays
engineering graduates complained about the overspecialization of training provided. Rebuilding American in
dustrial strength will require individuals trained to be
familiar with manufacturing technology in a broad sense. It
is asserted that both Japan and Germany have programs for
training such people. This may be one of the keys to in
creases in manufacturing productivity in these economies.
The last major issue to be addressed is "What comes after
1990?" Clearly the implication of our assumption of ex
ponential growth in the robot population is that the job
displacement effects are growing exponentially as well. The
examination of job displacement in the single year 1990 in
chapter 3 illustrated this effectively. If robots could
eliminate one job opening of eight projected for production
workers in manufacturing in 1990, when does it reach one in
two, or one in one?
While it is a simple matter to extend the calculations and
generate an answer to this question, we think it is an exercise
that should be done with extreme caution. Using the assump
tions of this study, we could forecast a robot population of
250,000 to 500,000 for the U.S. by the end of 1995. We also
think it would be irresponsible to do so at this early date. The
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data base does not exist and we do not believe the potential
policy responses to such implied levels of displacement re
quire lead times of more than three or four years. Thus the
wisest course would be to monitor robotics developments for
the next few years, keeping our vision fixed on a target six to
eight years ahead. This strategy provides sufficient decisionmaking time while simultaneously maximizing the quality of
information available at the decision point.
Nonetheless, we think it is possible to anticipate some
general trends that lie ahead for the manufacturing
workforce. The evolution of manufacturing process
technology will undoubtedly continue. Productivity enhanc
ing investment in robots and other new technology will go
ahead. Rising productivity in manufacturing will cause a
continued decline in the proportion of American workers
employed in the manufacturing sector, even if the challenge
of foreign imports is met. We believe that the skill-twist
demonstrated in this study can probably be generalized to
other manufacturing technology developments. Thus we
believe it is possible to predict a continued decline in manual,
semi-skilled jobs while the new jobs created will be increas
ingly technical and scientific.
It should also be reiterated that some of the substitution of
machines for human labor can and will be regarded as a
blessing. There are a great many dirty and dangerous jobs
that robots or other machines could do effectively, thereby
preventing human exposure to these situations. Provided
meaningful alternative work can be found for the occupants
of those jobs, there is no need to feel remorse at the loss. We
should not be so blinded by our short term economic prob
lems that we forget the connection between productivity, job
displacement, and economic progress.
Finally, there is no reason to believe that the addition of
robots to our factories is anything other than an evolu-
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denary change. Industrial robots are simply one more piece
of automated industrial equipment, part of the long history
of automation of production. Robots will displace workers
in the same way that technological change has always
displaced workers. There is a possibility that this job
displacement will be a significant problem, particularly in a
given occupation or industry or geographical area. There is
also the certainty that robots will create new jobs. Most of
these will be quite different from the kinds of jobs
eliminated. Robotics may challenge our ability to manage
our most valuable resource, but there is no reason for the job
displacement or the skill-twist impacts to create tragic conse
quences. It is not time to panic; it is time to begin rational
planning for the human resource implications of robotics.
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a fully structured econometric model of the State of Florida. Conclu
sions are that the econometric model performs slightly better, but not
enough to justify the additional cost and effort in maintaining the
model.
Fisk, John D. Industrial Robots in the United States: Issues and Per
spectives. Report No. 81-78 E, United States Congressional Research
Service, March 1981.
Discusses industrial robots, their present and future use in American
industry and the range of possible effects this technology may have on
industry and the workforce. Examines "adjustment mechanisms" for
the potentially displaced workforce.
Flaim, Paul O. and Howard N. Fullerton, Jr. "Labor Force Projections
to 1990: Three Possible Paths," Monthly Labor Review, December
1978, pp. 25-35.
Summarizes the BLS projections of the labor force in 1985 and 1990.
The three different growth scenarios differ primarily in their assump
tions about the rates of change in participation rates for women and
black men. All projections foresee a reduction in youth in both ab
solute and relative terms.
Freeman, Richard B. The Over-Educated American. Academic Press,
Inc., New York, 1976.
Analyzes the market for college graduates in the mid-1970s, the first
time in many years that new college graduates were having difficulty
in obtaining college-level jobs. Among other things, Freeman
documents the historical volatility in engineering enrollments and sug
gests that it is likely to continue.
Gerstenfeld, Arthur and Robert Brainard, eds. Technological Innova
tion: Government/Industry Cooperation. John Wiley and Sons, New
York, 1979.
A collection of papers by authors from nine countries which were
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presented to an international conference. The basic research question
was: Can industry and government cooperate to guide and stimulate
technological innovation?
Gevarter, William B. An Overview of Artificial Intelligence and Ro
botics, Volume II, Robotics. U.S. Department of Commerce, Na
tional Bureau of Standards, Washington, DC, March 1982.
Describes and classifies different industrial robots and their functions.
Discusses the present as well as the likely future direction of robotics.
Gold, Bela. Productivity, Technology, and Capital. D.C. Heath and
Company, Lexington, MA, 1979.
Presents analyses of productivity and technological change at the firm
and industry level based upon the author's more than 25 years of
research experience. Key conclusions include (1) the need for a more
comprehensive framework to analyze productivity changes, (2) the
heterogeneous nature of industries cannot be ignored, and (3) actual
productivity gains tend to be at wide variance with expectations.
. Improving Managerial Evaluations of Computer-Aided
Manufacturing. National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 198la.
Part of a project to develop a model for managerial evaluation of
CAD/CAM systems. that will be effective in assessing the distinct
capabilities and requirements of these systems. The model is designed
to more efficiently estimate the benefits of CAD/CAM as opposed to
the standardized budgeting procedures typically used for evaluating
the acquisition of new equipment.
. "Robotics, Programmable Automation and Increasing
Competitiveness," in Exploratory Workshop on the Social Impacts of
Robotics: Summary and Issues. Congress of the United States, Office
of Technology Assessment, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, DC, 1981b, pp. 91-117.
Concludes that the actual economic impact of major technological
changes have usually been less than expected due to an overconcentration on the change itself which neglects the total production
framework and its many interactions. Robotics should be evaluated as
part of a system of programmable automation for manufacturing.
The failure to adopt new technologies has already decreased the inter
national cost competitiveness and production efficiency of U.S. in
dustry, thus causing unemployment.
Gold, Bela, Gerhard Rosegger and Myles G. Boylan, Jr. Evaluating
Technological Innovations. D.C. Heath and Company, Toronto,
Canada, 1980.
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The authors attempt to establish an improved analytical foundation
for firms to evaluate new technologies. The empirical data is taken
from the iron and steel industry. One of the authors' many conclu
sions is that successful technological innovation by one firm in an in
dustry is not evidence that other firms in the same industry should or
will promptly adopt the same innovation.
Goldstein, Harvey. Occupational Employment Projections for Labor
Market Areas: An Analysis of Alternative Approaches. U.S. Depart
ment of Labor, R&D Monograph 80, U.S. Government Printing Of
fice, Washington, DC, 1981.
This monograph describes the general features of the OES approach
to occupational employment projections and examines the potential
of econometric models and input-output models for improving pro
jections. Local occupational forecasting requires improved local labor
market data and analysis.
Gordus, Jeanne P., Paul Jarley and Louis A. Ferman. Plant Closings
and Economic Dislocation. The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employ
ment Research, Kalamazoo, MI, 1981.
Presents an overview of 20 plant closing studies published in the last
two decades. Emphasizes what we know about plant closings and
what research remains to be done.
Grabbe, Eugene M. and Donald L. Pyke. "An Evaluation of the Fore
casting of Information Processing Technology and Applications,"
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Vol. 4, 1972, pp.
143-150.
The Delphi method of forecasting is described and evaluated by com
paring events forecasted with actual dates of occurrence. Although the
data provided is inconclusive, the indication is that information pro
cessing technology and application are advancing more rapidly than
expected.
"Growth Industries of the Future," Newsweek, October 12, 1982, p. 82.
Discusses the different forecasts of the future job markets. Robotics
will be one of the major growth areas.
Haber, William, Louis A. Ferman and James R. Hudson. The Impact of
Technological Change. The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research, Kalamazoo, MI, 1963.
One of the early reviews of the empirical research on the impact of
technological change. It specifically assesses the evidence of job
displacement by reviewing 17 studies conducted between 1929 and
1961.
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Hekman, J. S. "The Future of High Technology Industry in New
England: A Case Study of Computers," New England Economic
Review, January/February 1980, pp. 5-17.
Discusses the computer industry, including main manufacturing
centers and branches of these centers. Suggests that the smaller
branches are more mobile and will be indicators of growth and mobili
ty in terms of geographical location. The South Atlantic, Southwest
and Pacific regions tend to be most attractive for computer branch
locations, while New England is a strong location for new firms with
new products.
. "Can New England Hold onto Its High Technology Indus
try?" New England Economic Review, March/April 1980, pp. 35-44.
The author examines the medical instrument industry and concludes
that New England will retain its attraction for these firms.
Hollomon, Herbert J. Technical Change and American Enterprise.
Report No. 9, National Planning Association, Washington, DC,
1974.
Discusses the process of technological change and makes recommen
dations for private and public policies. Factors considered include
utilization of existing knowledge toward new technology, increased
support of applied sciences and engineering, the need for collective
R&D, business and the government's role in protecting the consumer,
and policy changes necessary to insure that the negative impacts of
technological change are not absorbed only by the individual workers
and firms involved.
Hunt, H. Allan and Timothy L. Hunt. Robotics: Human Resource
Implications for Michigan. The W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employ
ment Research, Kalamazoo, MI, 1982a.
Final report to the Michigan Occupational Information Coordinating
Committee (MOICC) regarding the impacts of robotics on the State of
Michigan.
. Robotics: Human Resource Implications for Michigan, A
Summary. Michigan Occupation Information Coordinating Commit
tee, 1982b.
Summarizes the findings of the full state report.
Industrial Technology Institute. The Program for the Industrial Tech
nology Institute. Preliminary draft proposal, Industrial Technology
Institute, Ann Arbor, MI, August 1982. Mimeographed.
Outlines the goals and objectives of the Industrial Technology In
stitute as well as the role it will play in research and development.

193
Institute of Science and Technology, University of Michigan. Automatic
Factory Opportunities in Michigan: I. Robotics. January 1982.
Analyzes the robotics industry and its potential in the State of
Michigan from an economic development perspective. Topics include
robotics research and training programs in Michigan, short descrip
tions of robotics manufacturers in Michigan, the Michigan business
environment, and business services provided by the Office of
Economic Development (OED), Michigan Department of Commerce.
Jablonowski, Joseph. "Robots: Looking Over the Specifications,"
American Machinist, Special Report 745, May 1982, pp. 163-178.
Discusses the specifications, capabilities, and costs of industrial
robots displayed at Robotics VI Conference (March 1982) by firm and
model name.
Kendrick, John W. "The Coming Rebound in Productivity,"
Fortune, June 28, 1982, pp. 25-28.
Explains that productivity is partially based on the level of business
activity. Productivity will improve over the next several years due to
several forces including the Economic Recovery Act of 1981, increas
ed awareness and confrontation of productivity problems, expanded
investment in plants and equipment and foreign competition.
Krause, Jeffrey M. "Robotics Impact on Human Resources." Un
published thesis presented to General Motors Institute. Detroit, MI,
April 1982.
Given the goal at GM for increased use of advanced technology
systems, especially robots, the author assesses the implications of
robotics on human resources emphasizing that successful integration
of robots at GM can lead to efficiency and productivity that will
benefit GM, the workers and the community.
Leon, Carol Boyd. "Occupational Winners and Losers: Who They Were
During 1972-80," Monthly Labor Review, June 1982, pp. 18-28.
Reports changes in employment between 1972 and 1980 based on the
Current Population Survey. Includes the occupations that experienced
significant growth or decline.
Leontief, Wassily W. "The Distribution of Work and Income,"
Scientific American, September 1982, pp. 188-204.
Discusses the likely impact of new technologies on employment and
income in the American economy by the year 2000. Suggests work
sharing and other measures to insure an equitable distribution of in
come.
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Levitan, Sar A. and Clifford M. Johnson. Second Thoughts on Work.
The W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Kalamazoo,
MI, 1982.
Among other things, this monograph includes a section on the likely
effects of robots on the workforce and workplace. Concludes that
there are limits to the rate of technological change and also questions
several popular perceptions about economic growth and technological
change.

"Little Corporate Zest for Leading a Recovery," Business Week,
December 13, 1982, p. 14.
Based on a survey conducted by Louis Harris and Associates, the ma
jority of executives report that tactics to improve business activity in a
flat economy include, among other things, increased output without
significantly adding to the workforce, increased output without addi
tional capital financing, and expanding inventories based only on de
mand and output.
Lund, Robert T., Christopher J. Barnett and Richard M. Kutta.
Numerically Controlled Machine Tools and Group Technology: A
Study of U.S. Experience. Center for Policy Alternatives, MIT, Cam
bridge, MA, January 1978.
This study examines the experience of N/C machine tools as the
forerunner of new computer-based manufacturing and the effects of
this technology on the discrete product manufacturing industry. The
question this study seeks to answer is "whether new manufacturing
technologies could bring the economics of batch manufacturing suffi
ciently close to those of large-scale production to make smaller-scale
manufacturing more attractive."
Luria, Daniel. "Technology, Employment and the Factory of the
Future." Presented to the SME Autofact III Conference, Detroit,
November 9, 1981.
This study suggests that the U.S. auto industry must automate,
rebuild and retool or lose even more markets to the Japanese.
However, the U.S. must plan for these changes. Luria suggests reduc
ing the length of the workweek, increasing international communica
tion and support among unions, requiring advance notification of
plant closures, reevaluating traditional management-union relation
ships, retraining of displaced workers and increasing job security for
workers.
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Lustgarten, Eli S. "Robotics and Its Relationship to the Automated
Factory," in Exploratory Workshop on the Social Impacts of
Robotics: Summary and Issues. Office of Technology Assessment,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, February 1982,
pp. 119-36.
Lustgarten, an investment analyst for Paine Webber Mitchell Hutchins, Inc., projects a $2.0 billion U.S. market for the robotics in
dustry by 1990. The adoption of robots will be spurred in part by the
aging of U.S. plant and equipment and the expected mid-1980s drop
in the entry level workforce.
Macut, John J. "New Technology in Metal working," Occupational
Outlook Quarterly, February 1965, pp. 1-6.
Discusses the use of N/C machine tools compared to the conventional
machine tools in terms of productivity, efficiency and quality control
and the effects of this technology on the workforce.
Malecki, Edward. "Product Cycles, Innovation Cycles, and Regional
Economic Change," Technological Forecasting and Social Change,
May 1981, pp. 309-323.
This review paper examines the implications of technological change
for regional economic development and policy from the perspective of
product cycles and innovation cycles. The review is fairly comprehen
sive and includes a lengthy listing of references.
. "Public and Private Sector Interrelationships, Technological
Change, and Regional Development," Papers of The Regional
Science Association, Volume 47, 1981, pp. 121-137.
Reviews the available evidence of the influence of public and private
sector research and development spending on regional economic
development. The study concludes that private research and develop
ment tends to lead rather than follow government and research activi
ty.
Mansfield, Edwin. Industrial Research and Technological Innovation:
An Econometric Analysis. W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., New
York, 1968.
This book brings together some of the results of Mansfield's quan
titative studies of technological change and innovation.
Mansfield, Edwin, et al. The Production and Application of New
Industrial Technology. W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., New York,
1977.
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Mansfield compares private and social rates of return for new
technological innovations and concludes that in many cases the social
returns are much higher than the private returns.
Mansfield, Edwin, et al. Research and Innovation in the Modern Cor
poration. W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., New York, 197la.
One of the pioneering efforts by Mansfield and his students. It is im
possible to adequately summarize this work, but one of the major in
sights is that it took a decade or more for a majority of the firms to
adopt a specific new process technology.
Mansfield, Edwin. Technological Change. W.W. Norton and Company,
Inc., New York, 1971b.
Surveys the literature of technological change. This book provides a
concise introduction to Mansfield's voluminous work as well as
others. The review is relatively nontechnical and written specifically
for a general audience. There is also a balanced presentation of the
relevant policy issues.
Martin, Gail M. "Industrial Robots Join the Workforce," Occupational
Outlook Quarterly, Fall 1982a, pp. 2-11.
Describes the types and uses of robots currently and addresses con
cerns over present and future trends in the robotics industry, par
ticularly those related to the effects this industry will have on the
workforce and society.
. "Manufacturing Engineering," Occupational Outlook Quar
terly, Fall 1982b, pp. 22-26.
Describes the changing role of the manufacturing engineer due to the
introduction of robotics and CAD/CAM and new concerns such as
energy costs, competition of foreign manufacturers and lagging pro
ductivity.
Meisner, Charlotte. High Technology Employment: Massachusetts and
Selected States 1975-1981. Massachusetts Division of Employment
Security, Job Market Research, 1982.
High technology industries are characterized by a high ratio of
research and development to sales, high value-added products, high
ratio of scientists and engineers, and high growth rates. This
somewhat broad definition is operationalized by selecting 20 in
dustries at the 3-digit level from the SIC system. The study then
presents comparative data for the states and industries selected.
Michigan Employment Security Commission, Occupational Employ
ment Statistics Unit. Michigan Occupational Employment Statistics
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for Manufacturing Industries. Michigan Employment Security Com
mission, Detroit, April 198la.
Reports results of the Occupational Employment Survey (OES) for
Michigan manufacturing industries in 1977 at the 2-digit SIC code
level of industrial detail.
Michigan Employment Security Commission, Bureau of Research and
Statistics. Motor Vehicle and Related Industries in Michigan.
Michigan Employment Security Commission, Detroit, Summer
1981b.
The results of a survey of all manufacturing industries directly involv
ed in supplying parts, materials and special tool and dies for the
automobile industry are discussed revealing that 55 percent of
Michigan's manufacturing sector is employed in the automobile or
automobile-related industries.
. Occupational Supply and Demand in Michigan. Michigan
Employment Security Commission, Detroit, Winter 1982.
This pioneering effort funded by the Michigan Occupational Informa
tion Coordinating Committee is a first attempt to bring together the
information available about the demand and supply for various oc
cupations in the State of Michigan. It includes analyses of 60 occupa
tional clusters primarily accessed through the vocational education
system.
Milliken, William G. A Plan to Increase the High Technology Com
ponent of Michigan's Economy. September 198 la.
Outlines goals and objectives to increase the high technology compo
nent of Michigan's economy describing the accomplishments of the
High Technology Task Force and recommendations for future ac
tivities.
. Special Message to the Michigan Legislature on Economic
Development. September 17, 1981b.
Presents Governor Milliken's plan for the future economic develop
ment of the State of Michigan.
"Motor Vehicles, Model Year 1982," Survey of Current Business,
October 1982, pp. 20-23.
Describes 1982 as the worst year since 1961 for the motor vehicle in
dustry. The economic and financial conditions of the major auto
manufacturers continued to deteriorate.
Nabseth, Lars and George F. Ray, eds. The Diffusion of New Indus
trial Processes. Cambridge University Press, London, 1974.
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An international study of technological diffusion that spans six years
and six research institutes. The processes analyzed included
numerically controlled machine tools. Even though numerical control
appeared appropriate for smaller firms which produce small batch
jobs, it was not adopted to any significant degree because of the large
initial financial cost.
National Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life. New
Technologies and Training in Metalworking. Washington, DC, 1978.
Analyzes the development of numerical control and other
technologies in metal working.
National Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life.
Productivity and Job Security: Retraining to Adapt to Technological
Change. Washington, DC, 1977.
Presents five case studies on worker retraining to determine the advan
tages and disadvantages of each and their effectiveness in protecting
job security. Policy implications are discussed regarding
management's role in incorporating new technology to achieve higher
productivity and maintain competitiveness while insuring the job
security of its workers through retraining.
National Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic
Progress. Technology and the American Economy. Volume 1.
Prepared for the U.S. Congress, 1966.
This national commission assesses the impacts of technological change
and policy challenges resulting from it. While the Commission found
that fears of widespread unemployment due to automation were not
well founded, they did find reason to be concerned about adjustments
to technological change and its impact on particular groups and sec
tors of the economy. Contains a set of recommendations for a com
prehensive program addressing the needs of those workers displaced
by technological change.
National Science Foundation. Science and Engineering Degrees:
1950-80. National Science Foundation, Special Report NSF-32-307,
Washington, DC, 1982a.
A statistical data source that provides detailed estimates of science and
engineering degree production.
. "Labor Markets for New Science and Engineering graduates
in Private Industry," Science Resource Studies Highlights, NSF
82-310, Washington, DC, June 9, 1982b, pp. 1-5.
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Presents data on labor market conditions for science and engineering
graduates based on a survey of 255 firms in 1981.
—————. "Engineering Colleges Report 10% of Faculty Positions
Vacant in Fall of 1980," Science Resource Studies Highlights, Na
tional Science Foundation, NSF 81-322, Washington, DC, November
1981a, pp. 1-4.
Reports on the results of a survey of 181 engineering colleges.
—————. "Science and Engineering Faculty with Recent Doctorates
Fell to One-fifth of Total in 1980," Science Resource Studies
Highlights, National Science Foundation, NSF 81-318, Washington
DC, October 1981b, pp. 1-4.
Reports the findings of a 1980 survey supported by the National
Science Foundation.
—————. National Patterns of Science and Technology Resources 1981.
U.S. Government Printing Office, NSF 81-311, Washington, DC,
April 1981c.
A statistical compilation of U.S. research and development resources.
Includes an evaluation of labor market conditions for science and
engineering personnel.
—————. Science and Engineering Employment: 1970-80. National
Science Foundation, Special Report NSF 81-310, Washington, DC,
March 1981.
Charts growth in science and engineering employment levels over the
decade of the 70s. Includes data on distribution of scientists and
engineers by sector and specialty. Also reports indices for research and
development employment and total funding 1970 to 1980.
—————. Problems of Small High-Technology Firms. National Science
Foundation, Special Report NSF 81-305, Washington, DC, December
1981.
Results of a survey of 1232 high-tech firms with less than 500
employees. Major problems are identified in the financial, personnel
and government relations areas. No policy implications are offered.
Nelson, Richard R., Merton J. Peck and Edward D. Kalacheck.
Technology, Economic Growth and Public Policy. The Brookings In
stitution, Washington, DC, 1967.
This work draws together most of the previous research on
technological progress. Topics include the way in which the economy
adjusts to technological change and possible public policy concerns.
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The authors propose a framework for delineating the roles of private,
public and governmental financing of R&D.
Obrzut, John A. "Robotics Extends A Helping Hand," Iron Age,
March 19, 1982, pp. 59-83.
Suggests that the robot industry finds itself popularized in the media
but relatively short on orders in 1982.
Porter & Novelli Associates. Targeted Industry Marketing Program:
Advanced Manufacturing Systems Report. Mimeographed. Michigan
State Department of Commerce, 1981.
Assesses the level of interest as well as the locational factors that at
tract business to Michigan by interviewing firms in and out of state.

Prab Robots, Inc. Annual Report, 1981. Kalamazoo, Michigan.
Presents complete operating results for this firm for the fiscal year
ending October 31, 1981.
Putnam, George P. "Why More NC Isn't Being Used," Machine and
Tool Blue Book, September, 1978, pp. 98-107.
Reports results of a survey of small machine tool firms who were con
sidered candidates for use of numerical control. Found that 72 percent
of the firms had not formally evaluated the applicability of numerical
control for their firms.
Rees, John. "Technological Change and Regional Shifts in American
Manufacturing," Professional Geographer, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1979, pp.
45-54.
Discusses the changes taking place in the American economic system
and the effects that these changes are having on the industrial
geography of the United States.
Riche, W. Richard. "Impact of Technological Change." Mimeo
graphed. Prepared for the U.S. Department of Labor for presentation
at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's
Second Special Session on Information Technologies, Productivity,
and Employment in Paris, France, October 1981.
Suggests that American business, workers, and consumers have
shared the benefits of technological change and will likely continue to
do so in the future. Adoption of new technologies has not resulted in
layoffs of workers because the private sector has retrained and
reassigned displaced workers or accomplished employment reductions
through normal attrition. A short section about robotics notes that
widespread adoption likely awaits the development of satisfactory
sensing devices.
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"Robotics Class Looks Ahead," The Detroit News, March 10, 1982.
Reports on the Warren, Michigan robotics technician training pro
gram conducted under the Comprehensive Employment and Training
Act (CETA).
Robot Institute of America. RIA Worldwide Survey and Directory on
Industrial Robots. Robot Institute of America, Dearborn, MI, 1981.
Reports the results of a survey on the use of robots in 18 countries.
The survey answers questions regarding the various applications of
robots, current population, financial information and future trends of
robotics. Includes a directory of the leading manufacturers,
distributors, component suppliers and research and government
organizations involved in the field.
"A Robotics Mecca in Michigan? Car Sales Must Rebound First,"
Detroit Free Press, October 11, 1982.
Reports that lagging auto sales have delayed some robot purchases by
the auto firms and suggests that the future of the robot industry in
Michigan depends in part on a recovery in auto sales. Reports also
that many of the new entrants in the robot market have had little or no
sales in 1982.
Rosenthal, Neal H. "Shortages of Machinists: An Evaluation of the
Information," Monthly Labor Review, July 1982, pp. 31-36.
Presents an interesting discussion of what can be gleaned from various
data sources about the current situation and future outlook for
machinists. The data are consistent with a shortage, but sufficient in
formation is not available to quantify that shortage.
Ruben, George. "Developments in Industrial Relations," Monthly
Labor Review, September 1982a, pp. 44-45.
Discusses the job security focus of the new collective bargaining agree
ment at General Electric Company.
—————. "Developments in Industrial Relations," Monthly Labor
Review, October 1982b, p. 44.
Discusses the new collective bargaining agreement for Westinghouse
Electric Corporation.
Rumberger, Russell W. "The Changing Skill Requirements of Jobs in
the U.S. Economy," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 34,
No. 4, July 1981, pp. 578-590.
This study measures the shifts in job skill requirements in the U.S.
economy from 1960 to 1976. Both changes in the distribution of
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employment among occupations and changes in the skill requirements
of individual occupations are addressed.
Russo, G. Paul. "Robotics at Chrysler," in Robotics and the Factory of
the Future, presented at the University of Michigan Management
Briefing Seminars, Traverse City, MI, August 2, 1982.
Chrysler is using 240 robots today, most in welding applications. By
the end of 1988 Chrysler expects to have 987 robots installed in their
plants, a growth rate of approximately 30 percent.
Russell, Jack. "Michigan's Ailing Economy: Is Robotics the Cure?"
Mimeographed.
The potential for the emerging robotics industry in the State of
Michigan is discussed. He concludes that robotics has little employ
ment potential for the state. Russell goes on to provide an alternative
possibility for economic growth—that of energy hardware—which he
feels would better utilize the already existing metalworking industry
and provide 100,000 industrial jobs.
Sahal, Devendra. Patterns of Technological Innovation. AddisonWesley Publishing Company, Inc., Reading, MA, 1981.
Sahal proposes (and supports with numerous case studies) an evolu
tionary concept of technological innovation which is more eclectic
than traditional economic approaches. In his own words,
". . .technological innovation is too significant a process to be left to
economists and engineers. What is needed is an independent science of
technology. My attempt in this book has been to provide the essentials
of this emerging science." Needless to say, the book is novel, complex
and rather comprehensive.
Schreiber, Rita R. "Meeting the Demand for Robotics Technicians," in
Robotics Today, Summer 1981, reprinted in Robotics Today '82 An
nual Edition, Society of Manufacturing Engineers, Dearborn, MI,
1982, pp. 78-79.
Describes the development of the first robotics technician curricula in
the U.S.: Macomb Community College, Warren, MI in 1978.
Smith, Donald N. and Richard C. Wilson. Industrial Robots: A Delphi
Forecast of Markets and Technology. Society of Manufacturing
Engineers, Dearborn, MI, 1982.
Reports results of a Delphi survey on many technical, marketing and
sociological aspects of the development of industrial robots. Over 200
questions were asked in round one, while rounds two and three
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repeated some questions of round one as well as adding supplemental
questions suggested by the panel of experts.
Smith, Donald N., Peter G. Heytler and Murray D. Wikol.
"Sociological Effects of the Introduction of Robots in U.S. Manufac
turing Industry." Industrial Development Division, Institute of
Science and Technology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.
Paper presented at the CAMPRO '82 Conference on Computer Aided
Manufacturing and Productivity, October 1982.
Discusses the implications of robotics in terms of current and future
developments. According to the authors, the market capacity for the
industry is expected to "burgeon" into a multi-billion dollar industry
by 1990. The potential displacement resulting from the growth of the
industry is expected to be offset by retraining.
Sternlieb, George and James W. Hughes, eds. Post-Industrial America:
Metropolitan Decline and Inter-Regional Job Shifts. Center for Ur
ban Policy Research, Rutgers—The State University of New Jersey,
New Brunswick, NJ, 1975.
A collection of papers on the plight and future of America's cities.
Tanner, William R., ed. Industrial Robots Volume 2/Applications.
Robotics International of SME, Society of Manufacturing Engineers,
Dearborn, MI, 1981.
A collection of journal articles, technical papers and proceedings
outlining the most recent technological advancements in robotics. The
materials in this volume cover the use of robotics in the areas of
Material Handling, Machine Loading, Die Casting, Press Loading,
Forging and Heat Treating, Foundries, Plastics Molding, Welding,
Assembly and other areas as well. The cost-effectiveness and produc
tivity implications are discussed in each chapter.
Tanner, William R. and William F. Adolfson. Robotics Use in Motor
Vehicle Manufacture. Report to the U.S. Department of Transporta
tion, February 1982.
Discusses the expanding utilization of robots in the automobile in
dustry predicting that by 1990 the robot population could be 35,000 or
more. Robot use will expand because of their effectiveness in improv
ing productivity and product quality.
Terleckyj, Nestor E. and Martin K. Holdrich. Sectoral Growth in Out
put, Productivity and Employment, 1981-2000. National Planning
Association, Report No. 81-N-2, Washington, DC, March 1982.
Projects growth in output and employment for broad sectors of the
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U.S. economy. Forecasts that employment in manufacturing is ex
pected to decline by 3.5 million in the 1980s and 1990s and continued
growth is expected in employment in trades, finance and service sec
tors.
United Auto Workers. Technology: Promises and Problems. A Policy
Statement, October 1981.
Discusses new technology and the UAW's policies regarding worker
protection and job security. It also assesses the role of public policy in
the same context.
U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office. Dislocated Workers:
Issues and Federal Options. U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, DC, July 1982.
Discusses the underlying causes and impacts of worker dislocation and
analyzes the possibilities for federal aid to these workers.
—————. Location of High Technology Firms and Regional Economic
Development. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC,
1982.
A staff study prepared for the Subcommittee on Monetary and Fiscal
Policy. Emphasizes the importance of high technology industry for
economic growth in the U.S. The results are based on a survey of 691
high technology firms in an attempt to gain more knowledge regarding
the locational decision making factors of high technology firms. Fac
tors identified in the study include availability of skilled labor, labor
costs, state and local taxes and proximity of educational institutions.
Relative growth of high technology industries will be fastest in the
Midwest.
—————. U.S. Economic Growth from 1976 to 1986: Prospects,
Problems and Patterns, Vol. 9, Technological Change. U.S. Govern
ment Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1977.
Indicates that a stagnant or slow growing economy with high levels of
unemployment is not the appropriate environment in which in
novative activity will flourish. The study cautions policymakers not to
place excessive expectations on technological change as a solution for
economic woes.
U.S. Congress. "Robotics: Economic and Social Implications." Con
gressional Clearinghouse on the Future, 1981.
Key individuals such as Mr. Stanley Polcyn, V.P., Unimation, Dr.
Angel Jordan, Dean, Carnegie Institute of Technology, Richard
Beecher, General Motors Corporation, William Spurgeon, National
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Science Foundation and Thomas Weekley from UAW, discuss
robotics including its present and future implications for society and
the economy.
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. Exploratory
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